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The Superpath method, a non-computerized probabilistic scheduling 
methodology relying upon first principles of the Program Evaluation Review 
Technique (PERT) and a summary level, event-centric network is presented.  Like 
PERT, a network scheduling methodology developed by the United States Navy 
during the development of the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile program 
of the 1950s, Superpath employs probabilistic techniques within a network-based 
time management platform allowing for the assessment of program or project 
performance against calendar dates certain.  The proposed methodology relies upon 
the identification of easily identifiable, distinguishable, unambiguous and 
measureable events along with either short term probabilistic or deterministic time 
  
estimates for the single summary paths, or Superpaths, that lie between.  A 
fundamental tenet of the Superpath approach is that the topology of several key 
events or reference points in time, vice hundreds or thousands of activities, forms a 
valid basis from which to perform a schedule analysis.  Once this simplified network 
is constructed, conventional deterministic calculations are performed to determine the 
slack along each Superpath affording the capability of evaluating the probability of 
the project’s on-time completion.  Superpath also accommodates the nearness of non-
critical superpaths, a limitation of PERT and modern-day CPM. 
Superpath differs from the Critical Path Method (CPM), perhaps the most 
common network scheduling methodology as of 2008 and widely employed within 
the projects and programs of public and private industry.  CPM is a network based 
methodology that relies upon a relatively large number of work activities and multiple 
types of network relationships as the basic network.  CPM is task focused whereas 
Superpath focuses on discrete events and considers the interstitial space between 
events in far less detail.  Complex relationships, sequential activities, “logic lags,” 
constraints, calendars and the daily unit of measure are also aspects of CPM not 
found in Superpath.  Generally, probabilistic analysis of time is not part of a CPM 
methodology, which relies upon a deterministic treatment of time using a single 














A NON-COMPUTERIZED PROBABILISTIC SCHEDULING METHODOLOGY  
USING FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE U. S. NAVY’S  













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 












Professor Greg Baecher, Chair 
Professor Miroslaw Skibniewski 
Professor Robert Friedel 
Professor Kenneth O’Connell 
Professor Gerald Galloway 






















© Copyright by 




























For Jean McCullough Smith and Eddyth Carter Smith 
 









I would like to thank the chairman of my dissertation examining committee, 
Professor Greg Baecher for not only agreeing to guide me through the dissertation 
process, but encouraging me to question both the subject matter and the fundamental 
tenets of project management.  His insights, guidance and patience along the 
circuitous that my research took are still difficult for me to fathom and without which 
I would be in a very different place.  I am forever grateful.  I would also like to thank 
the members of my committee for their support and accommodation of my research 
within their busy schedules.  Professors Gerry Galloway and Ed Link for their 
insights into the collaborative process in highly complex, large scale engineering 
efforts now seemingly lost in today’s scheduling profession and Professors Miroslaw 
Skibniewski and Kenneth O’Connell for perspectives in technology and CPM 
scheduling.  I would also like to thank Professor Robert Friedel of the University of 
Maryland’s History Department for not only agreeing to serve on my committee as 
Dean’s Representative but providing me with invaluable ideas and research leads that 
proved pivotal in weaving the numerous parts of my work into a single fabric and 
stimulating ideas for further research. 
I would also like to thank Al Santos and Elyse Beaulieu of the Department of 
Civil and Environmental Engineering for their guidance and the University of 
Maryland’s Zupnik Scholarship for support during my graduate studies. 
I would like to thank a very large number of people with whom I was able to 
work while serving in the U. S. Navy’s Civil Engineer Corps, many more than I can 





Cowan, Rear Admiral Thomas Dames, Captain Guy Mehula, Captain Ron Hertwig, 
Captain Mark Libonate were all my mentors, whether they knew it or not, and deeply 
influenced my thoughts and development which made its way into this research.  
Gary Horne, Vann Marshburn were also tremendous influences on my career and to 
this day, when the questions get difficult, I still ask myself what they would do. 
My five years in Hill International’s Construction Claims Group in 
Washington, DC were also a tremendous influence on my work.  I want to express 
my deepest thanks to Hill’s Founder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Irv 
Richter for both supporting my graduate education and fostering an environment at 
Hill where all the tools and minds were available to tackle what seemed to be the 
most challenging problems imaginable.  For Hill’s Claims Group President Roy 
Mitchell whose personal interest in my development and guidance both during and 
after my time at Hill has proven invaluable in every regard.  For Mark Anderson for 
“taking a chance on an unknown kid” and never hesitating to pick me up, dust me off 
and keep in the game as I experienced what seemed to be the darkest sides of 
industry.  For Richard Lamb whose belief in my potential exceeded anything I could 
ever imagine and his ability to foresee events well before they occurred made a 
tremendous impression on my work.  In addition to these men, I would also like to 
thank several expert witnesses who allowed me to work with them at close quarters, 
particularly Gordon H. Smith, Marvin Weinstein, Tony Delhomme and Bob Dieterle.  
I would also like to thank my family and friends who are still there for me 
despite my silence and neglect.  My parents Jean and Christine Smith and sister 





Alec Amarlikit, Dan Feinblum, Supat Sirirat and Be Pompruk.  Margaret and Bob 
Pursell and Mike and Lauren Ruehring for always being there when I called, Diana 
Temple for providing me with guidance on referencing and formatting and Nelly Bain 
for assisting with document assembly.  I want to thank Navy Commander Marko 
Medved, my much smarter Annapolis roommate who remains in the service of his 
country. 
Finally I want to thank my wife Elizabeth and daughter Katie for their love, 










Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................. xiii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ xiv 
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................. 1 
The Last Gantt Chart ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.1  Chapter Overview ......................................................................................... 1 
1.2  Henry Lawrence Gantt .................................................................................. 1 
1.3     The Hanford Works ...................................................................................... 7 
1.4  History, Science and Human Motivation .................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................... 22 
The Establishment of the U. S. Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile Program ....................... 22 
2.1  Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 22 
2.2  The Role of Scientists and Private Industry during the Cold War .............. 22 
2.3  The Balancing Effect of Mutually Assured Destruction ............................. 27 
2.4  The Fleet Ballistic Missile Program ........................................................... 30 
2.5  The Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile .................................... 34 
2.6  The Success of the U. S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program .............. 38 
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................... 40 
The Performance Evaluation Research Task .............................................................. 40 
3.1  The Performance Evaluation Research Task .............................................. 40 
3.2  The Declassification and Publication of the PERT Methodology .............. 44 
3.3  Fundamental Concepts of PERT ................................................................. 45 
3.3.1  “The Flow Plan” ..................................................................................... 48 
3.3.2  “Elapsed Time Estimates” ...................................................................... 50 
3.3.3  “Organization of Data” ........................................................................... 57 
3.3.4  “The Analysis” ........................................................................................ 59 
3.3.5  “Computation of “Expected Times” for Events” .................................... 61 
3.3.6  “Computation of the ‘Latest Time’ for Events” ..................................... 62 
3.3.7  “Computation of ‘Slack’ in the System” ................................................ 62 
3.3.8  “Identifying the Network’s Critical Path” .............................................. 64 
3.3.9  “Probability of Meeting an Existent Schedule” ...................................... 66 
3.4  Chapter Summary ....................................................................................... 68 
CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................... 69 
A Paternity Dispute Over Network Scheduling .......................................................... 69 
4.1  Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 69 
4.2  The Development of Computer Technology .............................................. 70 
4.3  The Work of Sperry-Rand on Behalf of the U. S. Department of Defense 75 
4.4  The Declassification of the Performance Evaluation Review Technique .. 78 
4.5  Other Efforts Towards a Network Based Scheduling Method ................... 78 





4.7  The Kelley-Walker “Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling” .................... 83 
4.7.1  “1. Project Structure” .............................................................................. 84 
4.7.2  “2. Calendar Limits on Activities”.......................................................... 86 
4.8  The Perpetuation of Legacy ........................................................................ 87 
4.9  Chapter Summary ....................................................................................... 91 
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................... 95 
The Development of Network Scheduling Methods, 1959-2008 ............................... 95 
5.1  Chapter Overview ....................................................................................... 95 
5.2  PERT’s De-Classification, Celebration, Rise and Demise ......................... 97 
5.3  The Osmosis of PERT and Kelley-Walker CPM ....................................... 98 
5.4  The Precedence Diagramming Method ...................................................... 98 
5.5  The Influence of Information Technology on Network Scheduling ......... 106 
5.6  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................... 110 
CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................. 112 
The Earned Value Management System ................................................................... 112 
6.1  Chapter Overview ..................................................................................... 112 
6.2  The ANSI/EIA-748-A Earned Value Management System (EVMS) ...... 113 
6.3  The History of Earned Value Management, 1967 to 2008 ....................... 117 
6.4  U. S. Government Requirements for EVMS ............................................ 119 
6.5  The Limitations of EVMS Management ................................................... 121 
6.5.1  Non-Prescriptive Requirements for EVMS .......................................... 121 
6.5.2  Detachable Value .................................................................................. 122 
6.5.3  Substitute Value .................................................................................... 124 
6.5.4  The Costing Lag .................................................................................... 129 
6.5.5  Critical Path Value ................................................................................ 131 
6.5.6  The Duration of the Analytical Period .................................................. 134 
6.5.7  Banana Curves ...................................................................................... 138 
6.6  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................... 140 
CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................. 142 
The Rationale for An Event-Centric Network for Time Management ..................... 142 
7.1  The Loss of Basic PERT Principles in Modern Construction Scheduling 142 
7.2  Debates on the Mathematics of PERT ...................................................... 153 
7.2.1  Use of the Beta Distribution to Model the Opinions of Competent 
Engineers............................................................................................... 155 
7.2.3  Use of the Normal Distribution to Calculate TE ................................... 159 
7.2.4  Addressing The Proximity and Variability of Non-Critical Paths ........ 164 
7.3  The Adverse Effect of Negative Float ...................................................... 165 
7.4  Projects, Programs, Humans and the CPM Schedule ............................... 170 
7.5  History as Rationale for a “New” Approach to Time Management ......... 182 
7.7  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................... 186 
CHAPTER 8 ............................................................................................................. 187 
The Superpath Methodology ..................................................................................... 187 
8.1  The Concept and Appearance of Superpath .............................................. 187 
8.2  The Rationale for Superpath ..................................................................... 192 
8.3  The Superpath Methodology (Deterministic Solution) ............................. 193 





8.3.2  Elapsed-Time Estimates ........................................................................ 194 
8.3.3  Organization of Data ............................................................................. 194 
8.3.4  The Analysis ......................................................................................... 194 
8.3.5  Computation of ‘Expected Time’ for Events ........................................ 195 
8.3.6  Computation of ‘Latest Time’ for Events ............................................. 195 
8.3.7  Computation of ‘Slack’ in the System .................................................. 195 
8.3.8  Identify the ‘Critical Path’ in the Network ........................................... 195 
8.3.9  The Display of Information .................................................................. 196 
8.4  The Superpath Methodology (Probabilistic Solution) .............................. 197 
8.4.1  The Elicitation of Time Estimates for Each Super-Arrow .................... 199 
8.4.2   Evaluating Delays to the Overall Project or Program .......................... 203 
8.5  Superpath’s Relationship to the Critical Path Method .............................. 206 
8.6  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................... 214 
CHAPTER 9 ............................................................................................................. 216 
Case Study ................................................................................................................ 216 
9.1  Chapter Overview ..................................................................................... 216 
9.2  Pre-Construction History .......................................................................... 217 
9.3  Six Companies’ Mobilization to the Site of Hoover Dam ........................ 221 
9.4  Overview of the Superpath Review on the Hoover Dam Project ............. 222 
9.5  Deterministic Superpath Review for the Hoover Dam Project ................. 225 
9.5.1  Selection of Superpath Events .............................................................. 226 
9.5.2  Expression of Relationships and Criticality of Superpath Events ........ 234 
9.5.3  Identification of Early and Late Event Positions .................................. 239 
9.6  Probabilistic Superpath Review for the Hoover Dam Project .................. 241 
9.7  Chapter Summary ..................................................................................... 253 
CHAPTER 10 ........................................................................................................... 255 
Discussion ................................................................................................................. 255 
10.1  Chapter Overview ..................................................................................... 255 
10.2  Contributions............................................................................................. 255 
10.2.1  Contribution #1: On The Role of Conflict and Games in Project 
Management ...................................................................................... 256 
10.2.2  Contribution #2: The Importance of Project Management Histories 256 
10.2.3  Contribution #3: The Problematic Theory of CPM’s Parallel 
Development ..................................................................................... 257 
10.2.4  Contribution #4:  Describing the Loss of the Activity-Event 
Juxtaposition ..................................................................................... 257 
10.2.5  Contribution #5:  The Rationale for an Event-Centric Network ....... 258 
10.2.6  Contribution #6:  Expressions on the Limitations of Earned Value . 258 
10.2.7  Contribution #7:  The Summarized Event Centric Network ............ 259 
10.2.8  Contribution #8:  The Non-Computerized Solution to Probabilistic 
Scheduling......................................................................................... 259 
10.3  Close ......................................................................................................... 260 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................... 261 
Correspondences of Albert Einstein and President F. D. Roosevelt ......................... 261 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................... 264 





Appendix C ............................................................................................................... 265 
Actual Production Milestones for George Washington Class Submarine ................ 265 
Appendix D ............................................................................................................... 266 
Tables for the Normal Probability Distribution ........................................................ 266 
Appendix E ............................................................................................................... 269 
Draft Letter from J. W. Mauchly to Remington Rand Executive ............................. 269 
Appendix F................................................................................................................ 270 








List of Tables 
 
 
Table 7-1 Comparison of Results of Three Solution Types   163 
 
Table 7-2 Comparison of Results of Three Solution Types (Weekly Units) 163 
 
Table 9-1 Superpath Events Related to the Diversion Tunnels   231 
 
Table 9-2 Superpath Events Related to Cofferdams    232 
 
Table 9-3 Superpath Events Related to the Colorado River, Dam  
and Reservoir        232 
 
Table 9-4 Superpath Events for Intake Tunnels and Towers   233 
 
Table 9-5 Superpath Events for Spillways, Powerhouse and Needle Works 234 
 
Table 9-6 Assignment of Chips Under the “No Complications” Scenario   245 
Table 9-7 Probability of Occurrence for Three Scenarios   247 
Table 9-8 Assignment of Chips for Three Scenarios    249 






List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1-1 “First Gantt Chart Plotted for Artillery Ammunition”  2 
Figure 1-2  “BONUS RECORD OF GIRLS WORKING IN A  FOLDING 
ROOM”         3 
Figure 1-3   “First Gantt Chart to be Published”                                        6 
Figure 1-4   DuPont Executive’s 1942 Schedule for Hanford Works               9 
Figure 1-5   DuPont Gantt Chart For Area 105-B, Hanford Works                 10 
Figure 1-6   Post Attack Conditions at Hiroshima, Japan, August 1945           12 
Figure 1-7   Vanderbilt Hall, Grand Central Terminal, New York City            15 
Figure 1-8   FDR’s Sketch of Future Naval Hospital on Display at Bethesda  17 
Figure 1-9   President Roosevelt Lays Cornerstone at Bethesda in 1940        18 
Figure 2-1   J. Robert Oppenheimer and MGEN Leslie R. Groves, USA     23 
Figure 2-2   “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” Bombs of the Manhattan Project 23 
Figure 2-3   The Hiroshima Bomb of August 6, 1945 and “Enola Gay” B-29 24 
Figure 2-4   Soviet Scientists Andrei Sakharov and Igor Kurchatov            26 
Figure 2-5   Photographs of Soviet Atomic Weapons Testing       26 
Figure 2-6   The Mariner Freighter U. S. S. Compass Island                              31 
Figure 2-7   “Comparison of Missiles of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program” 32 
Figure 2-8   Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Special Projects Office        35 
Figure 2-9   “A Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine”                37 
Figure 2-10   U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598)                             37 
Figure 2-11   Photograph of the first launch of Polaris, July 20, 1960              38 





Figure 3-2 PERT System Flow Plan                                                                     48 
Figure 3-3 Illustration of elapsed time estimate (te) for Single Activity               50 
Figure 3-4 The Three “Elapsed-Time” Estimates for Individual PERT Activity 51 
Figure 3-5 “Estimating the elapsed-time distribution                                           52 
Figure 3-6 Symmetric and Asymmetric Beta Distributions                                  53 
Figure 3-7 Expected Time                                                                           54 
Figure 3-8 First Appearance of the Term “Critical Path”                           56 
Figure 3-9 PERT “Diagram Showing Sequenced Events”                              58 
Figure 3-10 PERT’s “List of Sequenced Events”                                             59 
Figure 3-11 Illustration of Three Paths Within a Simplified Network            60 
Figure 3-12 “Outputs from Analysis”                                                                62 
Figure 3-13 “Determination of slack by calculating TL”                                 63 
Figure 3-14 “Critical Path in System Flow Plan”                                             64 
Figure 3-15 “Event Identification File” from the Polaris PERT Schedule        66 
Figure 3-16 “Estimate of Probability of Meeting Scheduled Date, TOS”         68 
Figure 4-1 The UNIVAC Computer System                                                 74 
Figure 4-2 Advertisement for UNIVAC Computer                                         75 
Figure 4-3 Major Contractors Within the U. S. Navy’s Polaris Program        78 
Figure 4-4 Photograph of Mauchly with “SkedFlo, Model MCX-30,”            82 
Figure 4-5 “Fig. 1 – Typical project diagram”                            85 
Figure 4-6 “Fig. 1. System flow plan.”        86 
Figure 4-7 “Fig. 5. List of Sequenced Events”       88 





Figure 5-1 The PERT Flow Plan of the Polaris Program (1958 – 1965)   96  
Figure 5-2 CPM Arrow Diagramming Method (1959 – Early 1980s)    96 
Figure 5-3 Precedence Diagram Method  (1961 – Present)     97 
Figure 5-4 “Diagramming Methods – Arrow Diagramming”     100 
Figure 5-5 “Diagramming Methods – Precedence Diagramming”    101 
Figure 5-6 “Initial Rough Network Diagram”       102 
Figure 5-7  Fulkerson’s AON and AOA Network Models     103 
Figure 5-8 “PERT System in Operation”        106 
Figure 5-9  “PERT data-processing flow chart”       107 
Figure 5-10 An 80-Column IBM computer punch card from the early 1970s   108 
Figure 5-11 A Typical IBM Mainframe Computer Setup in 1972    109 
Figure 6-1 Earned Value System Parameters       116 
Figure 6-2 The Detachable Value Concept       123 
Figure 6-3 As Planned Schedule as of “t0” versus Performance as of “t4”   127 
Figure 6-4 The Age of Information for Earned Value vs. Actual Costs   130 
Figure 6-5 Earned Schedule         132 
Figure 6-6 Granular Differences in the Comparison-To-Baseline Approach   136 
Figure 6-7 Earned Value to Date vs. Baseline PV and Most Recent PV   137 
Figure 6-8 “Banana Curves” – Dual Profiles for Planned Value   138 
Figure 6-9 Extrapolating for the Estimate at Completion     139 
Figure 7-1 Diagramming Methodologies of PERT and CPM     142 
Figure 7-2 “PDM” & “Gantt” Views Using Primavera Suretrak    143 





Figure 7-4 The “Simple” Relationships Found Within PERT     152 
Figure 7-5 Expected Time         157 
Figure 7-6 “Estimate of Probability of Meeting Scheduled Date, TOS”    160 
Figure 7-7 A Simple Network Based Upon James E. Kelley’s Table    162 
Figure 7-8 Project Status as of Project Start, 06 MAR 08     167 
Figure 7-9 Project Status as of 24 MAR 08 without Finish Constraint    168 
Figure 7-10 Project Status as of 24 MAR 08 with Finish Constraint    168 
Figure 7-11 Utility Profile Set Forth By Daniel Bernoulli     173 
Figure 7-12 Project Cost Curves for Owner And Contractor     178 
Figure 7-13 A Utility Model of Project and Program Managers     179 
Figure 8-1 A Superpath Network of 16 Events and Super-Arrows    187 
Figure 8-2 The Transition to Superpath’s “Stargaze” or “Night” View   190 
Figure 8-3 The “Night View” of “Early” and “Late” Events     191 
Figure 8-4 The “Day View” of “Early” and “Late” Events     192 
Figure 8-5 The “Night View” of “Early” and “Late” Events     196 
Figure 8-6   Early Gaze (top to bottom)        196 
Figure 8-7   Late Gaze (top to bottom)        197 
Figure 8-8 “Range Gaze” Showing Early and Late Extremes     197 
Figure 8-9 Simple Network Based Upon Kelley’s Tabular Approach    198 
Figure 8-10 Conceptual Illustration of a simplified PERT Network    199 
Figure 8-11 Assignment of Chip Distribution for a Single Super-Arrow   201 
Figure 8-12 Probabilistic Superpath        203 





Figure 8-14   Small CPM Schedule Network     207 
 
Figure 8-15 Superpath Events Overlaying a Small CPM Schedule  208 
 
Figure 8-16 View of Early Event Dates Before Criticality is Considered  210 
 
Figure 8-17 View of Early Event Dates With Super Arrows Assigned  212 
 
Figure 8-18 View of Early and Late Event Dates With Super Arrows  213 
 
Figure 8-19 View of Early and Late Event Dates With Super Arrows  213 
 
Figure 8-20 Project Status as of 24 MAR 08 with Finish Constraint  214 
Figure 9-1 Photograph of Hoover Dam, Power House and Tunnel Outlets   216 
Figure 9-2 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Plan View of Hoover Dam    219 
Figure 9-3 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Section of Hoover Dam    221 
Figure 9-4 Section View of Hoover Dam       228 
Figure 9-5 Plan and Elevation of Hoover Dam       228 
Figure 9-6 Hoover Dam Superpath Network as of November 12, 1932   236 
Figure 9-7 Hoover Dam Superpath Network as of November 12, 1932   240 
Figure 9-8 Critical Path For Probabilistic Superpath Analysis   242 
Figure 9-9 Near Term Probabilistic Evaluation as of November 12, 1932 243 
Figure 9-10 “Crowe’s” Assignment of Odds to Three Scenarios   247 
Figure 9-11   “Crowe’s” Expression of Odds Using the Roulette Felt Format 250 
Figure 9-12 Cumulative Probability Curve for the Short Term Period  251 
 








The Last Gantt Chart 
 
1.1    Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes time management methodologies employed by U.S. 
industry at the turn of the last century and by the U.S. military during World Wars I 
and II which involved the works of Henry Lawrence Gantt, a Maryland native who 
worked extensively in private industry as a management consultant studying 
production and scheduling and later on behalf of the War Department.  During 1917, 
while working in Washington, DC on behalf of the U.S. Army Ordnance Bureau, he 
devised a new charting technique for planning and production of artillery ammunition 
for the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphia.  Gantt’s depiction, which would become 
known as the “Gantt Chart,” was employed at Hoover Dam in the early 1930s and 
within the Manhattan Project of World War II, arguably two of the most challenging 
projects of the twentieth century.  The U. S. S. R., struggling to recover from World 
War I used the new Gantt chart approach to plan its economic recovery during the 
1920s.  Why is it that in 2008 our society places little value on these works of Henry 
Lawrence Gantt?  This chapter, and portions of this research, will address this 
question. 
Figure 1-8 Henry Lawrence Gantt 
 
“ ‘Joe, come along with me.  I have the whole world by the tail.  I have got the 
best mechanism yet devised for controlling production and purchase programs.’   
 
“In this enthusiastic way Gantt told Professor Joseph W. Roe of the application of 




on F Street in Washington.  After this outburst Gantt took Roe into one of the 
office buildings which had been commandeered by the Ordnance Bureau, and in a 
room on the upper floor exhibited a chart which was being worked upon by a 
young lieutenant.  He realized even then the value and power of his new 
management mechanism, and with an intensity of manner and speech, which was 
a part of him, said:  
 
‘We have all been wrong in scheduling on a basis of quantities.  The essential 
element in the situation is time, and this should be the basis in laying out any 







 Figure 1-1 “First Gantt Chart Plotted for Artillery Ammunition”  
(Alford 1934) 
 
During the course of his professional career, Henry Lawrence Gantt made many 
charts and analyses as a consulting engineer to both private industry and the U.S. 
Government.  A native of Maryland, Gantt would attend Johns Hopkins University 




mills of the steel industry, starting at Midvale Steel and working at other plants as a 
consulting engineer through the late 1800s. His later work consisted primarily of 
management consulting and included collaborations with Frederick W. Taylor. 
(Alford 1934)  The content of Gantt’s 1910 publication Work, Wages and Profits is 
consistent with Gantt’s 1917 outburst ‘we have been…scheduling on a basis of 
quantities.’  This earlier approach is evident in the many charts, analyses and 
commentary contained within this work that were the results of the analyses of textile 
settings (e.g. weaving, winding bobbins, winding yarn, inspecting cloth, folding, 
winding armatures and sewing sheets and pillowcases).   
 
 
Figure 1-2  “BONUS RECORD OF GIRLS WORKING IN A               
                                  FOLDING ROOM”                                             
(Gantt 1974) 
 
Prior to 1917, Gantt’s works, Frederick W. Taylor’s Scientific Management 




express performance measurement methodologies in a producer vs. product-to-date 
format.  (Taylor 1911), (Gilbreth 1911)  Perhaps most important within the 
methodologies of these men according to Taylor, and a point lost in the heated 
debates of the time where many viewed “Taylorism” as simply a management method 
designed to maximize production and corporate profits at the expense of the worker, 
were expressed within the opening pages of his principal publication. 
 
“It would seem to be so self-evident that maximum prosperity for the 
employer, coupled with maximum prosperity for the employ(ee), ought to be 
the two leading objects of management, that even to state this fact should be 
unnecessary…(t)he majority of these men believe that the fundamental 
interest of employ(ee)s and employers are necessarily antagonistic.  Scientific 
management, on the contrary, has for its very foundation the firm conviction 
that the true interest of the two are one and the same; that prosperity for the 
employer cannot exist through a long term of years unless it is accompanied 
by prosperity for the employ(ee), and vice versa; and that it is possible to give 
the workman what he most wants – high wages – and the employer what he 
wants – a low labor cost – for his manufactures.” 
(Taylor 1911) 
 
But perhaps the common thread within Scientific Management and the work of 
these three men is the careful observation and study of the minutiae of managerial 
approach, worker methods and motions.  An illustration of this perspective is 
provided within the many figures within these works depicting flow plans of people 
and product through manufacturing plants and the breakdown of worker motions 
from movement, to movement, to movement - - almost like the sequential frames of a 
motion picture, a fairly recent invention at the time.   
Perhaps due an over reliance on the Critical Path Method by the project 
management community in 2008, today the “Gantt Chart” is generally little more than 




management device because it does not convey the interrelationships between 
individual bars.  Industry publications define the Gantt Chart this way. 
 
“Gantt Chart.  See Bar Chart.” 
(PMI 2004) 
 
“The Bar Chart, also called a Gantt chart, is graphically the most simple of the 
scheduling methods.  It is understood by most project people and can be 
produced quicker than any of the other scheduling methods…can provide a 
quick, visual overview of a project, but they tend to neglect the management 
detail necessary to make complicated coordination decisions.” 
(Gould 1997)  
 
But as his 1917 work for the U.S. Army demonstrated, Gantt’s work deliberately 
presented a larger amount of information.  Alford presents the following explanation 
of the information found in the first “Gantt Chart” to be published.  This appears in 
Figure 1-3. 
“The long line in each case carried forward to October indicates the accumulated 
needs as expressed in orders.  The vertical figure at the end of each month gives 
the total requirements up to that date.  The amount written horizontally in each 
monthly space is the amount to be supplied during that month.  As plotted, the 
monthly divisions are equal in length.  The amount indicated by this legend, 
however varies according to the monthly needs.  So the plotting is to a uniform 
scale as regards the element of time, and to a variable scale, month by month, as 
regards amount.  Once the principle upon which the chart is constructed is 
comprehended, it is read at a glace and shows exactly the condition of the 










Figure 1-3 “First Gantt Chart to be Published” 
(Alford 1934) 
 
The time-based Gantt charts would be adopted by industry in the United States as 
well as internationally.  “The claim is made that when the Soviet “Five-Year Plan” of 
industrial development was organized, it was completely plotted on Gantt charts.”  
(Alford 1934) 
Was there more to Gantt’s charts than modern industry recognizes?  True, while 
there is no open expression of relationships between Gantt’s bars, when viewed from 
a different perspective these charts might be recognized as far more powerful tools.  
In Gantt’s practice, much of which was within manufacturing or “shop” settings, 
familiarity with the process was perhaps the most essential element of his work.  If 
Gantt was intimately familiar with the subject matter process before he created and 
utilized his chart for analytical purposes, was it possible that the “missing” 
interactivity relationships were even necessary?  And if, as his works suggest, Gantt 




thousands of activities – relying instead on less than two dozen in most cases – does 
the intimate knowledge of a process and a lesser number of activities provide that 
such expressions are not even necessary?  Stated another way, did these “simple bar 
charts” actually contain relationships within the larger analysis of which they were a 
part but these were just not expressed on paper?  Perhaps where intimate knowledge 
exists about a process, hundreds or thousands of activities are not necessary and a 
“simple” bar chart approach can be implemented successfully. 
Figure 1-8 The Hanford Works 
 
How was it that the Manhattan Project, an ultra top secret program to research, 
develop and produce an atomic device and delivery system during World War II, was 
able to accomplish its objectives within a relatively short period of time?1  And if we 
are to acknowledge that today’s CPM networks have resulted in tremendous 
efficiencies in many applications, how much more impressive was the Hanford 
accomplishment?  Or, is it important to reserve judgment with respect to the 
superiority of today’s CPM scheduling while examining the Manhattan Project’s 
methods of time management to see what they offer?  Original project documents of 
the Emile Irenee Du Pont des Amours Corporation (Du Pont), the prime contractor 
for the Manhattan Project, suggest an effective summary level scheduling system 
based upon Henry Lawrence Gantt’s Time Chart was employed during the 
construction of one the principal project sites at Hanford in eastern Washington state.  
(E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 1945)  (Greenewalt 1942) 
                                                 
1 Du Pont reports the actual start of the Hanford Works project as March 22, 1943 and the actual finish 
as March 31, 1945.  E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, I. (1945). "Construction, Hanford 





The Hanford Works was established to produce plutonium for one of two atomic 
weapons being produced under the program.  The other bomb would be uranium 
based and its production would occur at the Clinton Works near Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee.  The development and testing of delivery systems and bomb casings 
would occur at Los Alamos, New Mexico.  (Groves 1962)  The Trinity Site at 
Alamogordo, New Mexico would be where the bombs would be tested and the first 
test explosion occurred “at 5:30 A.M., Mountain War Time, July 16, 1945.” (Gelb et 
al. 1988)  Two bombs, one of each type, would be dropped on the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th using bomber aircraft leading to the 
unconditional surrender of Japan and the end of World War II.   
Ignoring the scientific and technical accomplishments of the program, to the 
extent that is possible, the relatively short time window for design and construction of 
the Hanford facility, and its on time completion while major aspects of the technical 
requirements were as yet unknown or in development is an important consideration.  
Perhaps also significant is that the project was managed using a series of bar charts, 
with different amounts of information and layout in each.  The notes of DuPont 
executive C. H. Greenwalt provide a summary level bar chart, which lays out the 
major tasks of the Hanford project under Figure 1-4.  It is perhaps significant to note 









Figure 1-4 DuPont Executive’s 1942 Schedule for Hanford Works 
(Greenewalt 1942) 
More detailed schedules were prepared for the project by field personnel.  A copy of a 
schedule for Area 105-B, the site of one of the project’s reactors, is provided under 







 Figure 1-5 DuPont Gantt Chart For Area 105-B, Hanford Works 
(E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 1945) 
The chart appears to be consistent with the factually intensive work of Henry Gantt, 
but also provides a very clear picture of the progress of individual work elements.  
The upper half of each horizontal black bar represents the planned duration and 
performance period of a task and the lower half of each black bar represents the 
actual start and finish dates.  By comparing the position of upper and lower black bar 
halves, one is able to discern if the work was performed early, on time, or late.  For 




the revised planned completion date and is not shaded (i.e. the white portion of the 
bar).    Clearly, the Hanford project was rapidly executed with a successful result and 
although it is not clear to what extent that the project’s scope might have changed 
during the course of the project, the early cost estimates for this work appear to have 
fallen within the contemporaneous definition of “accurate.”   
A comparison of Mr. Greenwalt’s handwritten initial cost estimate of March 
8, 1943 and the cost of work report contained with the contractor’s document “Du 
Pont Project 9536 History of the Project” show that the early cost estimate was 
exceeded by less than 6%.  (Greenewalt 1942), (E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Company 1945)  The DuPont Corporation deliberately performed its work on the 
Manhattan project “at cost” with no profit for reasons that could only be described as 
“complex utilitarian issues” related to the firm’s history and the overall risk and 
future public perception of the Manhattan Project endeavor.2  (Kinnane 2002)  
DuPont had been openly accused of being “merchants of death” during the early 
twentieth century as much of their efforts involved the production of explosives used 
during World War I.  In response, DuPont diversified its products and services 
beyond explosives and by the beginning of the Second World War was quite reticent 
at becoming involved in such a military endeavor as the Manhattan Project.  (Groves 
1962), (Kinnane 2002)  The decision to earn no profit on this work was surely in 
response to these concerns as was its absence as a primary contractor in the defense 
industry since the World War II.  Notwithstanding these points, at Hanford, the 
                                                 
2 Final cost estimates for DuPont’s work at Hanford totaled $308,885,798, some 5.46% higher than 





efficacy of a Gantt type chart was demonstrated on perhaps one of the largest and 
technically complex projects of the 20th century. 
 
1.4 History, Science and Human Motivation 
 
The constructs of this research, which are presented in the follow-on chapters, are 
based upon three basic thoughts: (1) that mankind is prone to either ignore or be 
unaware of relevant historical matter within a particular pursuit, and where this 
existing matter might be the source of, or be synthesized into, new advancements, a 
benefit might result; (2) that mankind’s pursuit and advancement of the sciences has 
not been without peril to society, and the harnessing of current information 
technology for self-serving interests is possible within modern project management 
systems such as the critical path method (CPM) and earned value management 
systems (EVMS); and (3) that the motivations and behavior of individuals or 
organizations are indeed far more complex than those expressed within one 
dimensional models of project and program management.   
 
 







A relaxed attitude of specific project and program management communities are 
illustrated by four examples encountered by the student during the course of, or 
before, this research: 
 
1. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Administration, the public entity 
that oversaw the construction of the subway system in greater Washington, 
DC in the 1970s and 1980s, was approached by the student in 2007 about 
possible sources of schedule data from their original tunneling and train 
station projects. WMATA indicated that their construction records, at least the 
ones that had been retained to date, were in the process of being removed 
from their offices to be possibly destroyed due to a mandated shift of 
construction responsibilities to multiple local governments in and around the 
District of Columbia.  
 
2. Some of the project records of New York City’s original Pennsylvania 
Station, at its time a landmark construction project in Mid-Town Manhattan at 
the turn of the last century, appear to be in existence, but are filed within the 
recesses of an office building in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  (O'Conner 2008)  
For the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the builders of this station, this 




and James O. Morris “voiced concerns” over the possible destruction or loss 
of historical project records that resulted in the Federal Railroad 
Administration’s intervention.  (Swanson and Gibb 1978)  Also, the grand 
station was destroyed in the 1960s to make room for Madison Square Garden.  
Today, all train travelers are now ushered down a set of stairs and escalators 
below this entertainment complex to board their trains in a cramped 




3. The renovation of Grand Central Terminal on Manhattan’s 42nd Street during 
the mid 1990s revealed a grime and paint covered celestial map within the 
high ceiling over the terminal’s main concourse.  The illuminated map of the 
celestial zodiac had long since escaped the memory of station managers, 
travelers and New Yorkers.  How was it possible to forget such a stunning 
ceiling, one that hovered over thousands of travelers in one of the most 







 Figure 1-7 Vanderbilt Hall, Grand Central Terminal, New York City 
(National Geographic 2008) 
The walking tour of the terminal now provides the following discussion, although 
any discussion of the “re-discovery” is absent from the current literature of the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority or the terminal’s real estate developers: 
 
“The most notable feature of the Main Concourse is the great astronomical mural, 
from a design by the French painter Paul Helleu, painted in gold leaf on cerulean 
blue oil. Arching over the 80,000 square-foot Main Concourse, this extraordinary 
painting portrays the Mediterranean sky with October-to-March zodiac and 2,500 
stars. The 60 largest stars mark the constellations and are illuminated with fiber 
optics, but used to be lit with 40 watt light bulbs that workers changed regularly 
by climbing above the ceiling and pulling the light bulbs out from above. Soon 
after the Terminal opened, it was noted that the section of the zodiac depicted by 
the mural was backwards. For several decades lively controversy raged over why 
this was so. Some of the explanations offered were that it just looked better, or it 
didn’t fit into the ceiling any other way. The actual reason is that Paul Helleu took 




cartographers depicted the heavens as they would have been seen from outside the 
celestial sphere.” 
(Grand Central 2008) 
 
4. The Department of Defense’s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
Commission of 2005 recommended, and the U.S. Congress mandated: (1) the 
closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC; (2) the 
renaming of National Naval Medical Center Bethesda after Army Physician 
Walter Reed, and; (3) the construction of a new major Army military hospital 
at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  But in these three actions, these parties neglected an 
opportunity to both honor the history of the military services, Dr. Reed and 
President Roosevelt.  Bethesda was the vision of President Franklyn Delano 
Roosevelt (FDR) and his original sketch on White House stationary is on 
display in an exhibit within the lobby of the main tower, a historical fact that 
was also a part of the formal education of multiple BRAC staffers.3  (U. S. 
Department of Defense 2005)   
 
                                                 
3 The military members of this staff included members of the Navy Civil Engineer Corps who, by 
attending the U.S. Navy’s Naval School for Civil Engineer Corps Officers (CECOS), would have 
learned of FDR’s famous sketch during their coursework as junior officers.  A copy of this sketch was 
prominently mounted on a wall of the school’s classroom facility at Port Hueneme, California during 





Figure 1-8  FDR’s Sketch of Future Naval Hospital on Display at Bethesda 
(Student 2006) 
 
Had the BRAC Commission simply named the new Fort Belvoir Hospital 
after Doctor Reed and renamed the Bethesda complex after President 
Roosevelt while closing the former Walter Reed facility, it could have:  
 
(1) connected Dr. Reed’s name to a major landmark within his home 
state of Virginia;4  
 
(2) recognized President Roosevelt’s role in the construction of the 
military hospital at Bethesda; and  
                                                 
4 Doctor Walter Reed (1851-1902) was born in Belroi, Virginia.  His commission would produce 
research that would lead to the proof that yellow fever was spread by mosquitoes and not through the 
soiled bed linens or other fomites of fever sufferers.  This discovery would contribute to the successful 
construction of the Panama Canal by an American effort between 1904 and 1914.  (Wikipedia 





(3) Named the Bethesda facility after a former Commander-in-Chief, a       
concept that would be in greater harmony with the newly minted 
joint command that would be occupying the complex upon 
implementation of the new legislation.5, 6   
 
 
Figure 1-9 President Roosevelt Lays Cornerstone at Bethesda in 1940 
        (Student 2006) 
                                                 
5 The term “joint command” often describes a command consisting of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force 
and Marine Corps.  
6 The student outlined the problem and proposed solution in a January 2006  letter to the Hon. 
Representative Chris Van Hollen (Maryland).  Congressman Van Hollen telephoned the student to 
express interest in the idea but indicated any revision to the BRAC legislation would be effectively 
impossible, but that other avenues might exist to observe this approach.  The student also provided 
letters to the Hon. Senator Paul Sarbanes and former President Clinton. The idea made it to the desk of 





The second and third conceptual underpinnings of this research relate to man’s 
use of technology for both “good” and “bad” and how highly sophisticated electronic 
management platforms, do or do not recognize and/or model the perspectives of 
individuals or individual parties.  Human history is replete with examples of the 
destructive power of the combination of the human mind, science and project 
management.  But are we applying modern time management technologies to their 
best use?  Modern project management scheduling methods, which often involve 
intricate expressions of relationships between the many thousands of critical elements 
using computer technology, are not detached from this human behavior.  Recognizing 
that monetary recoveries in post-project litigation is based to a large degree upon a 
CPM schedule,  it is fair to suggest that this connection has provided sufficient 
motivation for some to scuttle the possible harmony of these networks purely for self-
serving interests.   
EVMS, meanwhile, may also be manipulated to provide a false sense of security 
to project participants, allowing projects to proceed to later points before the 
indicators “catch” adverse performance, at which time it becomes less possible to 
abandon the project or program without greater upheaval and cost.  These activities, 
where not fraudulent, might be considered beyond the realm of ethical behavior in 
most circles, but only if those circles fully understand and are provided with the 
ability to monitor that which may be only observable within the deepest levels of 




and EVMS systems are even possible on the largest and most visible projects of the 
U.S. Government, provides much of the basis for this study.      
It is fair to consider the interplay between project participants as a game or 
conflict.  
‘It should be clear from the discussions of Chapter I that a theory of rational 
behavior – i.e. of the foundations of economics and of the main mechanisms of 
social organization – requires a thorough study of the “games of strategy.”  
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953) 
The 1960 publication The Strategy of Conflict authored by current University of 
Maryland Professor Thomas Schelling contains an essay entitled “The Retarded 
Science of International Strategy.”  In it is described how there exists: 
“a main dividing line…between those that treat conflict as a pathological state 
and seek its causes and treatment, and those that take conflict for granted and 
study the behavior associated with it.  Among the latter there is a further division 
between those that examine the participants in a conflict in all their complexity – 
with regard to both “rational” and irrational” behavior, conscious and 
unconscious, and to motivations as well as to calculations – and those that focus 
on the more rational, conscious, artful kind of behavior.      
(Schelling 1960) 
 
Within the realm of project and program management, this research “takes conflict 
for granted and studies the behavior associated with a focus on the more rational, 
conscious, artful kind of behavior.”  (Schelling 1960)  This is perhaps a break from 
conventional treatments or discussions of troubled projects and programs which are 
disposed towards Schelling’s “pathological” approach.7  Student’s Superpath then, 
becomes less about a simplified visual network of project events, than a perspective 
based upon Schelling’s theory.  That is, as interpreted by the student, if conflict can 
                                                 
7 It is fair to consider the U.S. Government Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, and False Claims Act of 1863 as individual examples of attempts to treat business behavior as a 





be taken for granted then it is the acute focus on the “more rational, conscious, artful 
kind of behavior” found within our projects and programs that is worthwhile.  To 
demonstrate an appreciation for, and the utility of, Professor Schelling’s theory 







The Establishment of the U. S. Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile Program 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 
“The Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, and particularly its Polaris component, 
is generally considered to be one of the nation’s most successful weapon 
development projects.  Certainly, it is the largest and one of the most 




2.2 The Role of Scientists and Private Industry during the Cold War 
 
 During World War II, the United States had relied heavily upon private 
industry and scientists to design, plan and produce its weapons systems for use 
against the Axis powers.  This approach was a departure from previous wars wherein 
various War Department Bureaus oversaw and even manned these same functions.  
Gantt’s work for the U. S. Army Ordnance Bureau during World War I is but one 
example of the pre-World War II approach.  The Manhattan Project, which saw the 
development of the world’s first atomic weapons during World War II, relied heavily 
upon the leadership of scientists such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Ferme and 
others while under the overall leadership of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and 




   
Figure 2-1 J. Robert Oppenheimer and MGEN Leslie R. Groves, USA 
(Wikipedia 2008) 
 
Figure 2-2 “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” Bombs of the Manhattan Project 
(Wikipedia 2008) 
This organizational structure was different from previous wars.   Similar Operations 
Research approaches were taken in programs for other programs such as the B-29 
Superfortress, Liberty Ship construction, North Atlantic convoy operations and anti-
submarine warfare.  Both the B-29 and Manhattan project bombs were deployed at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in early August 1945, bringing the unconditional 





Figure 2-3  The Hiroshima Bomb of August 6, 1945 and “Enola Gay” B-29 
        (Wikipedia 2008) 
Following World War II, the United States retained many aspects of its 
“scientific approach” to weapons production and government contracting.  Stephen B. 
Johnson’s book “The Secret of Apollo” describes the Army Air Forces’ efforts: 
“During World War II, scientist vastly increased the fighting capability of 
both Allied and Axis powers.  The atomic bomb, radar, jet fighters, ballistics 
missiles, and operations research methods applied to fighter and bomber 
tactics all had significant impact on the war.  Recognizing the contributions of 
scientists, Gen. H. H. “Hap” Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, 
advocated maintain the partnership between military officers and scientists 
after the war’s end.” 
(Johnson 2002) 
 
The World War II Manhattan project and strategic significance of atomic 
weaponry did not go unnoticed by other nations.  Great Britain and Canada were both 
members of the Manhattan project, providing scientists to Oppenheimer’s team.  
Germany and Japan, meanwhile, had their own atomic weapons programs during the 
war.  The German program was by far the most advanced having begun several years 
before the Manhattan Project’s start in 1942.  It was indeed the United States’ 




late 1930s, including Albert Einstein, and the declaration of war on Japan on 
December 8, 1941, which prompted the start of the Manhattan project.  (Bodanis 
2000)  A copy of Albert Einstein’s 1939 letter to President Franklyn D. Roosevelt is 
provided under Appendix A as is FDR’s reply.   
The German program was considered a viable threat to the United States and 
Great Britain.  But in February 1943, a successful raid by the Norwegian Resistance 
and the British S.A.S on the German’s deuterium production facility at Vemork in 
occupied Norway destroyed the plant and ended the feasibility of German bomb 
production.  Also effective was the bombing of a Norwegian ferry while underway 
over a very deep portion of Lake Tinnsjo in early 1944 which, while killing 
approximately one dozen civilians, sent a relatively large and critical supply of 
concentrated heavy water destined for Germany to the bottom.  (Bodanis 2000)   
Soviet advances in atomic weapons lagged the American efforts but the 
American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki motivated the Soviets to establish 
their own atomic weapons capability.   
“The USSR’s highest priority at that time was to produce an atomic bomb to 
counter the American nuclear power. The all-out research and industrial 
effort, directed by physicist Igor Kurchatov and assisted by atomic espionage, 
would be completed with the first Soviet nuclear test on 29 August 1949.” 
 
     (American Institute of Physics 2008) 
 
From their super secret facility in Sarov, the Soviets scientists were also able to 
develop a program that produced a hydrogen prototype weapon in 1953 and full scale 
bomb in 1955.  Soviet firsts in military and space technology in the late 1940s and 
1950s included the first successful tests or launches of an inter-continental ballistic 





Figure 2-4 Soviet Scientists Andrei Sakharov and Igor Kurchatov 
 
 
  First Atomic Bomb        First Hydrogen Device   First Hydrogen Bomb 
    August 29, 1949  August 12, 1953    November 22, 1955 
 
Figure 2-5 Photographs of Soviet Atomic Weapons Testing 
 
The relationship and conflict of the scientist is perhaps best illustrated by 
statements made by two leading scientists of the period. 
“On the morning of 7 August I left the house for the bakery and stopped by 
the newspaper displayed on the newspaper stand. I was struck by the report of 
Truman’s announcement: on 6 August 1945 at 8 a.m. an atomic bomb of the 
enormous destructive power of 20 thousand tons of TNT was dropped on 
Hiroshima. My knees buckled. I realized that my life and the life of very many 
people, maybe all of them, had suddenly changed. Something new and terrible 
had entered our lives, and it had come from the side of the Grand Science – 





   Andrei Sakharov, 1950 
      (American Institute of Physics 2008) 
          
“ ‘If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst into the sky, that would be 
like the splendor of the Mighty One…I am become Death, the shatterer of 
worlds’…In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no 
overstatements can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is 
a knowledge which they cannot lose.”8 
 
      J. Robert Oppenheimer, 1945 
     (Gelb et al. 1988)  
2.3 The Balancing Effect of Mutually Assured Destruction  
By the mid-1950s, a delicate balance of power existed, with each side 
possessing enough nuclear armaments to destroy each other, and the world, many 
times over.  The strategic balance was described as one of mutually assured 
destruction or “MAD,” but required that a first strike by one side would not 
incapacitate the other side and prevent them from responding in kind.  Despite these 
capabilities, the United States did lag the Soviets in numbers of weapons.   
The Soviet military threat lies not only in their present military 
capabilities – formidable as they are – but also in the dynamic development 
and exploitation of their military technology…(t)hey have developed a 
spectrum of A- and H-bombs and produced fissionable material sufficient for 
at least 1500 nuclear weapons.  They created from scratch a long range air 
force with 1500 B-29 type bombers; they then substantially re-equipped it 
with jet aircraft, while developing a short-range air force of 3000 jet bombers.  
In the field of ballistic missiles they have weapons of 700 n. m. range, in 
production for at least a year; successfully tested 950 n. m. missiles; and 
probably surpassed us in ICBM development…(a)t the same time, they have 
maintained and largely re-equipped their army of 175 line divisions, while 
furnishing large quantities of military equipment to their satellites and Red 
China. 
(Scientific Advisory Board 1957) 
 
                                                 
8 Portions of this quote were relayed by Oppenheimer as passages from the Hindu work Bhagavad-
Gita.  According to Oppenheimer, these words came to him as he witnessed the Trinity test bomb at 





Although it has since been acknowledged that the Gaither Committee deliberately 
suppressed the number of U. S. ICBMs and inflated the Soviet numbers to create a 
more pronounced “missile gap,” throughout the mid to late 1950s it was believed by 
most that the Soviets held a sizeable advantage over the United States with respect to 
the number of ICBMs and a strategic advantage overall.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
The United States’ decision to develop a “fleet” ballistic missile (i.e. a 
ballistic missile launched from a ship or submarine) did not occur until several years 
into the ICBM race.  The thinking at the mid-1950s was that if the U. S. could 
develop an alternative ICBM launch platform it might reduce the strategic advantage 
of the Soviets related to quantum capabilities.  Ultimately, this strategy would involve 
a missile system involving ships and submarines of the U. S. Navy.  By the time the 
Navy presented its first proposal for this “Fleet Ballistic Missile” (FBM) program to 
the Department of Defense in 1955, there were already four U. S. ICBM programs 
well under development by the Army (Jupiter) and Air Force (Thor, Atlas and Titan).  
(Sapolsky 1972)  Missing from most historical accounts, however, is the fact that the 
Soviets were already developing their own submarine launched ballistic missile 
which became operational in 1956, four years before the first successful launch of an 
American Fleet Ballistic Missile.  (Polmar 1978) 
Notwithstanding the earlier Soviet FBM capability, the idea of an underwater 
missile launch involving a submarine was not new. In 1942 the German Army 
Weapons Department facility at Peenemündee developed and fired missiles from 
depths of 30 to 50 feet using U-Boats with missile sleds in tow.  (Sapolsky 1972)  




bitter inter-service dispute between the service that controlled the missile program 
(German Army), and the service that was to deliver it (German Navy).  Also, the 
German U-Boat commanders were bitterly against accepting the mission of missile 
transport and launching, finding that such a break from the traditional missions of 
attacking surface ships, convoy raiding, reconnaissance and mining was not in 
keeping with their mission.  Interestingly, this same adverse reaction to a submarine 
launched missile would also be seen from U. S. Navy Submariners during the early 
stages of the FBM program in the 1950s, some fifteen years later.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
As both the Soviets and Americans recognized, a “fleet” ballistic missile 
(FBM) launched from surface ships or submarines had unique strategic advantages.  
Unlike land based missile silos, FBM submarines would have mobility, allowing 
them to operate closer to their target area thereby reducing the fuel requirements, 
missile flight times and overall rocket size.  The submarines, further, could remain on 
station for weeks or months without relief and be undetectable, particularly in the 
case of a nuclear fueled submarine which did not require periodic surfacing for the 
recharging of shipboard battery systems as was the case for diesel-electric 
submarines.9  Perhaps most importantly, knowing that it would face immediate 
counter attack from offshore ships and submarines would presumably serve as a 
deterrent to an attack from the other side.  The FBM strategy was in keeping with the 
“mutually assured destruction” (MAD) approach that had been adopted by both east 
and west.  
                                                 
9 The Soviet’s first ballistic missile launching submarine was a diesel-electric “KILO” class submarine.  
All U. S. ballistic missile submarines were nuclear powered.  The Soviets would begin commissioning 




“…because the SLBM force could not effectively (be) (sic) taken out by the 
enemy, it was the ideal retaliation weapon, and therefore very important for 
the Cold War concept of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction).” 
 
        (Parsch 2008) 
 
2.4 The Fleet Ballistic Missile Program 
 
In the fall of 1955, the Navy proposed plans for its Fleet Ballistic missile 
program to President Eisenhower.  While rejecting the Navy’s request for its own 
missile program, Eisenhower directed them to joint venture with either the Army or 
Air Force within one of their four existing missile programs.   The Navy selected the 
Army’s Jupiter missile program as its host platform over the Air Force controlled 
Thor, Atlas and Titan missiles for reasons related to size, fuel type, range and 
program maturity.  In November 1955 the Secretary of the Navy stood up the 
“Special Projects Office” to oversee the development of a modified Jupiter missile 
that would be suitable for the Navy’s purposes.  The Jupiter-S team consisted of 
members of the U. S. Army’s Jupiter program which included their “German rocket 
team” at Huntsville, Alabama led by Werner Von Braun and a team of Army 
contractors headed by the Chrysler Corporation as program manager.  The original 
“as planned” Navy FBM program was to see testing of “Jupiter-S”10  in 1958, 
deployment aboard a Mariner freighter11 in 1960, submarine test launching in 1963 
and deployment aboard a submarine in 1965.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
                                                 
10 The Navy’s Jupiter-S missile was to be a revised version of the Army’s Jupiter missile.  Revisions to 
the fuel type and missile dimensions would be necessary to make the missile suitable for shipboard 
operations.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
11 The U. S. Navy operated two Mariner freighters; U.S.S. Observation Island and U.S.S. Compass 
Island which were commissioned on December 5, 1958 and December 3, 1956, respectively.  Plans to 






Figure 2-6 The Mariner Freighter U. S. S. Compass Island (Polmar 1978) 
 
Several concerns surfaced within the first year of the FBM program that would 
ultimately doom the Mariner Freighter and the Jupiter-S ICBM.  First, was the belief 
that submarines possessed a significant strategic advantage over surface ships as they 
were virtually undetectable both before and after launch.  This advantage was so 
significant that the submarine became the exclusive launch platform sometime in 
1956.  Second, that the conversion of the Jupiter from a liquid fuel to a solid fuel 
would be extremely complicated, if not practicably impossible.12  And finally, was 
that the still massive size of the Jupiter-S, shrunken from 60 to 44 feet in height but 
                                                                                                                                           
the FBM launch platform, sometime in 1956.  These two ships would be used extensively for test 
launches and the development of the inertial navigation system for the Polaris missile.  (Polmar 1978) 
12 It was thought that liquid fueled rockets would be less conducive to a submarine application due to 
concerns over air quality and the volatility associated with liquid rocket fuel.  These were both key 





now weighing 160,000 lbs for its nautical application was simply too large.13  The 
immense size of the missile would reduce the missile’s range, increase the fuel 
requirements and increase the size of the submarine to a size well beyond that of any 
that had been built up to that time.  And if constructed, this large submarine would 
only be capable of carrying four Jupiter-S missiles, a number that was low enough to 
detract from the strategic significance of the launch platform.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
 
 




How the situation was handled by the Navy provides an insight into how the role 
of scientists and the competitions between the military services factored into the FBM 
program.  Reeling from its loss of a strategic nuclear weapons mission to the Air 
                                                 





Force in 1949,14 the Navy chose the Army’s Jupiter missile over the three Air Force 
options.  This choice could have been related to lingering bitter feelings between the 
two services, or as Sapolsky suggests, the belief the Army’s grasp on a nuclear 
mission was tenuous with only one missile program; and that the Army would 
therefore promote the Navy’s ICBM for at least its own welfare if nothing else.  
During the first year of the program, the Navy also held a “summer study” where 
scientific leaders were invited to a retreat at Nobska Point at Woods Hole, 
Massachusetts to critically evaluate the thinking behind the Jupiter-S ICBM program.  
The results of this study, though apparently unintended, would doom the Jupiter-S.  
On the problem of missile weight, Dr. Edward Teller of the Lawrence Radiation 
Laboratory made the “basic” suggestion that if the missile was not to be in operation 
until 1965, would it not be feasible to assume that a warhead of lesser weight and 
greater yield would be in place by that time.  Therefore a smaller rocket, significantly 
smaller than the Jupiter-S, would be advisable.  This development does not appear to 
have been deliberate on the part of the Navy, in fact an effort was made to downplay 
the results of these discussions in the final report of the workshop.   But the results of 
the summer session, combined with the other concerns already in play by the middle 
of 1956, would doom the Jupiter-S ICBM.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
In September 1956 it was formally concluded that the conversion of the Jupiter-S 
from liquid to solid fuel would not be feasible and in December 1956 the Navy 
                                                 
14 The Navy’s plans to build a strategic nuclear “Super Carrier” program was stricken by Secretary of 
Defense James Forrestal in 1949.  Forrestal instead selected the Air Force’s proposal to build and use 
B-36 “Peacemaker” bombers for the U. S. strategic nuclear air mission.  Something known as the 
“Revolt of the Admirals” ensued and Forrestal would soon suffer a nervous breakdown and take his 




received formal authorization to terminate its joint venture with the Army and 
proceed with its own FBM program for the development of the Polaris missile.15 
2.5 The Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile 
 
The mission of the Navy’s Special Projects Office was to oversee all research, 
development, testing and production necessary to achieve a functional 
intercontinental ballistic missile launched from a submarine within eight years (1957 
to 1965).  This Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) was first of a kind 
technology, notwithstanding Soviet progress in this area.  The complexities were new 
and not insignificant, such as those related to missile launch: 
“Because starting a rocket motor inside a submarine was considered too 
dangerous, a so-called "cold launch" method was developed, where the 
missile is ejected from the vertical launch tube by gas pressure before the 
motor is ignited. The first launch of a Polaris AX test vehicle in September 
1958 was unsuccessful, and the first fully successful flight only occurred in 
April 1959, after 5 other failures…” 
(Parsch  2008) 
The Polaris program represented approximately 10% of Navy’s annual 
budget, a staggering proportion both then and now.16  The external focus on the 
program would have been intense and the Special Projects Office recognized that the 
reputation of a well managed program would be an important ingredient to the 
success of Polaris.  Key to the success of the Polaris program would be the support of 
Admiral Arleigh A. “31-Knot” Burke who was appointed as the Chief of Naval 
Operations in mid-1955, immediately prior to the authorization of the FBM program.  
                                                 
15 The Chrysler Corporation would file a complaint against the U. S. Government.  The complaint was 
settled in the courts in 1960.  (Sapolsky 1972)   
16 The President’s Budget Request for FY-2009 seeks $149.2 Billion as the Navy’s Annual Budget for 
Fiscal Year 2009.  (Garamone 2008) Garamone, J. (2008). "Bush Sends Budget to Congress." The 




The head of the Special Projects Office was Vice Admiral William Raborn who 
proved especially successful at both managing the Polaris program and fostering the 
program’s reputation as a breeding ground for successful management innovation.  
This reputation for innovation and competence would serve to deflect some 
questioning by congressional and inter-service opponents of the program.  One aspect 
of Admiral Raborn’s approach to Congress was to often have the program’s scientific 
experts provide congressional testimony rather than simply he himself.  This was 
atypical for the period, and possibly remains so today.  (Sapolsky 1972)   
 








Innovations attributed to the Special Projects Office include enhancement of the Line 
of Balance method for evaluation worker productivity, establishment of the 
Performance Evaluation Review Technique for time management, the creation of a 
“Reliability Management Index” for the treatment of uncertainty and SPAN which 
formally integrated the schedule networks of multiple programs.  (Sapolsky 1972)  
Also of interest is the method of codifying the subjective judgments during the 
evaluation of the program elements.  The four terms of “Good Shape,” “Minor 
Weakness,” “Major Weakness” and “Critical Weakness” which are similar to the 
approach used within contemporaneous risk management systems.  (Sapolsky 1972) 
While not managed by the Special Projects Office, the development of Polaris 
had to be kept in lock step with the design and construction of the U. S. S. GEORGE 
WASHINGTON class submarine, the Polaris launch platform.  The George 
Washington submarine program was managed by Vice Admiral Hymen G. 
Rickover’s nuclear submarine community.  In order to minimize the production time, 
these submarines were built via a modification of the smaller SKIPJACK class attack 
submarine, a platform already in production.  Upon the President’s authorization of 
the FY-1958 Supplemental Shipbuilding Bill on February 11, 1958, three SKIPJACK 
submarines were “converted during construction” to become SLBM submarines.17  
This re-design  “…provided for the addition of almost 130 feet in length to 
                                                 
17 The first of these first three submarines had to be renamed.  What was to have been U. S. S. 
SCORPION was renamed U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON.  The second and third submarines 
authorized by the President were unnamed at the time of the authorization and became U. S. S. 




accommodate two rows of eight missile tubes, auxiliary machinery, missile fire 
control and inertial navigation systems.”18  The first George Washington class 
submarine (U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON) was commissioned on December 30, 
1959.  (Polmar 1978)   
 
Figure 2-9    “A Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine” (Sapolsky 1972) 
 
 
Figure 2-10 U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) 
 
                                                 




“In September 1959, the first Polaris A-1X tactical prototype missile, which 
included the inertial navigation system, was successfully launched, and tests 
of the A-1X continued through 1960…The first successful underwater launch 
of a Polaris missile was accomplished by (the U. S. S. GEORGE 
WASHINGTON)…on 20 July 1960.”   
(Parsch 2008) 
 
2.6 The Success of the U. S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program 
 
Figure 2-11 Photograph of the first launch of Polaris, July 20, 1960 
 
             (Parsch 2008) 
 
”Suddenly the blue-green Gulf Stream erupted with convulsive fury. Like a 
giant marlin in a cascade of brine, a grey, bottle-shaped monster leaped into 




streaming foam. Then it came alive with unearthly racket. Its tail belched 
flame, and it climbed into its new element with incredible ease. Arcing high 
into the thin, cold reaches of space, the first ballistic missile ever to be fired 
from a submerged submarine swung surely toward the south and east. Polaris, 
named for the mariner's bright pole star, needed no such guidance now. Brief 
seconds after it broached the water off Cape Canaveral last week and 
screamed down the Atlantic missile range, it was on its own—and it was on 
target.  
 
“Some 40 ft. below the roiling water, a grinning redhead, wearing the two 
stars of a rear admiral…Rear Admiral William Raborn Jr., boss of the Navy's 
Polaris project, gave orders to get ready for a second shot before a proud 
succinct message was sent to President Eisenhower in Newport: ‘Polaris, from 




Polaris was to achieve its first operational launch by 1965.  It beat that 
milestone by five years.  By 1967 there were forty-one U. S. Navy submarines 
delivered and on patrol, each with sixteen Polaris SLBM missiles.  While a technical 
and schedule success, that no Polaris ICBM missiles were ever fired in anger are 
perhaps there most important contribution.  Such hopes were expressed by Admiral 
Raborn in a second message sent to Admiral Arleigh Burke shortly after his message 
to President Eisenhower. 
"This new star of peace hoisted a trail of missile smoke from salt water to 
space as a signal of a bright new addition to seapower, a new strategic use of 
the world's oceans which will be felt around the world and across and behind 






The Performance Evaluation Research Task 
 
3.1 The Performance Evaluation Research Task 
 
In The Secret of Apollo Stephen B. Johnson provides insight into the struggle of 
federal program managers for effective management and control of technical and cost 
variables in the mid to late 1950s and the 1960s. 
“…as ballistic missiles and air-defense systems failed in the late 1950s, military 
officers and aerospace industry leaders had to heed congressional calls for greater 
reliability and more predictable cost.  Managers responded by applying extensive 
cost-accounting practices, while engineers performed more rigorous testing and 
analysis.  The result was not a “low cost” design but a more reliable product 
whose cost was high but predictable.  Engineers gained credibility through 
successful missile performance, and managers gained credibility through 
successful prediction of cost.  Because of the high priority given to and the 
visibility of space programs, congressional leaders in the 1960s did not mind high 
costs, but they would not tolerate unpredictable costs or spectacular failures.”   
    
(Johnson 2002) 
Johnson also makes an interesting point concerning the role that management 
specialists from private industry would play within missile programs.  
“the military needed better cost control and technical reliability in its missile 
programs.  Military officers and scientists were not particularly adept in these 
matters.  However, managers and engineers were.”   
        (Johnson 2002) 
 
Admiral Raborn might have agreed with this statement as the PERT team 
assembled by Gordon Pehrson, the Director of Plans and Programs Division of the 
Navy Special Projects Office in June 1957, deliberately included experts in 
Operations Research in addition to managers and engineers.  Pehrson had been given 




later describe themselves in publication as “a team of operations analysts.” (Malcolm 
et al. 1959)  But with the very beginnings of the Polaris program, the senior 
leadership’s emphasis on innovative management practices was already obvious.   
In mid-1956, Admiral Raborn took key members of his team to the corporate 
headquarters of several major corporations to explore existing management practices 
with the hopes of gleaning innovative, or cutting edge methodologies that were being 
employed in private industry.  Visits were made to corporations that included the 
Chrysler Corporation and E. I. DuPont de Nemours, but the results proved 
disappointing.  Admiral Raborn would describe the content of these visits as “nothing 
of value” leading him to conclude that the private industry innovations were 
“reputations unearned.”  (Sapolsky 1972)  Several aspects of the management of the 
SPO do stand out as noteworthy.  The SPO’s facility contained a management center, 
capable of housing dozens of team members for weekly meetings while at the same 
time displaying performance information for each program element.  Sapolsky’s 
description of this space seems to conjure images of a U. S. Navy ship’s Combat 
Information Center, although no connection is made by the author.  
In late 1957 Pehrson discussed formally establishing the management 
methodologies for time, resource and cost management within the Polaris program 
with members from the Chicago office of the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton.  
These discussions would ultimately result in the award of a Navy contract to that firm 
in early 1958 but not before the basic PERT concept had been already been mapped 
out during meetings prior to the start of the PERT contract, most likely in November 




formalization of PERT, but Booz Allen Hamilton was the lead contractor.  (Sapolsky 
1972)   
The timing of the PERT study, roughly one month after the successful launch and 
orbit of the Soviet satellite Sputnik I (October 4, 1957) and at about the same time as 
the Gaither Committee’s report to President Eisenhower is likely relevant.  It is not 
unimaginable that there were additional pressures on the SPO and Pehrson to develop 
and formalize innovative management concepts in response to Soviet progress in 
nuclear weapons delivery technology within the U. S. weapons programs.  (Sapolsky, 
1972)   
“The pressure never let up—and then, suddenly, it increased. In August 1957 the 
Soviets fired their first ICBM, and the oceans narrowed from thousands of miles 
to 30 minutes. The continental U.S. came within reach of a distant enemy firing 
from his own shore. On Oct. 4 that same year. Sputnik I soared into orbit. Official 
Washington, once it got over the shock, set about finding effective ways to 
respond to the increased Russian capabilities.  
(Time 1960) 
A sobering point was that the Soviet rocket used to launch Sputnik I into orbit, the R-
7 Booster, was the same rocket used within the Soviet ICBM program.  It is doubtful 
that the significance of a successful launch of an R-7 rocket would have been lost on 
western military strategists of the time and as of the Sputnik launch, the U. S. had yet 
to demonstrate its ICBM capability. 
The initial members of the PERT group in addition to Pehrson were the SPO’s 
Willard Fazar, Head of Special Projects Program Evaluation Branch; Donal (sic) 
Malcolm, John Roseboom (sic) and Dr. Charles Clark of Booz Allen & Hamilton; 
and Richard Young and Everett Lennen of the Lockheed Corporation.  Vice Admiral 




acknowledged as instrumental in the creation not only of PERT, but for fostering a 
management environment at SPO that allowed for the creation of such theories.  
(Sapolsky, 1972), (O’Brien, 1999)  Others involved included J. W. Pocock, W. F. 
Whitmore, L. T. E. Thompson, P. Waterman and R. Miner.  (Malcolm et al. 1959)  
Work began under the PERT contract on January 27, 1958 and a report that 
formalized the PERT methodology was to be completed within three months.  
Although details of PERT and the work of this team would not be presented to the 
public until early 1959, the PERT team has noted that “the general model 
specification upon which the analysis is based” took one only month.  (Malcolm et al. 
1959)  This would mean that the PERT methodology would have been formally 
recorded no later than April 1958 and possibly as early as February 1958.  
“Project PERT…was set up to develop, test, and implement a methodology 
for providing management with integrated and quantitative evaluation of: (a) 
progress to date and the outlook for accomplishing the objectives of the FBM 
program, (b) validity of established plans and schedule for accomplishing the 
program objectives, and (c) effect of changes proposed in established plan.”  
 
       (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
“Four features characterize PERT: a network that graphically describes the 
interrelationship of steps (called events) involved in developing a specific end 
item; three time estimates for reaching each event in the network – the most 
optimistic, the most likely, and the most pessimistic times for completing an 
activity; a formula for calculating the probability distribution of the 
“expected” time for completing the activity; and an identification of the 
longest expected time sequence through the network, which is labeled “the 
critical path” since the end item will not be realized until the path is 
completed.”  
       (Sapolsky 1972) 
 
Fazar elected to name the methodology “PERT” for “Program Evaluation 




memorialize his Program Evaluation Branch of the Special Projects Office while at 
the same time finding a name that would be described as “cute, catchy and bold.”  
Sometime between February 6, 1958 and April 29, 1959, the words “Research Task” 
would be replaced by “Review Technique”.  (Malcolm et al. 1959)  The resulting 
title, “Program Evaluation Review Technique,” has remained consistent to the present 
day, although current industry’s version of PERT is fundamentally different from the 
original form. 
3.2 The Declassification and Publication of the PERT Methodology 
 
By the spring of 1959 the U. S. Navy had allowed public dissemination of the 
basic details surrounding its formalized network based schedule methodology that 
had been developed by Fazar’s group.  A journal article authored by Malcolm, 
Roseboom (sic), Clark and Fazar titled “Application of a Technique for Research and 
Development Program Evaluation” was received for publication by Operations 
Research on April 27, 1959 and published later that year.  It described the PERT 
techniques and methodology to the general public but also described the conditions 
resulting in its requirement: 
“At the time of the initiation of the study reported in this paper, the position of 
the Plans and Programs Division was as follows: A schedule for the system 
development was at hand, encompassing thousands of activities extending 
years into the future.  This schedule had been set up partially to conform to 
time deadlines set in the light of an urgent requirement for the completed 
weapon system.  This forced some activities to be compressed into 
uncomfortably short time intervals.  Slippages of schedules dates sometimes 
occurred.  As the Program Evaluation Branch studied the slippages and 
prospects for future slippages, it appeared that the capacity to predict future 






The PERT team’s article mentioned performing a survey of “current practices” for the 
prediction of schedule slippages within “huge development programs,” only to find 
them inadequate for the purposes of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program.  
 
3.3 Fundamental Concepts of PERT 
 
In describing the PERT approach, Malcolm et al. note five fundamental 
concepts of PERT.  They are: (1) that “the most important requirement for project 
evaluation…(is) the provision of detailed, well-considered estimates of the time 
constraints on future activities;” (2) that “the qualifications of a person making such 
an estimate must include a thorough understanding of the work to be done;” (3) that 
“time estimates for some activities…are highly uncertain.  This uncertainty must be 
exposed; (4) that “each activity…should have a probability distribution of the times 
that the activity might require;” and (5) that there must be a “precise knowledge of 
the sequencing required or planned in the performance of activities.”  With these five 
fundamentals, it possible to construct a network of events and calculate “the time at 
which each milestone…can be expected” and also its uncertainty.   
The journal article by Malcolm et al. introduces the term “critical path” and it 
is believed that this is the first time the term is used publicly: 
“One can select the “critical path” of those activities that can not be delayed 
without jeopardy to the entire program.” 
 
In the case of the Polaris program, it was now possible to identify such a path 






Figure 3-1 Critical Path Illustration, Polaris Program   (Malcolm et al, 1972) 
By 1962 PERT was being hailed as “the hottest new trend in theory and practice of 
management” and had been become a formal contract requirement on all research and 
development projects of the U.S. Department of Defense and National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration.  (Business Week 1962)   
Malcolm et al also provide an interesting discussion regarding the treatment of 
“three kinds” of variables: 
“The status of a developmental program at any given time is a function of 
several variables.  These variables are essentially of three kinds: Resources, in 
the form of dollars, or what ‘dollars’ represent – manpower, materials, and 
methods of production; technical performance of systems, subsystems, and 





Upon identifying these “three kinds” of variables the authors express that ideally, a 
system would measure all three (resources, technical performance and time), arriving 
at some sort of “optimum” balance of each.  In most cases it is likely that each project 
participant would like to minimize the dollar value of resources utilized and also the 
overall duration of the project.  Technical performance, meanwhile, would appear to 
be a variable that would be maximized by all participants.  Ignoring, at least 
temporarily, that not all project participants always have these same objectives in 
common, the authors then describe the need for a single variable integrating 
resources, technical performance and time so that it might be maximized or 
minimized. 
“Ideally, we should like to evaluate a given actual schedule in terms of all 
three variables.  In this way it would be possible to arrive at an ‘optimum’ 
schedule that would properly balance resources, performance, and time.  The 
existence and determination of such an optimum requires that some criterion 
be analytically maximized or minimized.  To do this it is necessary to 
establish a criterion that integrates time, resources, and performance into 
meaningful utility.”   
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Although going on to state that the identification of such an integrated utility function 
went beyond the PERT study and that “an approach dealing only with the time 
variable was selected,” this concept is significant.   The FBM’s decision to focus 
exclusively on the time variable appears to be due to both the likely impossibility of 
performing such an integration in a short period of time as well as the limited 
computing capabilities of the period.   
“Suffice to say, it was determined that no such criterion was available and that 
the data-processing problems associated with a plan of some 10,000 events 
would preclude its practical implementation in any case.” 





This decision does not suggest that the FBM program ignored technical performance 
and resources.  FBM, instead, recognized that a time based system could 
accommodate both the cost and technical variables.   
The following subsections provide the original PERT methodology as set 
described by Malcolm et al. in the original journal article appearing in Operations 
Research in the fall of 1959 titled “Application of a Technique for Research and 
Development Program Evaluation.”  
3.3.1 “The Flow Plan” 
 
Malcolm et al describe a “flow plan” as the model of the network of events 
and activities “necessary to achieve the end objective, T0.  T0  is point in time when 
the end objective is achieved.  Their original illustration is provided under Figure 3-2. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 PERT System Flow Plan  (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
The system flow plan is the basic platform from which the PERT analysis is based 




there must be a “precise knowledge of the sequencing required or planned in the 
performance of activities…”).   
Malcolm’s article also describes PERT’s reliance upon unambiguous, 
distinguishable events and it is significant that each activity is “bookended” with an 
event (i.e. an event is found at both the start and finish of every activity within the 
network).   
“An ‘event,’ depicted by circled numbers…is defined as a distinguishable, 
unambiguous point in time that coincides with the beginning and/or end of a 
specific task or activity in the R and D process. 
 
“Events must be defined unambiguously.”  (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
In this regard, it is fair to describe PERT as an “event centric” network.   
The PERT flow plan includes only “finish-to-start” relationships between the 
events, a characteristic that is not shared by most contemporaneous applications of 
the critical path method.  Malcolm’s flow plan also has several other interesting 
characteristics that provide a possible insight into PERT.  First, the ratio of events to 
activities is very close to one-to-one, a very low ratio by today’s CPM standards.  
Second, that the event numbering system descends rather than increases with 
successive events.  To the extent this was employed by the Polaris team this would 
have provided the team with the ability to gauge its “distance” from the end objective, 
and perhaps motivate members involved within late performing activities. What is not 
clear from this numbering system is how the team would have numbered newly 
identified events as the project moved forward in time.  Today’s network 
methodologies do not have this problem as they most often increase activity numbers 




fives or tens).  Perhaps the answer is that by relying upon a finite set of well defined 
events from the start of the project, vice an evolving set of task activities that could 
not be fully defined at the start of a project, Polaris would see far fewer revisions to 
its events and numbering system.   
3.3.2  “Elapsed Time Estimates” 
 
“With the flow plan laid out graphically and authenticated as representing the 
work and activities to be performed, elapsed time estimates for each activity are 
obtained from competent engineers.”  (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
 Figure 3-3 Illustration of elapsed time estimate (te) for Single Activity 
 
The authors’ description of the assignment of an estimate of elapsed time (te) 
for each activity between numbered events within the system flow plan provides 
several interesting points related to the first and second fundamental concepts of 
PERT.  Combined, two principles were “the provision of detailed, well-considered 
estimates of the time constraints on future activities (and that) the qualifications of a 
person making such an estimate must include a thorough understanding of the work 




abilities and knowledge of these “competent engineers” was of the first order and was 
a large contributor to the overall success of the adaptation of PERT to the Polaris 
program.   
To accomplish the first concept, the engineers were required to provide three 
estimates of “elapsed-time” to the PERT team for the activity or activities in their 
charge.  These three estimates were for a likely, optimistic and pessimistic time 
scenarios, each of which were explicitly defined for each activity.  These three 
estimates were assigned the letters a, m and b, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 The Three “Elapsed-Time” Estimates for an Individual PERT Activity  
        (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
Using these three estimates, it was then important to assign a probability distribution 
stretching between the “optimistic” (a) and “pessimistic” (b) values with a peak at the 
“likely” (m) time estimate, which was based upon the subjective judgment of the 
competent engineer(s).  This “likely” value was “free” to take any position between 
optimistic and pessimistic values.  As such, the resulting probability distribution 
could be asymmetric.  This part of the PERT process recognized what the authors 
described as the third and fourth fundamental concepts of PERT which held: (3) that 
“time estimates for some activities…are highly uncertain.  This uncertainty must be 




times that the activity might require;” Although the distributions would likely be of a 
different shape for each activity, some characteristics were common to all.  The 
“extreme” optimistic and pessimistic values had a “relatively little” chance of 
occurrence and therefore had a small probability associated with them.  Figure 3-5 
provides an illustration of what the authors describe as the “elapsed-time distribution” 
for an individual activity. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 “Estimating the elapsed-time distribution 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
Although criticized by later articles, the choice of the beta distribution should 
be considered appropriate for this application.  This distribution is capable of 
modeling any curve between points “a” and “b” resulting from the three time 
estimates from competent engineers.  (Grubbs 1962), (Bildson and Gillespie 1962)  
Illustrations of the Beta distribution under both symmetric and asymmetric scenarios 





Figure 3-6 Symmetric and Asymmetric Beta Distributions 
(Clemen and Reilly 2001) 
The formula for the beta distribution is given by: 
 






The terms “r” and “n” are “parameters that determine the shape of the density 
function.”  (Clemen 2001)  Glavinich provides a discussion of the beta distribution: 
“The beta distribution…was selected by the PERT development team and is still the 
basis for PERT today for the following reasons: (1.) It is a unimodal or “single-peak” 
distribution; (2.) It has finite, non-negative end points; (3.) It is non-symmetrical and 
the mode can be skewed toward either the smallest or largest anticipated duration.”  
With the “likely” elapsed-time estimate free to take any value between, the 
beta distribution was chosen as the probability distribution for every activity within 
the PERT flow plan for Polaris.  With these distributions, the PERT team could 
compute expected time (te) and variance (σ2(te)) for every activity.  Figure 3-7 
illustrates the separate concepts of the three time estimates and the value and variance 
of expected time. 
 
 
               Expected Time (te) for Activity Finish 




(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
Together, the “expected” time (te) and variance of “expected” time (σ2) were 
used in the network computations that followed and allowed the determination of a 
“critical path” or longest path through a network, a term introduced to the general 
public by Malcolm et al.  It is important to note here that the PERT analysis has 
transitioned from an evaluation of probability distributions to a deterministic network 
analysis where there is only one duration, the “expected” time (te), associated with 
each activity.  The resulting PERT network, therefore, is now indistinguishable from 
a CPM network, which is also a network of activities with deterministic assessments 
of individual activity durations.  In his 1963 article “Monte Carlo Methods and the 
PERT Problem,”  Richard van Slyke of the University of California, Berkeley noted 
that the PERT team’s approximation of “the stochastic problem by a problem of the 
deterministic form” (i.e. identifying  “expected” durations for each activity in lieu of 
solving for the probability distribution) was most likely attributable to both the 
uncertainty within the three-time estimate and the computer limitations of the period.  
(van Slyke 1963)   
Although a somewhat bitter dispute would erupt over the “invention” of 
network scheduling methods, two key things should be recognized.  First, that PERT 
was indeed converted to a deterministic network during the solution phase; and 
second that D. G. Malcolm et al. introduce the term “critical path” in several places 
within their 1959 article “Application of a Technique for Research and Development 
Program Evaluation.”  It is believed that these examples represent the first use of this 




“One can select the ‘critical path’ of those activities of those activities that 
cannot be delayed without jeopardy to the entire program.” 
 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
“It is noted that, for some of the events, a zero slack condition exists.  This 
indicates that the expected and latest times for these events are identical.  If 
the zero-slack events are joined together, they will form a path that will extend 
from the present to the final event.  This path can be looked upon as ‘the 
critical path.’  Should any event on the critical path slip beyond its expected 
date of accomplishment, then the final event can be expected to slip a similar 
amount.” 
      (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
Figure 3-8 First Appearance of the Term “Critical Path” 
        (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 There are some psychological aspects to the elicitation of elapsed time 
estimates that merit some discussion.  That Polaris relied upon the inputs from 
separate individuals, presumably a relatively high number of experts, is significant 
and surely presented a separate challenge to those involved with management of the 




to provide three time estimates for each activity, and not one, it would “disassociate 
the engineer from his built-in knowledge of the existing schedule and … provide 
more information concerning the inherent difficulties and variability in the activity 
being estimated.”  This psychological basis for such a consideration would be 
described more than a decade later by Stanford University psychologists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Khannemann in their landmark study in Human Behavior titled 
“Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias” which appeared in the journal 
Science in 1974.   Herein the authors describe the role of representativeness, 
availability, adjustment and anchoring can create biased assessments under uncertain 
situations. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974)  That this process was deliberately 
organized, methodical and serious is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the process of 
eliciting these time estimates from the engineers was referred to as “the interrogation 
process,” perhaps a tongue-in-cheek term, but it is clear from these considerations 
that the PERT methodology considered factors beyond a “simple” network of events 
and activities.  It at least gave some consideration to human behavior. 
3.3.3 “Organization of Data” 
 
 With elapsed time estimates for each network activity and a flow plan 
providing an insight into to predecessors and successors for each activity, the Polaris 
program managers would construct a “diagram showing sequenced events” with 
arrows expressing the activities and the finish-to-start relationships.  Events were to 
be recorded sequentially in a single horizontal line providing “a pattern which 
(would) lend itself to analytical treatment …(t)his (was) the equivalent of graphically 






Figure 3-9 PERT “Diagram Showing Sequenced Events” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
PERT managers worked right-to-left while constructing this diagram, starting with 
the last event and recording each predecessor event and connecting activity arrows.  
No event was recorded in this diagram until all successors to that event had been 
listed.       
Next, using the collapsed flow plan diagram as a visual aid, a table of events 
and elapsed time estimates was constructed.   This table included the means and 







Figure 3-10 PERT’s “List of Sequenced Events” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
3.3.4 “The Analysis” 
 
Before proceeding with the solution the authors note that “many difficult 
analytical situations presented themselves” within the network.  One such example 
was illustrated for the elapsed time evaluation of the three paths between Event A and 






Figure 3-11 Illustration of Three Paths Within a Simplified Network 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
The authors state that path “a-d-e” would be correlated by some amount to the other 
two paths “a-c” and “b-e.”  This is because path “a-d-e” shares activity “a” with path 
“a-c” and activity “e” with path “b-e.”  Rather than solving a correlated solution,19 the 
effort for which they describe as “exorbitant,” the Polaris engineers chose a simpler 
approach. 
“…a simplified analysis has been utilized.  In this analysis the time constraints of 
all paths leading up to an event are considered, and the greatest of these expected 
values is assigned to the event.  The variance of this expected value is the sum of 
the variances associated with each expected value along the longest path…(i)t 
was felt that, considering the nature of the input data, the utility of other outputs 
possible from the data and the need for speedy, economical implementation, the 
method described above was completely satisfactory.”   
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
In other words, the expected time of event D would be given by the largest mean 
value of elapsed time given by the three paths “a-c”, “a-d-e” or “b-e.”  Although the 
mean and variance of event D were now assigned, the authors were silent on how 
                                                 
19 Performing such a calculation across the 10,000 activities within the Polaris PERT network would 




competing paths with lower means but significantly larger variances were to be 
treated.  Later discussions of PERT would describe this step as a “basic error.” 
“As is well known, the effect of activity chains terminating in a particular 
event are ignored in estimating variance in event-occurrence time unless the 
chain has the largest mean duration.  Even though a chain might have much 
larger variance than the longest time chain, this variance is in no way 
accounted for in estimating event variance until the chain becomes critical.”   
 
      (Bildson and Gillespie 1962) 
 
This point will be addressed in later portions of the study.   
3.3.5 “Computation of “Expected Times” for Events” 
 
 The next stage of the PERT methodology continues the tabular treatment of 
events and activities, calculating the “expected time” (TE) of occurrence for each 
event.  This expected time is expressed in calendar time and is found within columns 
two and three within Figure 3-12.  Starting at the bottom of the table with “time 
now”20 event, the PERT engineers provided the following methodology: 
“Starting at the time ‘now’ (bottom of the list) examine all the activities 
leading from this event and choose the one with the longest expected time.  
List this expected time and its associated variance and then proceed forward 
into the network (up the page…) adding elapsed times to expected times 
established for previous events.”  
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
                                                 
20 The terms “Time Now” and “X-Now” are used by the authors to describe the point in time from 
which the PERT analysis is conducted.  This terminology can be considered equivalent to the terms 
“Data Date” or “Status Date.” These latter terms are found in contemporaneous versions of scheduling 





Figure 3-12 “Outputs from Analysis” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Once completed, this exercise populates the second and third columns with an 
event’s mean expected time of occurrence and variance.  The process of moving “up” 
in the table is equivalent to a “forward pass” through the network and produces what 
could also be described as the date of “early occurrence” for specific events.  
3.3.6  “Computation of the ‘Latest Time’ for Events” 
 
Next, the equivalent of a “backward pass” through the network is performed, 
moving top-to-bottom within columns four and five of the table within Figure 3-12 to 
identify the latest time (TL) that each event can occur without affecting the expected 
time for the latest occurring event (Event 50 in the authors’ example).   





With both TE and TL, a calculation of activity “slack”21 is computed and 
entered within the sixth column of Figure 3-12. 
“Slack can be taken as a measure of scheduling flexibility that is present in a 
flow plan, and the slack for an event also represents the time interval in which 
it might reasonably be scheduled.” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Slack for each activity is computed by subtracting the time of early occurrence (TE)22 
from the time of latest possible occurrence (TL) and is given by the following 
formula: 
Slack  = TL - TE 
 
The concept of slack was illustrated by the authors in figure 3-13, wherein Event 33 




 Figure 3-13 “Determination of slack by calculating TL” 
                                                 
21 The term “Slack” is introduced by the PERT engineers within this article and remains in use to this 
day.  It is fundamental to both PERT and the Critical Path Method methodologies.  “Float” is perhaps a 
more common term used within today’s industries. 
22 The term “Expected” differs from terminology used by the critical path method.  In CPM the word 





(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
3.3.8 “Identifying the Network’s Critical Path” 
 
 With the computation of slack it is possible to connect the events and 
activities that have identical values for TE and TL and thereby a slack value of zero.  
This path was dubbed the ‘critical path’ and is introduced by the authors.  This was 
perhaps the greatest contribution of PERT.  Malcolm et al describe this concept as 
follows: 
“…for some events, a zero slack condition exists.  This indicates that the 
expected and latest times for these events are identical.  If the zero-slack 
events are joined together, they will form a path that will extend from the 
present to the final event.   This path can be looked upon as ‘the critical path.’  
Should any event on the critical path slip beyond its expected date of 
accomplishment, then the final event can be expected to slip a similar 
amount.” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959)  
 
The “critical path” for the author’s example flows through events 59, 56, 53, 51 and 
50 which are noted with an “X” within Figure 3-14. 
 
 




(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
While effectively supporting the PERT methodology, the tabular approach 
presented by the authors appears to complicate the calculation process unnecessarily.  
A manual calculation using the prescribed tabular approach to assemble the 
information found within Figures 3-11 and 3-12 was conducted by the student and 
took approximately one hour.  When the same calculation was performed by hand 
using a network flow plan to calculate and record this same information, the solution 
was completed in less than ten minutes.  The latter approach using the flow plan is 
consistent with the manual (handwritten ) “forward pass” and “backward pass” 
exercises that are part of most introductions to the critical path method.  It is not clear 
if the tabular approach was simply used as a means to present the methodology, or 
whether it was in fact employed by the Polaris engineers.  Perhaps the tabular 
approach reflects the computer limitations of the time.  The PERT reports produced 
by the computers were likely incapable of producing anything but tabular printouts 
such as the one for the Polaris’s Ballistic Shell shown in Figure 3-15.   
 




(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
In any event, this point is minor and speaks only to human machinations related to a 
far broader concept. 
3.3.9 “Probability of Meeting an Existent Schedule” 
 
 Finally, the authors use the completed “study” embodied within the previous 
sections to evaluate the probability that a “pre-existing schedule” can be achieved for 
specific events.  The term “pre-existing schedule” is perhaps too restrictive to 
describe what can now be performed with the available information.  Perhaps a more 
appropriate expression would be the modern day term “target schedule” which 
describes a second schedule against which the current schedule is compared.  This 
“target schedule” could be a scenario of some sort or another and would have to be 
“pre-existing.”  This is a minor point.  What the authors are describing how to make a 
probabilistic determination of future performance against a target baseline based upon 
performance to date 
 In the author’s example, Event 50 is evaluated probabilistically.  Column 
seven within figure 3-12 contains the expected occurrence dates of each event from 
the pre-existing schedule (TS).  Event 50 was to have occurred in week 82 (T0 S = 82) 
according to the pre-existing schedule but the results of the “current” PERT analysis 
indicate that week 92 is when it will occur (T0 E = 92).  The PERT methodology now 
assesses the probability of meeting the original “target” of event 50 occurring in week 
82 in light of performance to date which could be described as a ten week slippage 




“Utilizing the central-limit theorem, it may be assumed that the probability 
distribution of time for accomplishing an event can be closely approximated 
with the normal probability density.” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Further details involve placing the expected time of occurrence for the event in 
question (TE) at the center of a normal distribution, and with the variance of this event 
also known, calculating the probability of meeting the pre-existing target date (TS).   
Figure 3-16 illustrates this approach for event 50.         
 
     
 
 
Figure 3-16 “Estimate of Probability of Meeting Scheduled Date, TOS” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
This calculation is provided as follows for Event 50 and relies upon the table of 
cumulative probabilities for the normal distribution found within Appendix D. 
    
Given From Study: 





      σ 2  = 38 Weeks 
 
    
Given From Pre-Existing or “Target” Schedule: 
 
     T0S = 82 Weeks 
 
 Solution: 
    
     PN (T0 = < 82 ׀ μ = 92 , σ 2  = 38 ) 
 
     PN = (z = < (T0 – μ) / σ ) 
 
     PN = (z = < (82 – 92) / √38 ) 
 
     PN = (z = < -10 / 6.1644) 
 
     PN = (z = < -1.16222) 
 
     P (Z = < z) = 0.0526 
 
 
The solution provides that there is a 5.26% probability that Event 50 will occur on 
or before Week 82.  This calculation is performed for each event within the network 
and is provided by Malcolm et al. within the right most column of their table within 
Figure 3-12. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter provided a detailed discussion of the U. S. Navy’s PERT 
application prepared by the Special Projects Office, Booz Allen Hamilton and the 
Lockheed Corporation.  It is believed to represent the first time based network and 






A Paternity Dispute Over Network Scheduling 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 
 James E. Kelley, Jr. and Morgan R. Walker’s presentation at the Joint IRE-
AIEE-ACM Computer Conference held in Boston, Massachusetts on December 1-3 
1959 is recognized in most contemporaneous accounts as the public advent of the 
network scheduling technique known as the “critical path method.”  Herein Kelley 
and Walker, who both had just established a new management consulting firm called 
Mauchley Associates, asserted that they had invented the concept of network 
scheduling while working on construction projects of the DuPont Corporation 
between 1956 and 1959.  At the time these two men were employees of Sperry Rand 
and DuPont, respectively.  In light of the fact that the U. S. Navy had published the 
details of the similar PERT network scheduling methodology only eight months 
before in this December 1959 conference, Kelley and Walker’s presentation carefully 
asserted that CPM was indeed different from PERT and had been developed “in 
parallel.”   
A detailed review and analysis of the Navy’s original PERT publication 
authored by Malcom et al. and corporate records belonging to the DuPont 
Corporation indicate that Kelley and Walker may have overstated their contribution.  
These documents indicate that: (1) that the term “critical path,” the very term used by 
Messrs. Kelley and Walker to describe their critical path methodology, originated 
from within the U. S. Navy’s Polaris missile program and was not used to describe 




Walker presentation in December 1959 represented the combination of Navy PERT 
network and the DuPont cash curve methodologies into a single methodology 
described by the presenters as the “critical path method.”  To date these observations 
and distinctions have not been made by either the scientific community or the project 
management industry which continue to credit Kelley and Walker with the 
introduction of the term “critical” path and split credit with the Navy for the network 
“Flow Plan” representation.  One of the authors, James E. Kelley, Jr., continues to 
publicly assert his claim of invention as recently as 2003.  (Kelley 2003) 
This chapter provides the basis for the thesis that it was the scientists of the 
Polaris program, which included at least James Kelley and John W. Mauchly’s 
employer Sperry Rand if not themselves, are the originators of the network 
scheduling methodology that is now called the Critical Path Method.  Beginning with 
World War Two, an overview of the development of the first large scale computers 
that were necessary to support the PERT and CPM calculations and a small number 
of the people and organizations involved in those inventions are discussed.  The 
project and program management methodologies employed within the Polaris 
program and DuPont construction projects are also discussed before illustrating how 
modern industry credits Kelley and Walker with the invention of network scheduling 
methodologies.  
4.2 The Development of Computer Technology 
 
Harvard University was involved with the development and operation of 
mainframe computers during World War Two.  The Navy “Mark I,” the world’s first 




Cruft Laboratory in 1944 under the U. S. Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance Computation 
Project.  The Navy Computation Project was overseen by Harvard Associate 
Professor Howard Aiken, who was also a Commander in the Naval Reserve.  
Harvard’s computer work would provide “complex calculations necessary to 
accurately aim new Navy guns” during the latter stages of World War II.  (Billings 
1989)  The Mark I would see applications to missile guidance and the Manhattan 
Project.  Grace Hopper, a Navy Lieutenant and one of eight overworked Mark I 
operators at Harvard provided a sense of the operational tempo and importance of the 
work: 
“There was a rush on everything, and we didn’t realize what was really 
happening… 
 
“All of a sudden we had self-propelled rockets, and we had to compute where 
they were going and what they were going to do.  The development of the 
atomic bomb also required a tremendous amount of computation, as did 
acoustic and magnetic mines.” 
(Billings 1989) 
 
Joining Harvard in the race to develop computers were academic institutions 
that included the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Princeton University.  
The University of Pennsylvania’s Moore School of Electrical Engineering was also 
involved, conducting several highly secretive wartime projects for the U. S. Army 
and U. S. Navy involving computer development.  Much of the Moore School work 
was related to ballistics and the development of automated solutions for army artillery 
and naval gunnery systems.  Sometime in 1942, shortly after the U. S. entry into 
World War II, John W. Mauchly accepted a position as an Adjunct Professor at the 
Moore School and began teaching and working on some of these classified military 




College in Philadelphia having obtained a Doctor of Philosophy in Physics from The 
Johns Hopkins University in 1932.  (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008)  One of the 
Moore School efforts was Project PX, a classified Army project for the development 
of a mainframe computing system which would later become known as ENIAC.  
Although Mauchly was not afforded the opportunity to be one of the university’s 
researchers on this project, he was involved, at least peripherally, as a consultant to 
the other Moore School researchers.  The involvement of Princeton University’s John 
von Neuman is credited for enhancing the ENIAC to hold a stored program, the first 
computer to do so.  (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008)  Although interaction with von 
Neuman was deliberately limited, Army Lieutenant Herman Goldstine distributed a 
paper describing the content of von Neuman’s design.  It is believed that Mauchly 
received a copy of these notes and was also able to participate in the follow-on work 
on Project PX which reflected von Neuman’s approach contributing to his 
understanding of the ENIAC’s operation.  (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
During his time at the Moore School, Mauchly befriended Presper Eckert, a 
key contributor to the success of Project PX and a teaching assistant for a course in 
which Mauchly was a student.  On February 14, 1946 the ENIAC was unveiled to the 
public, some six months after the end of the war.  At approximately the same time, 
Mauchly and Eckert requested and received permission from the University of 
Pennsylvania to file a patent for the ENIAC in their own names.  (Goldschmidt and 
Akera 2008)  The patent was filed successfully, but shortly thereafter the university 
required that Mauchly and Eckert relinquish their rights to the ENIAC patent to the 




March 31, 1946.  For Mauchly, this was not the first controversy over intellectual 
property.  Iowa State University Professor Jon V. Atanasoff had developed an 
electronic computing device and allowed Mauchly to visit him in 1941 in Iowa.    
During his visit Atanasoff  showed Mauchly his work towards a computing device 
and the content of this event influenced Mauchly considerably in his follow-on work 
on the ENIAC and UNIVAC.  (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
 
Figure 4-1 The UNIVAC Computer System 
(Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
 
Although the ENIAC patent would ultimately be invalidated by the U. S. 
courts in 1973,  Mauchly and Eckert were able to use it to successfully develop and 
market the UNIVAC I (Universal Automatic Computer) computer under the newly 
formed Eckert-Mauchly Corporation between 1946 and 1950.   (Goldschmidt and 
Akera 2008)  With initial successes that included contracts with the U. S. Census 
Bureau and the Columbia Broadcasting Service, the Eckert-Mauchly Corporation was 




Navy’s active duty service to become an employee of the Eckert-Mauchly 
Corporation.  She would remain in the U. S. Naval Reserve where she was an active 
member of the Navy’s computer technology program for the next 37 years.  For 
reasons that included the death of Eckert-Mauchly’s principle financier and 
worsening uncooperative relationships with both the scientific and military 
communities, the firm was sold to the Remington Rand Corporation in 1950.  
(Goldschmidt and Akera 2008), (Billings 1989). 
 
Figure 4-2 Advertisement for UNIVAC Computer 
     (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
A synopsis of the professional career of Mauchly, opining on his professional 
accomplishments and his relationship with the scientists of his period, is provided by 
the Special Collections of the University of Pennsylvania: 
“In designing a general purpose computer, Mauchly had built a machine that 
inherently served more applications than he could possibly envision. In the 




significance that an individual scientist like Mauchly could not be trusted to 
oversee. Postwar planning for computer development fell to scientific advisors 
and military strategists who dealt with such technologies as the hydrogen 
bomb, supersonic combat aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles, and the nation's 
strategic air defense system. While Mauchly continued to try to advise the 
Univac Division of Remington Rand on the various applications of computer 
systems, the larger marketing and development staff of the corporation 
supplanted the usefulness of his knowledge.”   
 
    (Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
4.3 The Work of Sperry-Rand on Behalf of the U. S. Department of Defense 
In 1955, five years after the sale of Eckert-Mauchly to Remington Rand, 
Remington Rand merged with the Sperry Corporation to become Sperry Rand.  
(Wikipedia 2008)  In addition to having Grace Hopper, who had remained with 
Remington Rand following the 1950 sale of Eckert-Mauchly, Sperry Rand executives 
included retired General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander of the 
Pacific during World War II. Also on board at Sperry Rand was Major General Leslie 
M. Groves, Chief of the Manhattan Engineer District (i.e. the “Manhattan Project”).  
With these three personnel alone, combined with the immediate involvement on 
major military programs, it is plausible that any innovative management practices 
found on the major programs of World War II could find their way into the work of 
Sperry Rand.   
With Groves on board, it is also plausible that any innovative management 
practices found on the earlier Manhattan project could find their way into the work of 
Sperry Rand employees, provided of course that the information was not classified or 
otherwise inappropriate for the common corporate use.  This was no different for any 




The deep connections between the U. S. Government and Sperry Rand are 
important in this conversation for two reasons.  First, that a management system such 
as CPM could have been developed “independently” by an individual such as Kelley 
within large corporations immersed within massive federal workloads is indeed 
questionable.  Second, it likely that Sperry Rand, as an employer of many former 
employees from these government programs or their military sponsors, would have an 
ability to tap into the methodologies that had been worked by the U. S. Government 
on previous or ongoing projects and programs.   
The Polaris program alone involved over 250 contractors and 9,000 
subcontractors working in various capacities over the years.  (O'Brien and Plotnick 
1999)  Figure 4-3 provides a breakdown of the major contractors on the FBM 
program.  The list includes major defense contractors Westinghouse, General 
Electric, RCA, Lockheed and Aerojet General, Naval laboratories and the 
involvement of several academic institutions including the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.  Perhaps 
most significantly, Sperry Rand is also one of the major contractors, responsible for 
“Management, Coordination and System Design” within the Navigation Branch of 






Figure 4-3 Major Contractors Within the U. S. Navy’s Polaris Program 
         (Sapolsky 1972) 
 
 
It is indeed questionable if Sperry Rand personnel on the Polaris program were not 
aware of the PERT methodology.  Some of their “competent engineers” were quite 
likely providing Fazar’s staff with time estimates for the PERT network.  For a man 
of Mauchly’s likely professional stature within Sperry Rand and interests, it is 
doubtful that he could or would have insulated himself from the techniques that were 
being employed within the large defense programs in which his firm participated, 
particularly something as innovative as PERT.  It is also clear that Mauchly was 
“distinctly unhappy” with his role and position within the Remington Rand entity by 
1952.  See Appendix E.   
Mauchly’s former employee, Grace Hopper, remained heavily involved in 
Navy computer work both as an officer in the naval reserve during the 1950s and 




by the PERT team at Naval Proving Grounds, Dahlgren, Virginia was likely built and 
operated by Grace Hopper during either her work with Sperry Rand or her drill 
periods as a member of the Naval Reserve.  
 
4.4 The Declassification of the Performance Evaluation Review Technique 
  
 Admiral Raborn’s decision to publicize the PERT methodology within the 
April 1959 edition of Operations Research is significant with regard to the claims of 
the Kelley-Walker presentation for two reasons.  First, that with its publication the 
intellectual content of the Polaris PERT could be harvested by Messrs. Kelley and 
Walker, perhaps most notably the term ‘critical path,’ but also the intuitive network 
illustrations and general approach that it provides.  Second, if Mauchly, Kelley and/or 
Walker had become aware of the then classified PERT methodology during Sperry-
Rand’s work on Polaris between 1955 and 1959, but were prevented from divulging 
the details due to security requirements, they could now speak of these scheduling 
techniques without a fear of divulging classified information to the general public.  
This latter point is significant because it both explains the timing of Kelley-Walker 
publication and, even if one is to concede that their methods were “developed in 
parallel,” suggests that the authors were at least cognizant of an intellectual proximity 
between their work and the methods within the Polaris program. 
4.5 Other Efforts Towards a Network Based Scheduling Method 
James Fourre’s assertion found with his 1968 article “Critical Path 
Scheduling: A Practical Appraisal of PERT” that PERT “was basically an outgrowth 




various forms for many years.”  (Fourre 1968)  Fourre even refers to Henry L. Gantt’s 
scheduling charts as “networks,” but does not elaborate as to why he chose this word.  
Fourre does however, describe something resembling forward and backward passes. 
“Using the Gantt technique in the “forward direction,” we work from left to 
right, plotting activities as they must occur in time relative to other activities, 
and establishing a completion date for the job. 
 
“Another method in the Gantt technique is to schedule in the “backward 
direction,” starting with the required completion date and working backward 
or to the left, establishing the required dates of events to meet the schedule.” 
 
        (Fourre 1968) 
 
While there is no evidence to suggest that Gantt performed these operations with his 
charts, a “competent” engineer, overly familiar with his work and working with a 
relatively small number of bars might have done so subconsciously as an innate 
process.   
The 1977 work entitled Critical Path Analysis by Douglas W. Lang describes 
a phenomenon common to multiple historical accounts describing the origins of 
PERT and CPM, that of the “parallel development” of PERT-like planning techniques 
for time management: 
“the late ‘50s saw significant advances in planning techniques by teams 
working in the USA and Europe.  All the teams were engaged in devising 
scheduling systems to enable projects to be completed in less time than 
hitherto, using the same or fewer resources.…(u)nfortunately all the teams 




There are indeed multiple references to scientists and private contractors who are 
developing network based analyses in the mid to late 1950s for the purpose of 




Discussions of invention, or at least discussions of partial credit due for the 
invention of network based scheduling methodologies are not limited to the United 
States.   In Planning and Control in Management: The German RPS System, Walter 
and Rainer Schleip describe their RPS23 System as a network scheduling theory based 
upon the theory of regulating circuits and is reported to have been used by several 
companies prior to 1972.  The publication is not clear how far prior to 1972 this 
methodology was established, but while making no overt claims of invention, do 
suggest that RPS was developed independently from CPM and PERT.  
The Metra-Potential Method (MPM), a series of dots and circles is also 
purported to have been developed independently by the French Metra Group. (Schleip 
1972)  Werner von Braun, who in 1968 was head of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama provides an interesting insight into this topic as one 
whose work apparently did not embrace network scheduling or even systems 
engineering until very late in his career.  This despite his team’s work on what most 
might consider some of the most complicated and coordinated works of science of the 
twentieth century. 
According to Johnson: 
“by the summer of 1968, von Braun recognized that he needed to strengthen 
system engineering at MSFC24…Von Braun explained to (Professor Philip) 
Tompkins that (those) who had been trained in electrical engineering, thought 
more naturally in terms of a “nervous system” than he, who though of rockets 
as machines…  Why did NASA’s most experienced group of engineers take 
so long to embrace system engineering?  Three factors contributed:  the 
almost exclusive use of in-house capability for rocket development and 
testing, the extraordinary continuity of von Braun’s team, and the continuity 
of the teams R&D project.”   
                                                 
23 The authors provide that RPS represents “Regeltechnischen Planung und Steuerung.”  Translated 
into English this is “Planning and Control Techniques for Management.” (Schleip 1972)  





Perhaps von Braun’s approach, which was obviously sound, prompts the question of 
whether network scheduling is truly an invention, or more accurately described as a 
modern day manifestation of an ancient notion of innate acts of prioritization and 
planning.  The advent of the computer, perhaps, simply allowed this type of thought 
to occur on a larger scale. 
4.6 The “Extra Cash Value” of Network Scheduling Methods 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Photograph of Mauchly with "SkedFlo, Model MCX-30," 
(Goldschmidt and Akera 2008) 
Harvey M. Sapolsky’s The Polaris System Development, Bureaucratic and 
Programmatic Success in Government describes a “simple beginning” for PERT 




in 1959 stemmed from Gordon Pehrson’s desire to formalize, and Admiral Raborn’s 
desire to share, some of the management techniques that were in use within the SPO’s 
Fleet Ballistic Missile Program.  Follow on publicity surrounding the SPO’s 
publication of the PERT technique appears to have been intense as were, perhaps 
predictably, claims to the previous ownership over invention.  
“With the actual birth of the PERT technique and its instant rise to fame, 
however, an acrimonious dispute arose over parentage.  Given the size of the 
Polaris program, it is not surprising that many people would be in some way 
involved in the development and application of a management technique that 
was in high demand.  Paternity, then had a particular extra cash value that 
caused historical accuracy to be easily sacrificed in accounts of PERT’s 
origins.”   
(Sapolsky 1972)    
  
The Polaris team’s article provided the following point: 
 
“Since the implementation of PERT by the Special Projects Office in 1958, 
scores of organizations have developed an interest in PERT, several are 
studying the feasibility of applying PERT techniques within their own 
operations, and the system is already in operation in a number of industrial 
concerns and governmental agencies.”            
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Is it possible that having successfully applied the DuPont cash curve 
methodology on several projects between 1957 and 1959, and with the basic concepts 
of the Navy PERT system now declassified, Mauchly, Kelley and Walker were able 
to integrate the concepts and terminology of both systems into a single presentation.  
It is during the eight month period between the release of the April 1959 issue of 
Operations Research and the December 1959 Joint Computer Conference that 
Mauchly Associates Incorporated is founded and all three of these men leave either 
Sperry-Rand or DuPont for this new firm.  The circumstances of their departures from 




i.e. claim to invention, the publication of the Kelley-Walker article and the 
establishment of a new business, are consistent with Mauchly’s behavioral patterns 
seen while in the midst of world renown scientists on Project PX and with Atanasoff 
while affiliated with the Moore School.  Grace Hopper would not follow John 
Mauchly, “this time” electing to remain on with Sperry Rand until her private sector 
retirement in 1971.    
4.7 The Kelley-Walker “Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling”  
When James Kelley and Morgan Walker presented “Critical Path Planning 
and Scheduling” at the Eastern Joint Computer Conference, December 1-3, 1959 in 
Boston Massachusetts it is the first published account of a methodology with the term 
“critical path” in the title.  (Kelley and Walker 1959)  But rather than presenting a 
new methodology, as Kelley and Walker suggest, the non-refereed paper that was 
published in the conference proceedings employed the basic concepts of cost 
minimization and time management found within the DuPont cash curves and the 
network flow plan found within the Polaris program.  Perhaps most significant is 
Kelley and Walker’s adoption of terminology found within the Navy’s PERT paper, 
including the term “critical path,” which had not appeared in any of Kelley and 
Walker’s work prior to April 1959.  While Kelley would assert that the term was 
indeed his own, ultimately he would credit the Polaris program as the original author.  
(Sapolsky 1972)  This capitulation has not found its way into numerous publications 
of today which still credit Kelley and Walker with the creation of the term “critical 




For John W. Mauchly and James E. Kelley, Jr., their early assertions included 
claims that the Navy absconded the term “critical path” during a courtesy review of 
Kelley’s work to the assertion that the critical path method was developed before or 
in parallel to PERT without any knowledge of the SPO’s efforts.  Given the 
presumably wide dissemination of PERT material within the Polaris team, of which 
Kelley’s Sperry Rand was a principal contractor, this explanation is difficult to 
reconcile.  The following three subsections provide a comparison between Kelley-
Walker CPM and the PERT article of Malcolm et al. 
4.7.1 “1. Project Structure” 
Kelley-Walker provide a network illustration of work activities consistent 
with that embodied within the PERT methodology.  “Fundamental to the Critical-Path 
Method is the basic representation of a project.  It is characteristic of all projects that 
all work must be performed in some well defined order…(t)hese relations of order 
can be drawn graphically.  Each job in the project is represented by an arrow…(t)he 
result is a topological representation of a project.  Fig. 1 typifies the graphical form of 
a project.”  (Kelley and Walker 1959)  Kelley’s Figure 1 and the Polaris System Flow 





Figure 4-5 “Fig. 1 – Typical project diagram” (Kelley and Walker 1959) 
 
 
Figure 4-6 “Fig. 1. System flow plan.” (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
Malcolm et al. provide similar discussions within their presentation.  Per Malcolm et 
al., the system flow plan is the basic platform from which the PERT analysis is based 
and that there must be a “precise knowledge of the sequencing required or planned in 





“An ‘event,’ depicted by circled numbers…is defined as a distinguishable, 
unambiguous point in time that coincides with the beginning and/or end of a 
specific task or activity in the R and D process. 
 
There is very little, if any, substantive difference between the discussions of network 
topology and arrangement between these two articles, other than noting that Kelley 
and Walker already seem more focused on tasks or “jobs” than “events.”  
4.7.2 “2. Calendar Limits on Activities” 
 Kelley and Walker then describe the next step as putting the plan “on a 
timetable to obtain a schedule.  In order to schedule a project, it is necessary to assign 
elapsed time durations to each job.”  Mathematical computations are then performed 
for each task producing an “Earliest start time,” an “Earliest Completion Time,” a 
“Latest Start Time” and a “Maximum Time Available” for each activity.  Where 
“maximum time available for a job equals its duration the job is called critical.  A 
delay in a critical job will cause a comparable delay in the project completion 
time…If a project does contain critical jobs, then it also contains at least one 
contiguous path of critical jobs through the project diagram from origin to terminus.  
Such a path is called a critical-path.”   (Kelley and Walker 1959) 
 These concepts are not substantively different from those laid out by Malcolm 
et al.  “One can select the ‘critical path’ of those activities than can not be delayed 
without jeopardy to the entire program.”  (Malcolm et al. 1959)  Perhaps the most 
significant comparison between the Kelley-Walker method and Polaris PERT is 
provided by the data provided within the Polaris tabular solution.  Ignoring the 




fair to note how the Kelley-Walker methodology does not extend beyond the breadth 
of the Polaris methodology.  See Figure 4-7.  If one were to ignore the two columns 
titles “Variance σ te2” and only consider the Polaris network as a set of events and 
activities whose durations are defined by a single number (Mean Elapsed Time 
Estimate (te)), the Kelley-Walker work does represent a furtherance of these concepts. 
 
 Figure 4-7 “Fig. 5. List of Sequenced Events” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
4.8 The Perpetuation of Legacy 
Kelley’s first published work, outside of conference proceedings, on CPM-
PERT is submitted for publication on June 1, 1960 and appears in the May-June 1961 
issue of Operations Research.  (Kelley 1961)  Unlike his 1959 collaboration with 
Walker for the Joint Computer Conference, the article does not present the invention 
of CPM, but rather deals with the mathematical representation of the broader 




of inventor, freely using the terms “critical path” and “critical activities” and not 
crediting the Polaris authors or any others as the source of this terminology.  
“If there is a path from origin to terminus whose length equals the duration of 
the schedule, it is called a critical-path.  All the activities in a critical-path are 
limiting in the sense that a delay in any one of them will cause a comparable 
delay in the completion of the project.  Therefore, they are called critical 
activities.” 
        (Kelley 1961) 
 
Kelley’s 1961 article also presents the basic network scheduling concept as though it 
originated within CPM despite its obvious PERT likeness: 
“This paper is concerned with establishing the mathematical basis of the 
Critical-Path Method – a new tool for planning, scheduling, and coordinating 
complex engineering-type projects.  The essential ingredient of the technique 
is a mathematical model that incorporates sequence information, durations, 
and costs for each component of the project. 
 
“The process of describing the order relations among the activities of a project 
is facilitated by the use of a graphical technique.  Each activity in the project 
is denoted by an arrow that depicts the activity’s existence and the direction of 
time-flow (time flows from the tail to the head of an arrow).  The arrows are 
then interconnected to show the sequence relations among the activities…the 
nodes of the graph correspond to the events of the project.”  
                      (Kelley 1961) 
 
Kelley’s article does, however, offer an algorithm that allows for a computational 
approach to solving the network, that is different from the PERT solution and 
different from an algorithm that had been published by the RAND Corporation’s D. 
R. Fulkerson.  (Bildson, 1962), (Fulkerson, 1961)  Kelley also provide some 
terminology contributions, describing non-critical path activities as “floaters,” 
meaning their total float value was greater than zero.  This term is no longer in use as 
of 2008.  His article also attempts to distinguish between CPM and PERT.  PERT “is 




Method…is concerned with the planning, scheduling, and cost-control aspects of 
project work.” (Kelley 1961)  This is a tenuous statement.  Surely any basic 
distinction here is purely a matter of scale (i.e. between projects and programs) and 
cannot speak to a significant difference - - whether philosophical, intellectual or 
mathematic - - between PERT and CPM. 
In a 1964 article, Kelley would attempt to further establish the separation 
between PERT and CPM by defining different purposes for each: 
“…PERT was originally developed to estimate the expected occurrences of 
previously scheduled milestones for the Polaris program, it is now being used 
as a scheduling tool.  The requirements of the two applications are quite 
different.” 
         (Kelley 1964) 
Overall, Kelley’s distinctions are non-substantive.   
 
The discussion of PERT and CPM as two separate concepts and the history is 
complicated by the fact that the two methods osmosized so quickly into one 
methodology, which is now known as CPM.  This “osmosis” is noted by Sapolsky -- 
“(i)n practice, elements of PERT and CPM are often combined and variations of both 
systems are indiscriminately identified with one or the other of the acronyms.” 
(Sapolsky 1972)  This remains true to this day, but this osmosis was essentially 
complete by the mid 1960s. 
While relatively little PERT coverage exists beyond the 1959 PERT article by 
Malcolm et al., exhaustive descriptions of Kelley and Walker’s work are found within 
the works of Kelley’s protégés.  James O’Brien, who has authored six editions of a 




States, provides comments and tone consistent with the notion that the Kelley-Walker 
CPM was the first manifestation of a network scheduling concept: 
“In 1956, the E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company set up a group at its Newark, 
Delaware, facility to study the possible application of new management 
techniques to the company’s engineering functions.  One of the first areas 
considered was the planning and scheduling of construction projects. 
 
“The critical path method (CPM) was developed specifically for the planning 
of construction. 
 
 “In early 1957, the Univac Applications Research Center, under the direction 
of Dr. John W. Mauchly, joined the effort with James E. Kelley, Jr., of 
Remington Rand (UNIVAC) and Morgan Walker of DuPont in direct charge 
at Newark.  The original conceptual work was revised, and the resulting 
routines became the basic CPM.  It is interesting that no fundamental changes 
in this first work have been made. 
 
“The basic strength of CPM continues to be its ability to represent logical 
planning factors in network form.  One (anonymous) review noted: “Perhaps 
the most ironic aspect of the critical path method is that after you understand 
it, it is self-evident.  Just as an algebra student can apply the rules without full 
appreciation of the power of the mathematical concepts, so can the individual 
apply CPM or its equivalent without fully appreciating the applicability of the 
method.”  
        (O’Brien, 1999) 
 
O’Brien becomes more specific when discussing the interaction between the U. S. 
Navy and the DuPont team, carefully establishing that the DuPont work preceded 
AND contributed to the Navy work.  These points have not been supported by this 
research. 
“The development of CPM was enhanced when the U. S. Navy Polaris 
program became interested in it.  The Polaris program had developed its own 
network system known as performance evaluation and review technique 
(PERT).  The DuPont work is considered antecedent material for the 
development of PERT…(The U. S. Navy’s) search for a better management 
system continued throughout the fall of 1957.  At that time, the Navy was 
cognizant of the development of CPM at DuPont. 
 




“PERT owed much to the earlier work by Kelley and Walker.  Ironically, after 
a courtesy review of their own work as converted into PERT, Kelley and 
Walker were astute enough to use the term “critical path” as the new caption 
of their Kelley-Walker (“main chain”) technique.” 
        (O’Brien, 1999) 
 
Effusive credits to Kelley and Walker are not limited to recent work: 
“The above method of depicting a project graph differs in some respects from 
the representation used by James E. Kelley, Jr. and Morgan R. Walker, who, 
perhaps more than anyone alse (sic), were responsible for the initial 
development of critical-path scheduling.  (for an interesting account of its 
early history, see their paper, Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling,” reported 
in Proceedings of the Eastern Joint Computer Conference, Boston, December 
1-3, 1959.)  In the widely used Kelley-Walker form…”  
(Muth and Thompson 1963) 
 
O’Brien also notes at least one conversation between Kelley and or Walker 
and the PERT team, going on to suggest that this interaction was how the Navy was 
able to obtain the term “critical path.”  Notwithstanding that this research failed to 
support the statements and that Kelley would acknowledge Polaris as the creators of 
the critical path terminology, O’Brien’s accounting has other factual inaccuracies.  
His reference to the Special Projects Office being established in the fall of 1957 is off 
by two years.  It was established in the fall of 1955.  Sapolsky’s history cites a 
Mauchly Associates document from 1962 titled “History of CPM and Related 
Systems” authored by James E. Kelley, Jr. which acknowledges “(t)he very term 
CPM – Critical Path Method – it turns out, was borrowed in desperation from the 
better-known PERT system.”  (Sapolsky 1972)  The 1962 Kelley document has not 
been located as of this date. 





Today, none of the corporations who had worked on the major weapons 
systems of the 1950s or management studies, claim any connection to the invention of 
PERT or what is now referred to as the Critical Path Method.  This includes the firms 
that were perhaps in closest proximity to Polaris and Mauchly-Kelley-Walker: (1.) 
Booz Allen Hamilton; (2.) UNISYS (the name of Sperry Rand as of 2008); (3.) 
DuPont; or (4.) Lockheed Martin.  Even the DuPont Corporation, who proudly speak 
of inventions such as Polyester, Lycra, Kevlar and the over 34,000 patents that have 
resulted from its work, make no claims or comments related to the invention of CPM 
on its main website.  (E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 2008)  Any mention of 
these firms in separate historical accounts of the CPM invention can be attributed to 
the published work of these three former employees of either Sperry Rand or DuPont 
(Mauchly, Kelley and Walker) and their protégés. That any of these entities 
developed a PERT-like approach to the time problem independently from the U. S. 
Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program appears unsupported to this day despite 
widespread publication to the contrary. 
 Despite these inconsistencies, Kelley has done little to correct the history as 
typified by a statement to Engineering News Record in 2003: 




While a word mincing exercise would reveal that this statement as factually correct, 
statements such as these have only fostered the incorrect history on this subject that is 
held by modern industry.  Yes, upon dissection, it is true that 46 years prior to 2003 




from saying that this was the first iteration of the network scheduling methodology 
that would later become known as CPM.  It was not.  The work to which Kelley 
referred is the 1957-58 work for DuPont, further, which was neither called CPM nor 
was it a time management system.  It was a methodology for minimizing the overall 
cost of a project using time and resources as the dependent variables.    
Mauchly, Walker, Kelley and O’Brien perpetuated the notion that CPM was 
an invention, in and of itself, developed by two or three individuals rather than the 
scholars, scientists, engineers and military professionals in and around military 
weapons programs since the beginning of World War II.   It is obvious that this was a 
good business move, allowing the creation of a scheduling profession championed by 
management consulting firms and later, the computer software industry.  John 
Mauchly’s role in the development of computing technology is placed into 
perspective when contrasted with the career of Grace Hopper.  Hopper worked in the 
field of computers for 44 years and would retire at the rank of Rear Admiral in 1986 
having returned to active duty in the 1970s.  Admiral Hopper is credited with 
numerous inventions including the creation of the COBAL programming language.   
(Billings 1989)  There is no record of her ever filing a patent, receiving monetary 
compensation beyond salary, or claiming intellectual property for her contributions to 
her field.  She was, however, bestowed the honor of having a U. S. naval warship 
named in her honor, interestingly, a guided missile destroyer from the class named in 
honor of the man who served as Chief of Naval Operations during the Polaris era, 





Figure 4-8    Rear Admiral Grace Hopper (left to right)  
LT Grace Hopper, Mark I Computer Operator, World War Two;  
U. S. S. Grace Hopper (CG-70) underway;  
Rear Admiral Grace Hopper at Retirement Ceremony, August 14, 1986 






The Development of Network Scheduling Methods, 1959-2008 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides an overview of the transition of PERT from a 
probabilistic network of activities and events applied to only very large government 
and corporate programs, to a platform available to essentially anyone having access to 
a personal computer and scheduling software costing approximately five hundred 
dollars.  Several significant developments occurred during the forty-nine years since 
the publication of the PERT methodology in Operations Research in April 1959.  
PERT experienced explosive growth, but its immediate consumption by multiple 
federal agency users created different platforms, standards and confusion.  By the late 
1960s, PERT was no longer existence in its original format, if at all.  Kelley-Walker 
CPM, meanwhile, became part of a specialized consulting industry catering to the 
construction industry and particularly the large construction contractors.  This 
industry was less focused on events and more on activities, which is logical in light of 
the contractor’s role in identifying “how” the work will be executed.  This 
represented a very important change to the basic concept of PERT, which was more 
concerned with activities than events.  Figures 5-1 and 5-2 illustrate the original 
Polaris flow plan and the later Activity-on-Arrow format that would become the norm 






























 Figure 5-2 CPM Arrow Diagramming Method (1959 – Early 1980s) 
 
 
In 1961 Stanford University’s John W. Fondahl would conduct a classified study for 
the U. S. Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks seeking a “non-computerized” solution 
to the network scheduling methodologies embodied within PERT and CPM.  The 
resulting methodology was described as the Precedence Diagramming Method 
(PDM), where the activities were moved to the nodes and the arrows were made bare. 
PDM would also be used in computer applications following sometime in 1964 and 
today are the predominant form of CPM software.  Figure 5-3 shows the PDM format 




























 Figure 5-3 Precedence Diagram Method  (1961 – Present) 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of these subjects within an overview of CPM 
development since 1959. 
5.2 PERT’s De-Classification, Celebration, Rise and Demise 
 
 As PERT emerged beyond the confines of its security classifications in the 
late 1950s it was widely hailed as an innovative management concept.  Through this 
openness PERT’s individual merits were discussed as were its weaknesses.  By the 
early 1960s, revised versions of PERT would be found within the major procurement 
programs of the U. S. Government, particularly within the Department of Defense 
and the newly founded National Aeronautics and Space Administration, responsible 
for space exploration and more specifically, by 1962 the U. S. mission to the moon.  
The adoption of PERT, however, would lead to changes and revisions to the original 
PERT developed under the Polaris program as these public and private entities 
adapted the concept to their individual needs.  But PERT’s growth would ultimately 
lead to its demise, as with each adaptation, the differences made for confusion as 
differing standards and methodologies.  By the mid-1960s, PERT was essentially no 








5.3 The Osmosis of PERT and Kelley-Walker CPM 
The Kelley-Walker CPM presentation, meanwhile, while not having as 
explosive introduction as PERT, quickly became something of a niche industry.  It 
was being championed to construction contractors by management consulting firms 
as a means to minimize cost of construction by establishing the most efficient work 
sequences and use of resources.  The firms headed by John W. Mauchly and James J. 
O’Brien were particularly involved in this market.  With the Polaris program 
essentially complete by the mid-1960, PERT no longer being required within federal 
contracting and the advent of the non-network based Cost/Schedule Control Systems 
Criteria in 1967, the Kelley-Walker CPM became the mainstream form of network 
based scheduling systems.  And with it, a contractor-style activity-centric approach 
became quite obvious within their activity-on-arrow diagramming methods which did 
not, typically, provide event descriptions.  Any remaining distinction regarding the 
Kelley-Walker CPM not representing anything intellectually new beyond the 
methodology of Polaris PERT, to the extent this was even being discussed during the 
mid-1960s, appears to have been lost at this point.  As of 2008 the term “CPM” is 
used to describe all of the intellectual content of PERT and Kelley-Walker CPM, 
notwithstanding the fact that PERT is now considered a subset methodology within 
CPM. 
5.4 The Precedence Diagramming Method 
 In 1961 the U. S. Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks (BUDOCKs) 
commissioned a study by Stanford University to devise a “non-computerized 




Professor John W. Fondahl, this effort, which would remain classified until sometime 
prior to 1964 sought three things: 
“(1) To present a non-computer method for obtaining the benefits of critical 
path scheduling that it (sic) is practical to apply to many of the projects 
encountered by the construction contractor. 
 
(2) To develop the possibilities inherent in a step-by-step, manual solution 
to overcome some of the shortcomings of computer programmed 
solutions. 
 
(3) To offer the reader an opportunity to understand the theory and the 
assumptions of the Critical Path Method by discussing them and 
presenting a complete solution to an illustrative problem.   
 
 
Described in a supplemental report from 1964, the Stanford team noted several 
observations on the state of the industry as of 1961.  
“…there was very little detailed information readily available concerning the 
application of critical path techniques.  Most articles dwelt on the benefits of 
these methods without providing useful working information.  A few 
management consulting firms were offering workshops and furnishing 
instructional manual to those who participated.  However, they were reaching 
representatives from only a limited group from the industry, these mostly from 
larger organizations dealing with very complex projects. 
 
The Stanford report also described the difficulty with applying Polaris-PERT to more 
modest efforts of the period. 
“The Special Projects Office, U.S. Navy, had published detailed reports 
concerning the applications of PERT.  However, at that time, PERT offered a 
probabilistic approach better suited to controlling such undertakings as the 
Fleet Ballistic Missile Program rather than ordinary construction work.” 
 
        (Fondahl 1964) 
 
Perhaps the most definitive product of this study was a revised network format that 
would come to be known as the “Precedence Diagramming Method.”  This 




on the nodes of the network.  The resulting network diagram would come to be 
known as “activity-on-node.”  Figures 5-4 and 5-5 provide comparison of  “Arrow 
Diagramming” and “Precedence Diagramming” for the same set of activities. 
 
 Figure 5-4 “Diagramming Methods - Arrow Diagramming” 
        (Fondahl 1964) 









Figure 5-5 “Diagramming Methods - Precedence Diagramming” 
        (Fondahl 1964) 
 
The basic concept is also provided by a handwritten PDM network reproduced 
within Fondahl’s 1964 report.  Clearly this represents a feasible non-computerized 







 Figure 5-6 “Initial Rough Network Diagram” 
(Fondahl 1964) 
 
The Navy would allow release of the PDM methodology in late 1961 when it 
appeared in “The Constructor,” the monthly magazine of the construction industry 
trade group the Associated General Contractors of America.   
 Notwithstanding Fondahl’s claims and the classified nature of the BuDock  
report, the Rand Corporation’s D. R. Fulkerson provides a discussion of the Activity-
on-Arrow and a PDM type representation of the same network in an article submitted 
to Management Science in June 1960.  (Fulkerson 1961)  The timing here would 
suggest that Fulkerson’s work is the first evidence of a PDM network.  
Notwithstanding this point, Fulkerson provides the following discussion:  






1 precedes 3, 4 
2 precedes 4, 
3, 4 precedes 5, 
 
and those implied by transitivity.  The usual way of picturing this partially 
ordered set is shown in Fig. 1, where nodes correspond to jobs and directed 
arcs to the displayed order relations.  Another way is shown in Fig. 2, where 





 Figure 5-7  Fulkerson’s AON and AOA Network Models 
         (Fulkerson 1961) 
Interestingly, while noting the necessity of the dashed arc “not corresponding to any 
job” Fulkerson downplays the significance. 
“(t)his need cause no concern, since a dummy job can be added to the project 
to correspond to such an arc, and the assumption made that such fictitious jobs 
have zero completion time and zero cost.  It is not difficult to see that allowing 





        (Fulkerson 1961) 
 
Fondahl’s 1964 report for BuDocks provides an accounting of industry 
feedback to the PDM idea, which Fondahl claims to have been using prior to 1958, 
particularly on topics describing the differences between arrow diagramming and 
precedence diagramming.  Several reviews of the time describe these differences:  
“The principal advantage of the activity-on-node system is its simplicity.  The 
avoidance of dummy activities as special devices eliminates most of the 
problems of networking, especially for beginners.  The disadvantage of using 
activities-on-nodes as a networking system is primarily that it is non-standard.  
The other systems greatly overshadow it in general practice.  The authors 
know of only one computer program for this system, as compared to more 
than 60 for the other systems.”  
      (Moder and Phillips 1964)  
 
“The (PDM) method described above by the present authors avoids the 
necessity (and complexity) of dummy jobs, is easier to program for a 
computer, and seems more straightforward in explanation and application.”   




Moder and Phillips go on to describe BuDock’s adoption of the PDM methodology 
within several of its construction contracts by 1964 and have renamed the technique 
“circle and connecting arrow technique.”   
A detailed discussion of the pros and cons of arrow diagramming and 
precedence diagramming is provided by Glavinich.   
“Both AOA and AON networks are computationally equivalent.  A 
comparison of AOA networks with AON networks for planning and 
scheduling construction projects is as follows: 
 
(1) AOA networks require restraints to maintain schedule logic.  No 





(2) AOA networks are more difficult to lay out than AON networks 
because each activity is defined by two nodes and restraints are 
required to maintain schedule logic. 
 
 
(3) AOA networks are more difficult to understand and present 
because each activity has two numbered nodes and restraints are 
required to maintain schedule logic. 
 
AON networks do, however, require a beginning and ending activity the sole 
purpose of which is to tie the schedule together.  This activity is usually a 
milestone.  AOA networks need only a common event node to tie the start and 
end of the schedule together. 
 
“The AON format is computationally equivalent to the Activity-On-Arrow 
(AOA) format and was favored over AOA as the primary presentation format 
for the flowing reasons: 
 
(1) The use of AON format is used extensively in construction 
scheduling because nearly all microcomputer-based scheduling 
software supports this format. 
 
(2) The AON format is conceptually easier to understand for the 
novice because of its similarities to bar charts.  Unlike the AOA 
format, each activity in an AON network can be uniquely 
identified with one number and the use of restraints is not required. 
 
(3) Examples of network calculations are more easily presented in the 
AON format because all data associated within an activity can be 
included within that activity’s node.” 
(Glavinich 2004) 
The Fulkerson-Fondahl PDM remained in place within the Navy construction 
program during the time of the student’s attendance at NAVFAC’s Naval School, 
Civil Engineer Corps Officers (CECOS) in early 1991.  As part of the introductory 
courses for junior officers, students were instructed to develop a PDM network for a 
project involving the construction of a remote sentry guard shack using only 3-inch 
by 3-inch paper squares (for the activities), string (for the relationships), scissors, tape 




remain part of the BuDocks/NAVFAC curriculum for at least twenty-eight years 
speaks to the soundness of the theoretical concept and its practicality of the method 
which had required, until his study, elaborate computer systems for implementation. 
5.5 The Influence of Information Technology on Network Scheduling 
 
 The Polaris program established focus areas for performing the PERT 
calculation including designing an operating system for data management, the 
establishment of a computer program that would perform the necessary calculations.  
(Malcolm et al. 1959)  Figure 5-8 provides a depiction of the management 
“operation” to include the three inputs into the Naval Operations Research Computer 
(NORC) at the Naval Proving Grounds, Dahlgren, Virginia (1. Event File, 2. Elapsed 
Time Estimates and 3. Change Order Analysis) and outputs.  It is interesting to note 
that Polaris required that “(e)vents be defined unambiguously,” a point lost within the 







 Figure 5-8 “PERT System in Operation”   
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
 
It is not clear if individual computer cards, which were the norm on mainframe 
computers by the mid-1960s, were used for data entry, but some evidence exists that 





 Figure 5-9 “PERT data-processing flow chart” 





 By the time Kelley-Walker presented CPM to industry in 1959, mainframe 
computers, presumably similar to the Navy NORC computer, were available within 
the industry, although limited to the larger corporate concerns.  The data input for 
CPM-PERT systems consisted of computer cards that were stacked and “fed” into the 
computer.  Fourre provides a basic description of the use of computer cards as of 
1964. 
“On larger jobs, when use of a computer is advisable, input to the computer is 
usually in the form of standard 80- or 90-column punch cards…(s)tandard 
programs have been developed to accept cards on an activity basis.  Each card 
must contain two event numbers, the first number describes the start of the 
activity, the second its completion…(t)hese event numbers must be punched 
in certain preassigned columns of the card…a field is also available for the 
activity time.  This field is wide enough to accept three-time estimates for 






Figure 5-10 An 80-Column IBM computer punch card from the early 1970s 






Figure 5-11 A Typical IBM Mainframe Computer Setup in 1972 
(Janis and Thompson 1972) 
Notwithstanding the success of Fondahl’s deliberate attempt to construct a 
non-computerized solution to the critical path method, the limited availability of 
computers did continue to influence CPM’s growth and development.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s mainframe computers were the only practical means of implementing 
larger CPM schedules, and therefore computerized solutions were in place only on 
either very large projects or within large public and private concerns.   
Fondahl’s supplemental report to BuDocks in 1964 did, however, make 
mention of the IBM “Application Programming Announcement” of February 28, 
1964 in which a PDM analyzing system had been developed specifically for the 
construction industry:  “Recently IBM has announced a project control system for the 
construction industry…”  (Fondahl 1964)  With the widespread use of IBM 
computing systems between 1964 and the early 1980s, it is likely that this industry 
specific service line utilizing PDM had a large influence on the approach to CPM 
scheduling for the next fifteen years and beyond. It is ironic that his non-




variation for the computerized solution.  Notwithstanding this point, Precedence 
diagramming and Arrow diagramming methods would both be employed within the 
CPM industry until the advent of the personal computer in the late 1970s and the 
dominance of PDM centric software applications by the mid-1980s.  
 As of 2008, the U. S. construction industry is dominated by the CPM 
scheduling software of the Primavera Systems Corporation.  The U. S. Government 
specifically requires its use, or its “equivalent,” on all construction projects and 
programs of the U.S. Department of Defense, U. S. General Services Administration, 
U. S. State Department, U.S. Department of Energy and all other agencies with a 
construction program.  Software systems found in non-construction related industries 
include Microsoft Project and others.  What is clear, regardless of which industry or 
software system is reviewed, is that scheduling is now conducted not by teams of 
people interacting around a large mainframe computer but is accomplished by one, or 
a small number, of scheduling software operators who may or may not be fully 
connected to the project.  This potential disconnect will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter seven. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
 During the forty-nine years since PERT was introduced to the general public, 
network scheduling has transitioned from a management application reserved for very 
large government and corporate programs to one that is immediately available to most 
anyone having access to a personal computer and scheduling software.  CPM 
schedule are required by both private and public sector entities on most construction 




the Fondahl-Fulkerson Precedence Diagramming Method from the early 1960s is 
perhaps the most significant development in the field of network scheduling.  
Together, these two inventions have greatly influenced the information technology 






The Earned Value Management System 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
 
The American National Standards Institute/EIA-748-A Earned Value 
Management System (EVMS) is intended to produce meaningful cost and schedule 
performance metrics through comparisons of actual progress and actual cost-to-date 
against a pre-existing baseline integrating a project or program’s scope, cost and 
schedule management platforms.  Since the creation of its predecessor the 
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria in 1967 by the United States Air Force, 
EVMS has been recognized as a viable means for monitoring cost and schedule 
performance, and sees broad application, particularly on very large public sector 
procurements.   
As of 2007, formalized EVMS reporting is required for all U. S. Government 
“cost plus” contracts valued at or above $20 Million (USD).  Despite this broad 
implementation by the U. S. Government alone, formalized requirements for EVMS 
implementation found within these contracts provide little in the way of exacting 
procedures for conducting EVMS measurements.  The ANSI/EIA-748-A EVMS 
standard is fairly considered more conceptual than prescriptive.  U. S. Government 
contracts, instead, rely upon the contractor’s own internal cost and scheduling 
accounting procedures for the EVMS calculation.  This offers the possibility for 
several cost and schedule phenomenon that either fall outside the purview of 




platforms by the contractor, to inhibit a project team to accurately describe project 
performance. 
This chapter discusses the Earned Value Management System and its 
limitations while providing discussions of cost and schedule subjects including: (1) 
the appreciable latitude in cost and schedule management practices that exist within 
EVMS requirements, (2) the concept of “Detachable Value,” a term introduced to 
describe monetary amounts that can be earned freely and independently of 
supposedly constraining network logic, (3) a discussion of a work substitution 
methodology that masks EVMS metrics, (4) the influence of the timing of progress 
assessments and cost recording on EVMS metrics, (5) limitations on the 
meaningfulness of the “Earned Schedule” measurement, (6) how the length of the 
evaluation period influences EVMS metrics, (7) how early and late planned value 
profiles may be combined into a “banana curve” which can be used in EVMS 
calculations, and (8) How EVMS metrics return to a state of equilibrium in the latter 
project period greatly affecting the utility of these measurements. Together, these 
discussions may provide a supplement to the ANSI/EIA-748-A and other EVMS 
standards within the practices of scheduling and costing. 
6.2 The ANSI/EIA-748-A Earned Value Management System (EVMS) 
The Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is a platform that measures a 
project’s schedule and cost performance based upon the monetary value and timing of 
accomplished work, or contract scope, against a pre-existing Project Baseline.   
Earned Value Management (EVM) is regarded by the U. S. Government as a tool that 




actual work performed to compared against the project’s baseline, thereby producing 
cost and schedule metrics.  (U. S. Department of Defense 2006) 
“From these basic variance measurements, the program manager (PM) can 
identify significant drivers, forecast future cost and schedule performance, and 
construct corrective action plans to get the program back on track.  EVM 
therefore encompasses both performance measurement (i.e., what the program 
status) and performance management (i.e., what we can do about it).  EVM is 
program management that provides significant benefits to both the 
Government and the contractor.”   
(U. S. Department of Defense 2006) 
In 1967 the United States Department of Defense (DOD) established the 
“cost/schedule control system” (CS2) criteria as a means of providing early warnings 
of cost and schedule problems on major defense contracts.  (U. S. General 
Accounting Office 1997)  A 1997 report by the U. S. Government Accounting Office 
described CS2 as follows: 
“DOD’s CS2 was established in 1967 as a tool to measure the 
value of work performed as compared to the actual costs, a 
concept referred to as earned value.  Earned value goes beyond 
the two-dimensional approach of comparing budgeted costs to 
actuals.  It attempts to compare the value of work 
accomplished during a given period with the work scheduled 
for that period.  By using the value of work done as a basis for 
estimated the cost and time to complete, the earned value 
concepts should alert program managers to potential problems 
sooner than expenditures alone can.” 
(U. S. General Accounting Office 1997) 
EVMS has since been adopted by the governments of foreign countries for 
contract oversight, particularly Sweden, Canada, France, Australia and New Zealand. 
(Fleming and Koppelman 2000)   The U. S. GAO has also reported that the system 
has been embraced by private industry in the United States.  It is not clear if the 
adoption of EVMS by private industry in the United States, to the extent this is so, is 




Government contracts.  The student has been unable to discover a private contractor 
that is using an earned value management system approach where no contract 
requirement exists.  
In December 1996 the U. S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen approved 
revised EVMS criterion which had been developed and proposed by private industry.  
This updated EVMS platform was incorporated into the formal Department of 
Defense standard DODINST 5000.2R and also became the basis of the NSIA/EIA 
748 which, as of July 1998 became the “official” EVMS platform for the United 
States Government.  (Fleming and Koppelman 2000)  A comparison of the original 
35 CS2 criteria and 32 EVMS criteria are provided under Appendix F.  (Fleming and 
Koppelman 2000) 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) recognized EVMS as a formal 
standard in 1999.  As of 2006 the Department of Defense required EVMS on all “cost 
or incentive contracts, subcontracts, intra-government work agreements, & other 
agreements valued at over $20 Million.”  In November 2006 EVMS became 
mandatory on all cost-plus U. S. Government contracts over $20,000,000.00.  (U. S. 






SPI - Schedule Performance Index CPI - Cost Performance Index  
SV - Schedule Variance   CV - Cost Variance  
 
Figure 6-1 Earned Value System Parameters   
 
ANSI/EIA-748-A “Standard for Earned Value Management Systems” revised 
EVMS terminology contained within the original (CS2) standard and this revised 
terminology as follows: 
 
Planned Value (PV).  Planned Value is the budgeted cost for 




Earned Value (EV).  Earned Value is the budgeted amount for 




Actual Cost (AC).  Actual Cost is the total cost incurred in 
accomplishing work on the schedule activity or WBS 
component.  This Actual Cost must correspond in definition 
and coverage to whatever was budgeted for the Planned Value 






Cost Variance (CV).  Cost Variance equals earned value (EV) 
minus actual cost (AC).  The cost variance at the end of the 
project will be the difference between the budget at completion 
(BAC) and the actual amount spent. 
   
Cost Variance Formula:                     CV = EV – AC 
 
 
Schedule Variance (SV).  Schedule Variance equals earned 
value (EV) minus planned value (PV).  Schedule variance will 
ultimately equal zero when the project is completed because all 
of the planned values will have been earned.   
 
Schedule Variance Formula:              SV = EV – PV 
 
 
Cost Performance Index (CPI).  CPI equals the ratio of the 
earned value to the actual cost.   
 
Cost Performance Index Formula:  CPI = EV/AC 
 
 
Schedule Performance Index (SPI).  SPI equals the ratio of the 
earned value to the planned value.   
 




All three variables of the EVMS system, Planned Value, Earned Value and Actual 
Cost, can be captured within a project’s Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) platform 
where cost and schedule information have been integrated to create a “cost loaded 
schedule.”  The cost loaded schedule is often already a formal contract requirement 
on all U. S. Government, even where there is no formal EVMS requirement.  





 While the concepts of cost variance measurement date back to at least the 
works of Frederick Taylor and Lawrence Gantt, EVMS can be traced to the original 
PERT methodology developed by the Polaris program between 1955 and 1958.  
(Fleming and Koppelman 2000)  By 1962 there were two types of PERT techniques 
employed by the U. S. Government: “PERT/Time” and “PERT/Cost.”  PERT/Time 
was essentially the continuation of the time management techniques described by 
Malcolm et al. whereas PERT/Cost incorporated the cost and resource variables that 
the Polaris team had identified in very early efforts but deliberately set aside.   
“The status of a developmental program at any given time is a function of 
several variables…(r)esources…technical performance…and time.  Ideally, 
we should like to evaluate a given actual schedule in terms of all three 
variables…  To do this it is necessary to establish a criterion that integrates 
time, resources, and performance into meaningful utility.  Further, it is 
necessary that the variables be measurable over all feasible ranges.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the nature and difficulty in 
furthering such an approach.  Suffice to say, that it was determined that no 
such criterion was available and that the data-processing problems associated 
with a plan of some 10,000 events would preclude its practical 
implementation in any case.  Therefore an approach dealing only with the 
time variable was selected.”  
 (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
The connection to PERT can be made because within the 1962 “PERT/Cost” platform 
was a specific management report titled “cost of work report” which captured the 
concepts of cost and schedule variances that are embodied within contemporaneous 
EVMS indices.  Neither “PERT/Time” nor “PERT/Cost” would be in use within 
federal government procurements by mid to late 1960s.  (Fleming and Koppelman 
2000) 
By late 1967 the U. S. Air Force had prepared thirty-five criteria that were to 




a cost-plus incentive structure.  These criteria were collectively termed the 
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) and were based upon management 
techniques employed by the Air Force within the Minuteman ICBM program between 
1965 and 1967. (Fleming and Koppelman 2000)  See Appendix F.  C/SCSC (aka CS2 
or CS2) was widely implemented by the U. S. Government during the 1970s, 80s and 
90s.   
6.4 U. S. Government Requirements for EVMS 
 
As of October 20007, the U. S. Government requires EVMS on all “cost-plus” 
contracts greater than $20  million and discourages its use on EVMS on “firm-fixed-
price” contracts of any amount.  The EVMS requirements are formally established by 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): 
“FAR  34.201  Policy.  
An Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is required for major 
acquisitions for development, in accordance with OMB Circular A-11. The 
Government may also require an EVMS for other acquisitions, in accordance 
with agency procedures…”  
 
    (U. S. General Services Administration 1999) 
 
This clause continues, at least encouraging the contractor’s use of the ANSI/EIA-748-
A in response to the EVM requirement: 
“If the offeror proposes to use a system that has not been determined to be in  
compliance with the American National Standards Institute /Electronics 
Industries Alliance (ANSI/EIA) Standard-748, Earned Value Management 
Systems, the offeror shall submit a comprehensive plan for compliance with 
these EVMS standards. Offerors shall not be eliminated from consideration 
for contract award because they do not have an EVMS that complies with 
these standards.”  





The type of incentive structure dictates how much cost information is shared, 
and unshared, between owner and contractor.  In cost-plus-fee contracts, contracts 
that see far greater application of the Earned Value Management System by the U. S. 
Government, there is generally only one cost management platform for the project 
and both parties have full access to it at any point in time.  In this “open book” 
arrangement the contractor is paid for its costs incurred “plus” a fee which is based 
upon some sort of pre-arranged calculation such as a percentage of cost incurred, a 
function of effort and/or time, a simple lump sum amount atop the project cost or a 
combination thereof.  In order to provide an incentive to the contractor to minimize 
the overall project cost to the owner, the contractor’s fee might be capped at a 
monetary amount or actually increased in situations where the contractor has 
maintained the overall cost below a monetary target.  This type of project 
arrangement is known as a “Guaranteed Maximum Price.”  There may also be 
penalties assessed (i.e. fee reductions) for cost or schedule overruns.  Such “carrot 
and stick” fee structures are designed to make the contractor “whole” for costs 
incurred and pay a reasonable profit or fee, while at the same time ensuring that the 
contractor is indeed motivated to minimize the project’s overall cost (to owner). 
 A “firm-fixed-price” contract, or “lump sum,” is a simpler arrangement 
where a contractor is paid a sum certain for work performed with no reporting, but for 
limited exceptions of actual costs incurred.  Here, the contractor must estimate the 
cost of the work and add a “contingency” amount for cost uncertainties.  Should the 
final cost of the work be less than the contract price, the difference may be considered 




the contract does not allow for the reimbursement of the loss.  This is the risk that is 
assigned to the contractor under a firm-fixed-price arrangement.   
6.5 The Limitations of EVMS Management 
 
Several aspects of the EVMS system are noted as potential weaknesses which 
offer the possibility of inaccurate representations of project performance.  These 
limitations are discussed within subsections 6.5.1 through 6.5.8. 
 
6.5.1 Non-Prescriptive Requirements for EVMS 
 
 Although a formal ANSI standard, the 32 criteria are deliberately non-
prescriptive.  As such it is reasonable to suggest that in the absence of discrete 
requirements across the five main areas, a contractor has latitude in managing their 
cost and schedule platform for a project or program.  While it was not the intent of the 
EVMS authors to dictate contractor means and methods, it is worth noting that the 
1997 re-write of the EVMS standard relaxed several areas.  EVMS Criteria Number 
22, for example, struck key terminology related to comparisons between planned 
value and earned value.  The omitted standard which was stricken in 1997 was as 
follows: 
 
Identify at the cost account level on a monthly basis using data from, or 
reconcilable with, the accounting system…(v)ariances resulting from the 
comparisons between the budgeted cost for work scheduled and the budgeted 
cost for work performed …together with the reasons for significant variances. 
        
(Fleming and Koppelman 2000) 






This is a significant revision and allows for work substitutions to mask adverse 
performance.  By not requiring EVMS calculations to be performed at a cost account 
level, holistic, program level calculations are possible and provide a means to mask 
planned-but-unperformed work with prematurely performed work that was not 
scheduled to occur until a much later point in the schedule.  This subject is discussed 
in greater detail in latter portions in sub-section 6.5.3.  
Several other differences, less substantive, but indicative of the relaxation of 
reporting requirements, include the requirement to provide information “as needed” 
by management rather than simple requiring this information be submitted as was the 
case in the CS2 standard.  See ANSI EVMS criterion 23, 24, 25, 27 and 29.  See 
Appendix F.  
6.5.2 Detachable Value 
Within the subject of granularity, or level of detail, of the cost and schedule 
platforms is the concept that even at the most detailed or “critical element” level,  
there exist multiple cost components that can, in certain cases, be “earned” 
independent of schedule network logic.  This concept is introduced as “detachable 
value.”  An example would be a single schedule activity (“Activity 3”) that has an 
assigned planned value (PV) of $10.  Although the CPM schedule clearly shows that 
Activity 3 cannot commence until Activity 2 is complete, something that will not 
occur for several months, the contractor might pre-purchase material associated 
Activity 3 several weeks, or even months, in advance.  The value of the material, 
valued at $2 in this example, is therefore “detachable” from Activity 3.  Figure  6-2 






Figure 6-2 The Detachable Value Concept 
 
The term “detachable value” is defined as follows: 
 
Detachable Value: The monetary value within a single schedule activity that can 
be earned independent of the satisfaction of expressed predecessor schedule logic.  
 
The theory surrounding this concept is based upon the notion that although CPM 
networks treat individual activities as discrete and absolute objects with a discrete 
start and finish point for the purposes of time management, the same standard cannot 
be applied to the cost components of those same activities.  Although breaking single 
activities with detachable value down into multiple activities, it is often impractical to 
impose excessive granularity on a project schedule platform simply to address the 
detachable value concern.  Therefore it could be recognized that some individual 
work activities or project elements will have a portion of their total monetary value 




early start date provided by the conventional network calculation.  Where this value is 
“detachable” this has an optimistic influence on EVMS variances and indices because 
it is “earned” atop the monetary amounts of earlier activities that have already been 
accomplished.  
 
6.5.3 Substitute Value 
Where planned work is not performed within its planned timeframe or is 
performed at a slower rate of progress, two schedule performance indicators within an 
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) are designed to detect and quantify these 
events.  These two indicators are Schedule Variance (SV) and Schedule Performance 
Index (SPI) which compare the value of planned work to date to the earned value (the 
value of work performed) using the budgeted values of each work item.   
 
         Schedule Variance = Earned Value - Planned Value  
SV = EV – PV 
Where SV > $0, the Project is Ahead of Schedule 
 
                     Schedule Performance Index = Earned Value / Planned Value  
SPI = EV/PV 
Where SPI > 1.00, the Project is Ahead of Schedule 
 
It is not uncommon for a project to see the accomplishment of work planned 




given period to not be performed.  These two events are defined by the student as 
“premature work” and “deferred work.”  The monetary value of premature work will 
have a positive effect on the earned value to date and thereby the earned value 
schedule performance indicators SV and SPI.  Deferred work will have a negative 
effect on these same two.  But where these two events occur simultaneously, because 
of the “lost language” within EVMS standard #22, SV and SPI will only show the net 
result of these two separate events.  Worse some, or all, of the “deferred” work is on 
the critical path of the project thereby representing a project schedule delay, the 
introduction of non-critical premature work would partially or fully mask the deferred 
work.  Thus, where unplanned work is performed ahead of schedule, EVMS schedule 
performance indicators are compromised to some degree.  Ultimately, as the project 
progresses, the schedule variance and schedule performance index will eventually 
reflect the adverse performance unless the contractor has been able to fully mitigate 
the effect of the original impact(s).  This might not occur for a significant period of 
time and the delay limits the project team’s ability to be cognizant of the situation and 
take proper action where necessary.   
Kerzner provides five questions to be asked during the course of a 
conventional EVMS variance analysis (Kerzner, 2003).  These five questions are: 
 
1. How much work should be done? 
2. How much work is done? 
3. How much did the “is done” work cost? 
4. What was the total job supposed to cost? 





Kerzner’s conventional approach produces the values for “Planned Value”, 
“Earned Value”, “Actual Cost” and “Estimate at Completion.”  What neither 
Kerzner’s questions nor conventional EVMS methodologies consider, however, is 
that performed work can be freely substituted into the EVMS calculations without 
regard to whether it was planned to be performed then or at a much later point in the 
project.  In the case where a planned critical activity is not performed, and a non-
critical activity of equal value planned for much later on in the project is performed in 
its stead, the EVMS indicators will not detect this substitution and thus present a 
more favorable indication for the period in question.  In order to measure the effects 
of this phenomenon it is necessary to establish a methodology for measuring both 
deferred work and premature work and calculating EVMS schedule performance 
indicators.  The new methodology must provide for the early detection of work 
“deferrals,” thereby providing the project team with an earlier indication of schedule 
variance than is possible using conventional EVMS calculations. 
 The following figure represents a project that at the outset (0%) is planned to 
cost one hundred dollars.  Figure 1 provides a representation of the planned value 
across ten progress periods, each with a planned value of ten dollars.  Figure 6-3 















Earned Value    Planned Value  








Figure 6-3 As Planned Schedule as of “t0” versus Performance as of “t4”   
 
At time t4 the project has earned forty dollars which represents the exact value 
of the work that was planned to occur as of a specific point.  But there have been two 
departures from the original plan.   The first is that $2 worth of work items that had 
been planned for the t3 to t4 period was not earned.  The second is that $2 of the work 
that has been earned as of t4 was originally planned to occur after the t4 completion 
point.  The problem becomes apparent when conventional EVMS computations as of 
t4 yield “perfect” EVMS metrics.  
 
Planned Value (PV)    = $10 + $10 + $10 + $10 
   = $40 
 
Earned Value (EV)    = $10 + $10 + $10 + $8 + $2 
$10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 
t0 t1                 t2            t3                  t4                  t5                 t6                  t7                  t8                  t9                 t10 
 
$10 $10 $10 $8 $8 $10 $10 $10 $10 $10 
$2 $2 





     = $40 
 
Schedule Performance Index (SPI) = EV / PV 
= $40 / $40 
   = 1.0 
 
Schedule Variance (SV)   = EV – PV 
     = $40 - $40 
     = $0     
 
Together the “deferred work” (i.e. the $2 planned to have been earned prior to 
t4 but unearned) and the prematurely performed work (i.e. the $2 planned to have 
been earned after t4, but now already earned), which are coincidentally of equal value 
in this example, perfectly mask each other making either event undetectable.  Where 
critical path activities have been deferred, this phenomenon allows for a more 
favorable or optimistic indication of cost and schedule performance within 
conventional EVMS calculations for the project, at least temporarily.  Ultimately, the 
work that is not being performed will produce adverse EVMS values, but this might 
not occur immediately and a lag of several weeks or months before this becomes 
obvious.   
A corollary concern is that work that is not performed when scheduled stands a 
greater risk of cost or schedule impact which might be attributable to price escalation, 
extended financing, disruptions to other work activities resulting in productivity 
losses, demobilizations, out of sequence work, demobilization of subcontractors and 
other affects.  The “work substitution” approach might provide a means to manipulate 




and/or superior performance within a specific work area.  Short of exhaustive 
analysis, this provides a means for a contractor to “mask” adverse performance in one 
area with superior performance in another.  These effects are virtually undetectable 
without extensive analytical effort. 
6.5.4 The Costing Lag 
 
EVMS calculations are influenced by the different age of information between 
earned value, which is based upon an up to the moment and subjective assessment 
work accomplished versus actual cost, which relies upon the contractor’s recording of 
expenses in the project ledger.   Cost recording, while perhaps more objective than 
assigning percentages to individual activities, often lags the progress assessment by 
several weeks.  Thus the value for Actual Cost is indeed deflated relative to its true 
amount.   This presents a situation at the time of the assessment where the variables 
necessary to compute Earned Value (Planned Value and Percent complete) are fully 
visible but the final actual cost amount is not known.  With Actual Cost being lower 
than its finalized amount, the values for Cost Variance and Cost Performance Index 





Figure 6-4 The Age of Information for Earned Value vs. Actual Costs 
 
Stated differently, earned value, which relies upon a calculation of percent complete 
applied against the Planned Value of individual activities at an instantaneous point in 
time, might be several days or weeks ahead of the “project costing” exercise.  Thus, 
Earned Value, the numerator within the formula for the Cost Performance Index (CPI 
= EV / AC) is likely “inflated” relative to the actual cost denominator which does not 
have all costs recorded.  To the extent this is so, the cost performance index will 
recognize performance to date but actual costs as of an earlier point in time.  The CPI 
would be slighter higher, or more optimistic, than it actually should be.  To the extent 
a contractor might choose to “slowly” enter actual costs, this could also be considered 
a candidate for EVMS manipulation.  
Therefore, several processes seem to factor heavily into the validity of the 




assessment of current progress, the timing of the progress “snapshot” and the follow-
on processing of the payment application and reporting of EVMS data.  In light of the 
FAR requirement for certified payment applications it is also important to consider 
that these documents must be prepared, reviewed and validated by the contractor for 
several days prior to their formal submission to the owner.  Therefore they do not 
represent an exact accounting of current project status, although it would seem that 
the schedule and cost information might not be more than just a few days old.   
6.5.5 Critical Path Value 
 
Although not formally recognized within the ANSI standard, “Earned Schedule” 
(ES) can be calculated as another measure of schedule performance.  Corovic 
describes the use of the earned value vs. planned value comparison as the basis for a 
separate EVMS indicator for schedule performance.  (Corovic 2007)  Earned 
schedule is calculated by simply plotting both earned value and planned value over 
time and then measuring the horizontal distance between from the earned value curve 
to the planned value curve.  If the earned value curve is to the right of the planned 
value curve, then the project is behind by an amount of time represented by the length 
of the line segment.   If the curves are reversed, then the project is ahead of schedule 






 Figure 6-5 Earned Schedule 
 
But the validity of earned schedule as a means for assessing schedule performance is 
extremely limited.  It’s utility as a measure of schedule performance is strongly, if not 
completely, influenced by how much monetary value has been assigned or allocated 
to individual activities on the critical path of the project schedule.  In fact, Earned 
Schedule is only relevant where there is a strong, positive correlation between 
monetary value and schedule criticality.  Since earned schedule, however, does not 
account for the criticality of individual activities, projects with more money assigned 
to the critical path will have more meaningful earned schedule calculations, but this is 
not practical as a sound scheduling practice.   
The term “critical path value” or “critical value” may be used to describe the 
total monetary value of all critical path activities.  These are perhaps the only 
activities that should be considered in evaluations of schedule performance.  If earned 




Critical Schedule” indicator could be used to evaluate schedule performance in its 
stead.   
Two fictitious sample projects can be used to demonstrate this point.  Projects 
A and B are identical in almost every sense.  Each are for the construction of a highly 
specialized, stand alone building being built immediately adjacent to one another, 
from the same set of architectural and engineering plans, in the same county and 
municipality by the same general contractor and subcontractors.  Each project has a 
separate contract and CPM schedule associated with it and the value of each project is 
$300,000,000.00 and the schedules for projects A and B are the same, consisting of 
the same 9,000 activities.  Despite the similarities of the two projects, identical in 
every sense, the schedules submitted by different project managers have different cost 
loading.  The value of critical activities for Project A total $50 Million, while Project 
B’s total $250 Million.  Using alternative terminology, Projects A and B have 
“critical values” of $50 Million and $250 Million, respectively.  Project B, having a 
higher relative amount of monetary value on the critical path, could be evaluated 
more effectively for time performance using the earned schedule whereas Project A, 
where there is very little monetary value on the critical path could not.  In light of the 
fact that the “critical value” for most projects is about 10% of overall project cost, this 
provides evidence that as a practical matter, the earned schedule indicator is possibly 
not a reasonable means to assess schedule performance.  Kelley noted the relatively 
small number of activities on the critical path in his first workings on the critical path 
method which speak to the basic limitation of Earned Schedule. 
“It is of interest to not that in all ‘real’ projects studied to date, less than 10 per 




schedules.  This fact points out the fallacy, prevalent in project work, of 
embarking on an ‘across-the-board’ crash program when expediting the 
project end date is required.  This is probably an illustration of Pareto’s 
principle that “In any series of elements to be controlled, a selected small 
fraction, in terms of numbers of elements, always accounts for a large 
fraction, in terms of effect.”  (Kelley 1961) 
 
6.5.6 The Duration of the Analytical Period 
 
EVMS indices are based upon a comparison of the most current cost and schedule 
platform to a pre-existing or “baseline” platform.  As such, EVMS requires that both 
the most current and pre-existing platforms represent: (1) an accurate representation 
of contract requirements; (2) a reasonable allocation of contract costs over the 
contract performance period; (3) an accurate or up to date presentation of actual costs; 
(4) an accurate recording of actual progress and events to date; or (5) a reasonable 
plan for work yet to be performed.  In most EVMS methodologies, the pre-existing 
platform is often the original baseline schedule that was established very early on in 
the project, or one that is updated no more frequently than on an annual basis.    This 
approach is consistent with the U. S. Department of Defense standard for EVMS 
correctly notes that it is the comparison of schedule and cost information contained 
within (1.) the project’s most current cost/schedule update, to (2.) the project’s 
cost/schedule baseline, that forms the basis of the EVMS calculations at given point 
in time.   
 “As work is performed and measured against the baseline, the corresponding 
budge value is “earned”.  From this earned value metric, cost and schedule 
variances can be determined and analyzed.  From these basic variance 
measurements, the program manager (PM) can identify significant drivers, 
forecast future cost and schedule performance, and construct corrective action 





In cases where project baselines are aged several months, or longer, it is quite 
possible that the project’s cost/schedule baseline no longer represents the contractor’s 
intended approach to the project.  Reasons for deviations from the original “baseline” 
could include the clarification of the contractor’s intended approach to the project, 
changed conditions, the addition of scope by the owner, acts of god, or other events 
that might have revised the contractor’s means and methods.  It is also possible, 
sometimes, that the baseline cost/schedule platform was indeed never reasonable 
and/or represented the contractor’s intended approach to the project.   
The distinct contrast of granularity when a comparing-to-baseline approach is adopted 
is illustrated under Figure 6-6.   Also, it is more likely that differences in the type of 





Figure 6-6  Granular Differences in the Comparison-To-Baseline Approach 
To minimize the effects of aged baselines, a methodology that steps away 
from comparisons between the current update and the original baseline in favor of a 
comparison to the most recent update to the cost loaded schedule.  This approach is 
consistent with analysis performed by the Weyerhauser Corporation in 1999 although 





 Figure 6-7 Earned Value to Date vs. Baseline PV and Most Recent PV 
While the project schedule and project cost management platforms change over time, 
they change less from month to month.  Schedule granularity and Scope granularity, 
just two examples, are more consistent between the two schedules that are one month 
apart as compared to one year apart.   
United States case law supports this periodic approach which resembles more of a 
“windows” or “time impact analysis” methodology the “as-planned versus as-built” 
methodology which is no longer an acceptable for the demonstration of time impacts.  
While not suggesting that existing EVMS methodology be abandoned, this 
supplemental approach could support the use of EVMS as a means of detecting 
adverse cost/schedule performance at an earlier point in time than is currently 
possible.   
Another advantage of the periodic analyses is that EVMS metrics become 




completion date of the schedule has passed and the project is still underway.  When 
this has happened, earned value is recorded but with no planned value against which 
to measure performance, the indicators will eventually revert to their equilibrium 
positions and as such are compromised.   
6.5.7 Banana Curves 
 
 Although earned value management systems are applied to projects having 
CPM schedules planned value EVMS indices do not account for the fact that these 
profiles have float and can be earned within a period, rather than at a discrete point in 
time.  Were one to recognize the two profiles for Planned Value (PV), there could be 
additional indicators there could indeed be two separate sets of EVMS indicators; one 
from the PVEarly profile and a second from the PVLate profile.  The resulting profiles 










While banana curves have been used to describe project cash curves, these have not 
been applied to EVMS.  Where EVMS is implemented within a project or program 
having a CPM schedule, recognizing the two “extreme” profiles (i.e. early and late) 
for planned value is a useful management tool. 
 
 
6.5.8 Consideration of Dissimilar Work in Final Cost Estimates 
 
Another complication with EVMS analyses using aged baselines is that long term 
projections are made using performance to date.  The “Estimate at Completion” 
(EAC) is perhaps the best example for this point.  EAC is calculated through 
extrapolation using cost performance to date.   
 
 




But this approach fails to account for the fact that rarely, is an endeavor that is 
large enough to require the EVMS methodology, performed by one subcontractor, 
trade or represent a uniform type of work.  Projects or programs that merit a formal 
EVMS requirement typically have very diverse requirements, trades and types of 
work.  In Stephen Revay’s article “Calculating Impact Costs” which dealt with the 
quantification of productivity losses, he noted that there must be a consideration 
given towards how calculations must consider how “representative” a particular work 
type is of another if they are to be combined in a calculation.  (Revay 1987)  
Applying his thought to EVMS, in order for meaningful “Estimate at Completion” 
values, the work performed up through the interim measurement point would need to 
be representative of the work throughout the entire project.  While this is possible, it 
is seemingly unlikely for large, complex projects or programs having dozens if not 
hundreds of separate performers, and presumably, varying levels of cost and schedule 
performance.   It is perhaps possible to define a term “Representative Value” as the 
measure of how the value of an individual project cost element is representative of 
that for the entire project or program.  
6.6 Chapter Summary 
The latitude in EVMS cost and schedule management allows for several cost 
and schedule phenomenon to interfere with meaningful EVMS results.  The concepts 
of “Detachable Value,” “Substitute Value,” “Critical Value,” the “Costing Lag,” 
“Representative Value” and the “Return to Equilibrium” are perhaps considerations 
might be of assistance to any EMVS practitioner.  With these concepts it is perhaps 




and EVMS through not only an awareness of these methodologies that include dual 
profiles for planned value (i.e. “banana curves”), the measurement of EVMS metrics 
across shorter periods of time and across fewer scope elements within the project’s 












The Rationale for An Event-Centric Network for Time Management 
 
7.1 The Loss of Basic PERT Principles in Modern Construction Scheduling  
 
 As of 2008, CPM networks consist of a network of activities and events 
within a software that utilizing the Precedence Diagramming Method using a personal 
computer.  Figure 7-1 illustrates the PERT, Activity-on-Arrow CPM and Precedence 
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Today’s scheduling industry relies almost exclusively on what Primavera Systems 
Incorporated describes as “PDM” and “Gannt” views of the network.  A typical 




 Figure 7-2 “PDM” & “Gantt” Views Using Primavera Suretrak 
 
Today’s CPMs are typically prepared by a single CPM scheduler modeling 
the project on a personal computer.  They are often full time professional scheduling 
consultants working on multiple projects, or are field personnel who have been 
assigned scheduling tasks as a collateral duty.  This picture is perhaps different from 
the networks prepared by the Polaris team.  Here, there were a large number of 
personnel involved eliciting the time estimates from engineers who maintained “a 
thorough understanding of the work to be done.” This “team” established and 
followed “explicit definitions” for each condition under an “interrogation process” 




knowledge of the existing schedule and…provide information concerning the 
inherent difficulties and variability in the activity being estimated.”  (Malcolm et al. 
1959)  Not only are such deliberations involving teams of skilled project participants 
less common within the industries of 2008, the professional scheduler may know very 
little about the technical aspects of the project itself, having instead a limited 
technical skill set focused more on CPM software than how the project or program 
needs to be sequenced. 
Today’s networks, further, are typically provided at an exhaustive level of 
detail, perhaps far beyond the detail necessary for an owner to simply monitor and 
assess progress. It is not uncommon to have between 500 to 10,000 activities on 
building projects with values above $5,000,000.00 (USD).  And while this detail has 
a purpose, such as allowing subcontractors to know their approximate performance 
periods, this level of granularity provides an opportunity for at least some project 
participants to “lose their way.”  It is not uncommon to find contracts where owners 
have specified a high level of detail for the schedule, requiring a minimum number of 
activities in the thousands.  What can also be troublesome are contract requirements 
stating that no activity duration may exceed a specified duration of say three or four 
weeks, as is often the case for many agencies of the U.S. Government. 
“Use the Critical Path Method (CPM) of network calculation to generate the 
project schedule.  Prepare the project schedule using the Precedence Diagram 
Method (PDM)…(d)evelop the project schedule to an appropriate level of 
detail...(r)easonable activity durations are those that allow the progress of 
ongoing activities to be accurately determined between update periods.  Less 
than 2 percent of all non-procurement activities shall have original durations 
(OD) greater than 20 work days or 30 calendar days.” 





This is not in concert with the Project Management Institute’s “Rolling Wave” 
concept, or most contractor’s means and methods, which call for the addition of 
definition to the latter portion of the schedule as the project proceeds.  Under “Rolling 
Wave,” the short term activities are generally greater in number and shorter in 
duration, while those several months or years in the future are longer.  This technique 
is entirely appropriate given the uncertainty associated with long term planning.  To 
the extent that an “artificial” requirement such as the Army’s is imposed, and this 
requirement is not unusual in the construction industry, the contractor must often 
make assumptions about means and methods which may as yet be unknown, and 
remain so for several months. 
 
 
Figure 7-3 Schedule Granularity Over Time 
  
 The level of detail, or schedule granularity, is a very key point in this study 




the construction industry struggles with in 2008.  A 2003 article in Engineering News 
Record (ENR) described “widespread abuses of powerful software (that) produce(ed) 
badly flawed or deliberately deceptive schedules that look good but lack 
mathematical coherence or common sense about the way the industry works.  The 
result is confusion, delayed project and lawsuits”  (Korman and Daniels 2003)  Four 
men were identified as experts in the article; attorneys Jon Wickwire and Fred 
Plotnik; and professional schedulers James O’Brien and Stuart Ockman.  These men 
identified the advent of the PC and accessibility of scheduling software “in the hands 
of inexperienced and poorly trained practitioners” as the problem, lamented the loss 
of the more intuitive Activity-on-Arrow method to the “de-facto standard” PDM and 
suggested that the software industry, most notably Primavera Systems Incorporated, 
was largely to blame for the situation.  Primavera’s software stopped supporting an 
activity-on-arrow format when it dedicated itself to the Microsoft Windows operating 
system in 1994.  Primavera’s President, Richard K. Faris indicated that the statements 
of these four men were “dead wrong” and that “Primavera can’t be responsible for 
abuses any more than a spreadsheet company is responsible for those who use its 
product to draw up faulty or deceptive reports, he contends.”  (Korman and Daniels 
2003) 
The coverage of the scheduling “crisis” by ENR, which is perhaps the most 
widely read weekly construction journal in the United States, was something of an 
announcement of sorts for the newly founded College of Scheduling of the Project 




primary interviewees: Wickwire, Ockman, O’Brien and Plotnick.  James E. Kelley, 
Jr. provided a response to the article in the follow-on issue of ENR: 
 “Your cover story…paints a disheartening picture of the current state of CPM 
schedules... It's only 46 years since Morgan Walker and I first worked out 
CPM for duPont and yet project people are still falling into some of the same 
scheduling traps warned against during CPM's childhood. The use of features 
like "leads and lags," "multiple calendars" and "assigned constraints" do 
provide some levels of schedule flexibility. In practice, their use too often 
leads to inconsistent schedules and misleading views of project condition.” 
 
          (Kelley 2003) 
 
 Clearly the industry faced a crisis, at least perhaps on a project to project 
basis, and little has happened to alter the situation in the last five years.  Cost and 
schedule overruns on large public projects, while not new developments in 2003, are 
perhaps more caustic when one recognizes that the CPM can be and is used a tool to 
“set up” a large recovery during a claims scenario (i.e. litigation).  One contractor 
strategy apparent on a recent $200-Million U.S. Government construction project saw 
an unrealistically shortened initial baseline schedule submitted prior to the start of 
construction so that the time between planned and actual completion, were it to be 
late, were maximized allowing for a greater monetary recovery for time related costs.  
The project did indeed finish late and the contractor’s post-project claim at $100-
million (with interest) was the largest in the history of that individual agency.  
Another contractor on a multi-billion dollar project used the combination of a remote 
software called “progress override” and the recording of extremely small amounts of 
progress on only a small number of activities to obscure the fact that the project had 
already experienced a slippage of more than one year.  While this latter example 




activities (over 50,000 for this project) and an understaffed government field office 
without monies for the hiring of a “counter-scheduler” to analyze the submission in 
great detail, this sort of manipulation is most often detected only through exception.  
As a practical matter there are a myriad of schedule manipulations that can be 
performed within the depths of a large CPM and only the heavily staffed owners with 
the ability to hire a scheduling expert will be able to detect these strategies, which are 
if not fraudulent, at least beyond the confines of respectable behavior in certain 
circles. 
Also, where a project is delivered after the contract completion date, most 
federal contracts penalize the contactor by imposing “liquidated damages” -- a 
monetary penalty for every day that the project is late.  In order that contractors may 
avoid both liquidated damages and recover their time related costs where the project 
is delivered late, they must successfully prove which issue(s) or event(s) delayed the 
project and which party was responsible.  Where the delay is the fault of the owner, a 
“compensable” delay allows the contractor to be paid for its time related costs and not 
be subject to the assessment of liquidated damages.  Where the delay is the fault of 
neither party, an “excusable” delay excuses the assessment of liquidate damages but 
does not provide the contractor with compensation for time related costs.  In both 
situations, the process will result in a formal change to the contract completion date 
by the contracting officer, but satisfactory supporting documentation is required.  The 
project’s schedule platform is critical to this proof and the degree to which the 
contractor can successfully express his position can provide significant swings to the 




Before elaborating on the various manipulative practices that can be employed 
within a CPM schedule, it is first important to speak to motive, specifically, why 
project participants might seek to engage in a deceptive scheduling practice.  A 
contractor’s time related costs such as those for salaried personnel, workspace costs, 
consumable supplies and other overhead items, make up a significant amount of the 
contractor’s overall contract amount, often more than 10% of total project cost.  This 
value is even more significant when one looks at how much time related costs are 
attributed to the prime contractor which are often not passed on to the subcontractor 
due to contract provisions that preclude the sub from enjoying the ability to recover 
time related costs in all situations where the prime does. 
The topic of manipulative scheduling has been somewhat confined, at least in 
the United States, to subjects related to scheduling software.  Discussions, flowing 
primarily from the 2003 article in ENR, have focused upon whether CPM software 
operators are making revisions to individual work activities, network logic or 
relationships, adjustments to software settings that affecting the network calculation 
because of actual project conditions or to present a more favorable position.  There 
have been one or more software platforms developed specifically for the purpose of 
itemizing changes between two electronic schedule updates, and the requirement of 
this software has found its way into the scheduling requirements of many federal 
construction contracts.  (U. S. Navy 2007) 
But it is the student’s belief that manipulative scheduling practices can also 
fall outside the confines of a software platform.  A contractor, for example, might 




a schedule disruption or delay in order to present a stronger position at a later point in 
time.  It is important to suggest, therefore, that schedule manipulations can take 
several forms, some expressed in software and formal project records, others 
expressed only in the strategies, tactics, words and movements of the members of the 
project team. 
 The cost of implementing a formal CPM is not insignificant.  Something that 
appears to have remained constant through the last fifty years.     
 “…regarding (PERT’s) use as an analytical tool, a close examination shows that 
the basic theoretical approach explained in most textbooks on PERT is not always 
practical.  It is an exceptional case where PERT is useful as an analytical tool… 
 
“Other drawbacks appear in the implementation of PERT networks, which in 
some cases require a team to keep them current; this becomes costly.  
 
“Key punches for such cards are available for rental, for about $40 per month, or 
sale, from both IBM and UNIVAC.” 
(Fourre 1968) 
Notwithstanding the advent of the personal computer, which has enhanced 
accessibility, the implementation of a CPM function remains costly as of 2008.  
Software prices range from $400 to $3,000 for a single seat license and hourly rates 
for professional schedulers range between $75 to $150, with higher rates for the more 
experienced.  New editions of the software are issued every three to five years, 
owner’s place specific requirements for these systems, and the individual contractors 
must invest money and time in order to keep up.  Those schedulers that are typically 
lent to a project are somewhat detached from the project, often appearing for several 
hours per month on small to mid-size projects to prepare updates.  It is this 




describes, that is common.  Where schedulers are working independently, or in a 
“vacuum,” Fourre’s article is relevant. 
“In other cases networks have become so mechanized that labeling has been 
done with a numbering system, making it difficult to read or understand the 
network.  As a result interest diminishes until the effort is either dropped 
altogether or a token effort is maintained to appease management.  There are 
cases where development and maintenance of the network have been given 
over to PERT group that knows little if anything of the details, resulting in an 
incorrect schedule.”   
(Fourre 1968) 
As an aside, the fact that the U.S. Government often specifies Primavera “or 
equivalent” within their construction contracts does help this situation, although one 
must question whether this is in keeping with the spirit of “full and open” 
competition.  This type of quasi-proprietary requirement, which is essentially no 
longer debated for CPM software, is under debate by industry groups and the 
agencies of the U.S. Government for Building Information Management (BIM) 
software.  (Associated General Contractors of America 2007)  BIM is a full or partial 
integration of the three dimensional or four dimensional project designs with a facility 
management function.25  But with several federal agencies specifying different BIM 
software platform, and with each platform requiring substantial contractor 
investments for software licenses and training, at least one contractor trade group has 
expressed the concerns about this new requirement.  (Associated General Contractors 
2007)  The BIM problem grows worse for those contractors who have work with 
multiple federal agencies and must invest in all three software platforms simply to 
maintain relations.  The federal agencies with BIM requirements were approached by 
                                                 
25 Fourth dimension technology (4-D) is an integration of a three dimensional building design with 
time as the fourth dimension.  4-D software allows one to witness the 3-D electronic model of the 




AGC at a recent forum in Washington, DC but seemed reticent to specify a single 
system as they had done several years before for Primavera.  
 It is perhaps the subject of granularity that could provide a solution to many of 
the problems of 2008.  To the extent that the industry might develop a summary level 
means of assessing schedules, either in concert with existing CPMs, or without them 
entirely, this might solve many of these problems.  The extensive detail associated 
with the typical CPM schedule is compounded by the fact that the PDM methodology 
facilitates the use of four separate relationship types, multiple calendars, constraints 
and complex relationship modifiers such as leads and lags.  The PERT methodology, 
which utilized a weekly vice daily bin size, juxtaposed activities and events (i.e. 
Event-Activity-Event-Activity-Event, and on), did not use calendars, constraints, used 
only finish-to-start relationships, did not use lags or offer a series of remote settings 
that modified the mathematical calculation was far more straightforward, at least if 
one limits themselves to the deterministic application of PERT. 
 
 





Also of significance is that within the Polaris approach the elapsed time estimate 
was given in weeks, not days as is the case for most CPM applications.  This point is 
noteworthy.  In light of the fact that the three year duration of the Polaris missile 
program was of the same general order as many of today’s projects and programs and 
had over 10,000 events in the network, why was it that the competent engineers 
responsible for providing the activity time estimates were instructed to give their 
answer in weeks and not days?  Or, why is it that today’s competent engineers use 
‘days’ and not ‘weeks’ for estimating durations on projects of duration?  Did the 
program managers recognize that the variability these estimates, level of detail within 
the flow plan and error in the estimating process all combined to make the week the 
ideal bin size?  Were the activity durations deliberately longer in PERT (i.e. 
expressed in weeks and not days), thereby affording the possibly of this different 
scale, which would support the viability of lower level of granularity?     
7.2 Debates on the Mathematics of PERT 
 
The lack of a coherent and practical probabilistic approach in today’s 
construction industry is lamented by Dr. Glavinich: 
“…the probability associated with the critical path, which is frequently 
claimed as one of PERT’s best features, is seldom more than a misleading, 
incorrect number which should, in most cases, be disregarded.” 
 
        (Glavinich 2004) 
 
This reliance upon a single number is particularly interesting when one considers that 
the assignment of planned durations to individual construction activities is can be 




such as is often the case for most contractor cost estimating routines.  Glavinich 
supports this point before stressing its importance. 
 
“Activity durations are normally estimated in an intuitive and subjective way.  
Estimates are usually given little systematic attention even though activity 
durations are the basis for the construction schedule…The need for accurate 
estimates of activity duration cannot be overemphasized.  The construction 
schedule is only as good as the activity durations that make it up.”   
 
                     (Glavinich 2004) 
 
The probabilistic techniques in PERT were largely set aside by the major federal 
agencies by the mid-1960s.  Polaris’ choice to use a deterministic approach to a 
probabilistic question in the late 1950s was noticed immediately. 
“The usual practice in this situation (as in other linear programming problems 
with random objective functions) is simply to replace each distribution by its 
expected value, thereby obtaining a deterministic problem… 
 
        (Fulkerson 1962) 
 
“Currently emphasis is put on the activities on the ‘critical path’ in the 
network with the activity distributions replaced by their means…in current 
solution methods, the output does not depend on the structure of the activity 
duration distributions but only on their means and variances.”  
 
        (van Slyke 1963) 
 
The implementation of a Monte Carlo solution to the PERT problem was 
provided by Richard van Slyke of the University of California, Berkeley in 1963.  
(van Slyke, 1963)  Rather than converting the PERT problem to a deterministic 




Carlo application which simulated the project multiple times using the actual 
probability distributions. 26   
“in current solution methods, the output does not depend on the structure of 
the activity duration distributions but only on their means and variances.  The 
Monte Carlo approach, in order to gain extra accuracy, does depend on the 
shape of the distribution.  On the other hand, the Monte Carlo approach has 
greater flexibility in that any distribution can be used for activity durations – 
beta, normal, triangular, uniform, or discrete in any sort of mix.” 
 
        (van Slyke 1963) 
 
Also debated were the “dummies” or arcs with no work assigned to them but 
necessary to realize a true expression of the relationships between events.  Kelley 
laments the excessive number of dummies necessary within any network. 
 
“It has been observed that by using these rules on ‘real’ projects, the resulting 
number of activities (including dummies) averages 1.7 the number of events.” 
 
        (Kelley 1961) 
 
“If this approach were to be adopted, the resulting project graph would be 
replete with fictitious or dummy activities – anywhere from n to ½(n)(n-1) 
dummies in a project of n activities.  Of course many of these dummies are 
not necessary and could be eliminated.” 
        (Kelley 1961) 
 
7.2.1 Use of the Beta Distribution to Model the Opinions of Competent Engineers 
 
Perhaps the most widely debated aspect of PERT was the decision to use a 
beta distribution to model the probability distribution of the time estimate for an 
individual activity. 
 
“With the flow plan laid out graphically and authenticated as representing the 
work and activities to be performed, elapsed time estimates for each activity 
                                                 
26 van Slyke cites the original PERT article of Operations Research authored by Malcolm at. al. as one 
of his references.  Within his citation he cites a publication year of 1957 instead of 1959.  This is most 




are obtained from competent engineers…these te values are computed from 
data given by engineers responsible for performing the indicated activity…” 
      (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
Although the fundamental theory upon which PERT was based was probabilistic, 
faced with the limitations of computing technology of the time, the Polaris engineers 
would ultimately adopt a methodology that was indeed a hybrid of both probability 
theory and deterministic time estimates for each activity.  Almost immediately after 
its publication, the PERT methodology would be “picked on” for its assignment of a 
beta distribution to the time estimates for each activity, a step that was considered too 
simplistic by many mathematicians of the period, including van Slyke.   
“Since, as will be seen later, only the mean and variance of the distributions 
are use in current calculations methods, the character of the distribution is 
treated somewhat cavalierly.  The distribution is assumed to be a beta 
distribution with standard deviation equal to 1/6 the range.  These are of 
course highly arbitrary assumptions and should not be taken too seriously.” 
        (van Slyke 1963) 
 
In order to examine the validity of this critique it is necessary examine the Polaris 
solution at the stage in the solution where the network flow plan has been constructed 
and three time estimates (i.e. (a) optimistic, (m) likely and (b) pessimistic) have been 
elicited from “competent engineer(s).”  At this stage of the PERT analysis, the Polaris 
team sought “to translate the engineers’ estimates into measures descriptive of 
expected elapsed time (te) and the uncertainty involved in that expectation, σ(te).”  
(Malcolm et al. 1959)  What Polaris did next is assume a beta distribution around the 
three time estimates.  This allowed the calculation of the mean and variance of the 
distribution using a formulaic approach.  Then, with a mean and a variance for each 




network could be readily calculated through summation.27  Polaris used a tabular 
solution, but this is the equivalent process of what would now be described as the 




               Expected Time (te) for Activity Finish 
 Figure 7-5 Expected Time  
 
While it accomplished a solution to the network for Polaris, this was admittedly an 
approach of convenience.  With the state of computing technology in 1958, urgency 
to achieve a functional submarine launched ballistic missile, such a solution, while 
not precise, was likely “close enough” to be effective for the program.   
                                                 
27 It is significant that if one focuses exclusively on the Polaris team’s treatment of the mean expected 
time (te) for each activity, and ignores the portion of the methodology concerning variability and 
perhaps probability theory altogether, the PERT solution equates to the deterministic network solution 
provided by the Kelley-Walker CPM.  It is for this reason that CPM’s presentation of a time network 




Digging deeper, one sees other issues that go beyond the question of how well 
the beta distribution “fits” the theoretical distribution of the competent engineer.  
Other assumptions, such as the single peak, are perhaps more significant.   
 
“It was postulated that the three estimates could be used to construct a 
probability distribution of the time expected to perform the activity.  It was 
felt that such a distribution would have one peak -–with the most probable 
time estimate, m, being representative of that value…(and with) relatively 
little chance that either the optimistic or pessimistic estimates, a and b, would 
be realized.” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
The single peak theorem is perhaps capable of modeling “routine” activities of great 
granularity.  But what about the example of a construction project on the western 
Pacific island of Guam, where it is routine for the work to be heavily dependent upon 
material deliveries by cargo ship.  If a container ship from the west coast of the 
United States, where the steel is being fabricated, only arrives every other week and 
the steel delivery has an equal probability of being on either ship, would the 
distribution not have two peaks simply due to the ship’s schedule?  It would be 
reasonable to consider this a larger problem than those described by PERT’s 
adversaries in the early 1960s.  This type of consideration is noted by Glavinich: 
“Construction activity durations do not necessarily behave as beta distributions.  
The probability distribution for a particular construction activity will vary based 
on a number of factors.  Due to the one-time nature of construction and all of the 
project-specific variables that can impact the duration of a construction activity, it 
is difficult to predict with certainty what the actual duration distribution should be 
for any construction activity…no one is sure what distribution is the best model 
for construction activities.”   
(Glavinich 2004) 
 
If we are to assume that there is no “best model” for construction activities, perhaps 




for the theoretical probability distribution of the competent engineer, but whether the 
competent engineer’s time estimate can always be expressed with a one-peak 
distribution. To the extent that the Beta distribution has not successfully captured the 
activity’s probability distribution, this is a function of the process of eliciting the 
subjective assessment of the competent human engineer(s) than a deficiency within 
the beta distribution itself.  As of 2008, computing technology allow for a Monte 
Carlo analysis, providing the opportunity to provide individual probability 
distributions for each activity. 
7.2.3 Use of the Normal Distribution to Calculate TE 
 
“Utilizing the central-limit theorem, it may be assumed that the probability 
distribution of time for accomplishing an event can be closely approximated 
with the normal probability density.” 
       (Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
When calculating the probability of “meeting an existent schedule,” the Polaris PERT 
team assumed that it was fair to assume that the distribution resulting from a large 
number of events, some 10,000 in the case of Polaris, would be a normal.  With this 
normal distribution, Polaris engineers would then assess the probability of meeting a 
calendar date certain (T0S).  Figure 7-6 illustrates this model, where T0E is the 
“expected” completion date, or week, produced by the network flow plan and T0S is 
the proposed calendar date certain. 






Figure 7-6 “Estimate of Probability of Meeting Scheduled Date, TOS” 
(Malcolm et al. 1959) 
 
PERT would be criticized for the assumption of a normal distribution for the purpose 
of evaluating the overall schedule.   
“We should realize, of course, that strictly speaking we should not use normal 
distributions because they do not have finite ranges.” 
       (van Slyke 1963) 
 
The discussion of constraints to the application of the central limit theorem is 
provided by Professor Gregory Baecher of the University of Maryland and John 
Christian. 
“The Central Limit Theorem is not without constraints upon the underlying or 
component distributions.  For example, Kaufman (1963) has shown in the 
context of oil reserve estimation that the sum of lognormal variables does not 
satisfy these conditions and thus the distribution of reserve estimates 
involving logNormally distributed pool volumes is more complex than would 
they be if the Central Limit Theorem applied to them.” 




Kelley seemed adverse to the idea of using probability distributions or elaborate 
mathematical solutions for large projects while also acknowledging that the PERT 
solution is indeed deterministic. 
“although there are neat mathematical formulas for the information sought, 
they are most intractable for any reasonable computation for large projects.”             
 
“(PERT) determines first the expected duration and variance for each 
activity…(then) the critical path is computed deterministically.”   
(Kelley 1964) 
His article “Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling: Mathematical Basis” that 
appeared in the May-June edition of Operations Research provides the results of three 
methods for computing expected duration (TE) for the project.  Kelley provides a 
model where each activity is provided with three time estimates with “odds” assigned 
to each.  In order to describe properly evaluate Kelley’s work, which was provided in 
tabular form, it is helpful to construct a network of his tabular presentation of his six 







Figure 7-7 A Simple Network Based Upon James E. Kelley’s Table 
(Kelley 1964) 
 
Kelley’s article goes on to solve his network using the methodologies of 
PERT, Fulkerson and his own and the “true values” which were known at the time of 
the analysis.  Fulkerson had proposed an alternative methodology based upon 
network flow computations in his article “A Network Flow Computation for Project 
Cost Curves” that appeared in Management Science in 1961.  Kelley’s results show a 
closer approximation of expected duration and a lower variance to the “true values” 
than the Fulkerson or PERT solutions and provide.  His approximation, further, is the 
only pessimistic forecast whereas Fulkerson and PERT express remaining durations 







Table 7-1 Comparison of Results of Three Solution Types 
 
Expected Project Duration 
Method   Months   Variance 
Kelley      9.54       0.500 
True Values     9.49       0.533 
Fulkerson     9.38       0.229 
PERT      8.89       1.157 
 
         (Kelley 1964) 
 
If Kelley’s results are converted to weeks, consistent with the Polaris PERT, it 
is Fulkerson’s approach that is most impressive.  Fulkerson’s analysis now provides 
the closest approximation of the true value (38 weeks vs. 38 weeks) and with an 
exceptionally small variance.  Also noteworthy is the exactness of Kelley’s variance 
now, which computes to a perfectly rounded number (8.00).  It is not clear if Kelley 
first performed the analysis in weeks and then converted the results to months, or if 
this is significant. 
Table 7-2 Comparison of Results of Three Solution Types (Weekly Units) 
 
Expected Project Duration 
Method Months Variance Weeks  Variance 
Kelley     9.54     0.500     39        8.00 
True Values    9.49     0.533     38        8.53 
Fulkerson    9.38     0.229     38        3.66 
PERT     8.89     1.157     36      18.51 
 
  
When one recognizes that the limited computing capabilities of the late 1950s 
were indeed a constraint to practical use of the probability concepts embodied within 
PERT, it is fair to suggest that each of these approaches were rational in light of this 
constraint.  Today, the process of obtaining a composite probability distribution based 




several software platforms, allowing this debate to be largely supplanted by 
technology and other forms of practice. 
7.2.4 Addressing The Proximity and Variability of Non-Critical Paths 
 
An early criticism of PERT was the lack of proper accounting for proximity 
and variability of non-critical network paths.  Van Slyke describes this inherent flaw 
of the PERT methodology (this flaw is also present within modern CPM platforms). 
“One of the more misleading aspects of current PERT solution methods is the 
implication that there is a unique critical path.  In general any of a number of 
paths should be critical, depending on the particular realization of the random 
activity durations that actually occurs. 
        (van Slyke 1963) 
 
With deterministic approaches (i.e. single time estimates for each activity), only the 
most critical path will receive attention, notwithstanding the point that there might be 
far more variability on near “non-critical” paths.   
It is, perhaps, a system that provides the project team with the ability to ask 
and answer six basic questions at each schedule update that might provide a 
reasonable solution: (1) Where is the critical path?; (2) How much uncertainty is 
associated with the activity durations along this path?; (3) What other paths are close 
to the critical path and what is there relative criticality? (i.e. how close are they to the 
critical path); (4) How much uncertainty is associated with these close paths?; (5) 
What jumps could occur and what is the probability of each; and (6) What is the 
effect these jumps on the planned completion date for the overall project schedule? 
Two measures are identified by van Slyke: (1) the measure of “closeness” 
between paths; and (2) “the number of paths that may become critical” are significant.  




length and their correlation.  While these points were described in the original PERT 
article, van Slyke introduces a conceptual solution to this problem: 
“Thus it makes sense to talk about a ‘criticality index,’ which is simply the 
probability that an arc will be on the critical path.   
       (van Slyke 1963) 
van Slyke’s criticality index is absent from contemporaneous management 
approaches, but was simply an expression of the probability of an activity being on 
the critical path.  Noting that “the ramifications and use of this parameter, which is 
not available using current techniques, are developed.”  (van Slyke 1963)  To 
calculate this index, van Slyke described assigning a binomial distribution to an 
individual path and then utilizing a Monte Carlo simulation to determine this solution.   
Is it appropriate to draw holistic conclusions about future schedule 
performance by only considering the path with the smallest value of total float?  This 
approach has been taken in U. S. Government contracting since the deterministic 
solution to the PERT problem was performed in the late 1950s by the Polaris team 
and remains so within the CPM analyses of 2008.  Generally, there is no accounting 
for variability in activity time estimates within most construction contracts of the U. 
S. Government, which, for all practical purposes, considers only deterministic 
approaches when evaluating time impacts and/or CPM schedules. 
7.3 The Adverse Effect of Negative Float 
 
 
Several agencies of the U. S. Government maintain a formal contract requirement 
within their contract documents for the imposition of a “finish constraint” on the last 




“Constraint of Last Activity Milestone:  The Contractor shall include as the 
last activity in the contract schedule, an activity named “End Contract”. (sic)  
The “End Contract” activity shall have a mandatory finish constraint equal to 
the contract completion date.”   
        (USG 2007) 
 
This finish constraint is meant to insure that the contractor’s schedule will never 
extend beyond the specified contract completion date.  Where the contractor is behind 
schedule, for whatever reason, the periodic schedule updates will reflect on-time 
completion but float values on the critical path will have numeric values below zero.   
A recent construction contract solicitation by the U. S. Navy’s Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command for a $10 million design-build project provides the following 
schedule management requirement regarding negative float: 
“… Contract status shall be evaluated on the basis of relative float on the 
critical path at the time of updating with negative relative float indicating the 
contract is behind schedule and positive relative float indicating status ahead 
of schedule.  (Relative float is the current status of an activity in relation to the 
approved schedule completion date.)”   
(USG 2000)   
 
Negative float appears to be considered something of only a slight nuisance within 
these same contracts, which also state that it is still possible to identify the critical 
path in negative float situations.  But what is lost in these situations is that because 
the late start and late finish dates are actually forcibly constrained to fall “behind” the 
early dates, the project team’s ability to continue to produce meaning mathematical 
calculations using their CPM is compromised.  The absence of meaningful “late 
dates” adversely impacts the ability of the contractor to plan, prioritize and optimize 
the execution of future work.  The following example illustrates this phenomenon.  




Now or Today) is March 6, 2008.  The critical path flows through Tasks 1, 2 and 4.  
Task 3 is eleven workdays off the critical path (Total Float = 11d).      
 
 
Figure 7-8 Project Status as of Project Start, 06 MAR 08 
In this example, as of March 24, 2008, the project start milestone has been observed 
effective March 6, 2008.  This was the date that the owner provided the formal Notice 
to Proceed.  Nothing else has happened.  The contractor has not performed any work 
and is not able to record progress on any of the four project tasks.  Where no 
mandatory finish constraint is present, the network may extend freely to the right side 
of the Gantt Chart and depict the new planned completion date of May 12, 2008.  
These points are illustrated by Figure 7-9 which provides the project status as of 






Figure 7-9 Project Status as of 24 MAR 08 without Finish Constraint 
Thus far the project schedule has both identified the critical path and represented that 
the planned completion date has slipped to May 12, 2008 while still providing 
meaningful start and finish dates (both early and late dates) for all activities.  The 
non-critical Task 3 has float and may the early and late dates provide meaningful 
information to the project team.  This picture changes, however, if we are to apply a 










The total float value is now negative and the critical path may still be identified by 
those activities with the lowest value of total float, minus eleven days in this case.  
Task 3, although showing a total float of zero, remains non-critical.  This is a minor 
nuisance and does not inhibit the team’s ability to discern which activities are critical 
(Total Float = -11d) and which are not (Total Float > -11d).  The finish constraint has 
prevented the late finish date of “1040 Project Complete” from moving beyond 25 
APR 08, while the early finish date for this activity shows the late date of May 12, 
2008.  This is also not a significant issue for the critical activities as, by definition, 
they are driving the finish date and therefore the early dates can provide the project 
team with the necessary information for project planning.  The more significant 
problem is that the early and late dates provided for “1001 Task 3”, which is non-
critical by 11 days, are the same.  This situation provides no useful information to 
allow the project team to enjoy the benefits of the eleven days of float that actually 
exists on Task 3.  Where contractors are using the early and late start and finish dates 
to plan their work, the effects of this compromised mathematical calculation have a 
deleterious effect on a contractor’s means and methods.   
It might be also feasible to suggest that the mandatory finish constraint is 
indeed an implicit order to finish on the contract completion date, even where delays 
have occurred and the project is behind schedule.  It is arguable, therefore, that the U. 
S. Government’s finish constraint not only interferes with a contractor’s “means and 
methods” but also constitutes a form of constructive acceleration by the owner.  Were 




for a loss of efficiency, the concept of which is illustrated by the 1978 Guide to 
Contract Modifications, produced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  
Acceleration concerns aside, where late projects are subject to a finish constraint, the 
CPM schedule no longer provides the contractor with the ability to identify specific 
calendar dates for completing non-critical work activities.  While the mandatory 
finish constraint does provide the owner with a measure of protection against an 
unwitting “tacit approval” of a schedule update showing late delivery, it is not 
without adverse effect to the project’s time management platform and a contractor’s 
means and methods.   
 
7.4 Projects, Programs, Humans and the CPM Schedule 
 
Is it possible that a single schedule and cost platform, which has been the 
standard contract deliverable on public and private sector construction projects for 
many years, can adequately reflect the needs and/or requirements of each project 
participant?  Perhaps not.  Expressed in their most primal form, contractor 
organizations have an innate requirement to be paid, as much and as early as possible.  
This revenue pays expenses, repays debt and allows the contractor to enjoy the 
benefits of interest on principle.  Owners meanwhile, have a desire to pay as little as 
possible and as late as possible, at least in most cases.  How is it then that a single 
platform for cost and schedule can be a true reflection of the needs of these two 
parties.  Perhaps the single cost-schedule should be thought of as nothing more than a 
treaty reflecting agreements within the larger tug-of-war over project funds and time.  




“miserly” owner may not be fair.  Perhaps these two caricatures are indeed accurate 
depictions of rational behavior for both parties.  This nuance, however, is not 
recognized in most everyday industry discussions although it surfaces on rare 
exception. 
“One high-level Lockheed executive, on hearing PERT described at a Special 
Projects meeting, banged his fist on the table and reportedly said: ‘No 
management system is going to get me to admit that I am going to miss my 
scheduled delivery dates.  This system is going to listen to some pessimistic 
Lockheed engineer say that Lockheed is likely to miss delivery but not to me.  
I sign the contract; I hire and fire Lockheed engineers.’ ” 
        (Sapolsky 1972) 
 
This is an explosive example of the point that the contractor’s presentation of 
schedule information can indeed be affected by this “play” between the parties. 
The 1738 paper “Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis” by Daniel 
Bernoulli presented the concept of utility theory for perhaps the very first time. The 
paper, whose English translation is “Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement 
of Risk,” expressed Bernoulli’s belief that existing risk theory did not properly 
consider the specific characteristics of the individuals facing risk.  As such, a single 
hypothesis that for “two persons encountering identical risks…the risk anticipated by 
each must be deemed equal in value…(and that)…(n)o characteristic of the persons 
themselves ought to be taken into consideration”  was inappropriate.   (Bernoulli 
1738)  The topic is important in the discussion of time management platforms 
because projects and programs generally require only one schedule be used by the 
contractor, subcontractors, owner and others.  Contemporaneous scheduling software 
allows for the single CPM schedule to be arranged, sorted, filtered and summarized in 




It is within his hypothesis that Bernoulli describes how different individuals 
might place different “values” on certain events due to differing circumstance.  He 
describes, for example, how a poor individual finding a lottery ticket might be more 
inclined to sell that ticket for a sum certain, while a very rich individual placed in the 
same circumstance might be well justified in preferring to play the ticket.  But in 
another example, a wealthy prisoner needing only a small sum of money in order to 
purchase his freedom might place a greater value on that monetary amount than a 
poorer prisoner with no possibility of release or other avenue for spending once free.  
Bernoulli’s thoughts were that while situations such as the latter were rare (i.e. it was 
more often the case that individual’s utility for monetary gain was dependent upon 
one’s wealth), it is necessary to evaluate the circumstances of each instance in every 
case (Bernoulli 1738). 
Bernoulli also addresses how an individual’s attitude toward monetary gain 
might change as one becomes wealthier.  Bernoulli provides that “it is highly 
probable that any increase in wealth, no matter how insignificant, will always result 
in an increase in utility which is inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods 
already possessed.”  In other words, Bernoulli is stating that the “value” one places on 
a single wealth enhancing event, decreases as they get richer.  This is consistent with 
the lottery ticket example.  The concept also explains why a wealthy individual might 
say to their investment manager “Remember this, young man, you don’t have to make 
me rich.  I am rich already!”  (Bernstein 1998)  Bernoulli’s work goes so far as to 
offer a mathematical discussion of his concept, which has become the foundation of 




monetary amount along the horizontal.   Bernoulli selected a log-normal profile to 
model the utility profile of an individual, which provides for a smaller gain to utility 




Figure 7-11 Utility Profile Set Forth By Daniel Bernoulli 
(Bernoulli 1738) 
 
But the validity of Bernoulli’s Utility Theory and model should not be limited 
to discussions pertaining to individuals.  They are both relevant and visible within the 
behavior of organizations both private and public and within discussions concerning 
two or more different individuals.  As is the case for many projects, commonly held 
team goals focus on delivering project scope with the highest levels of quality, “on 




statement about safety, effective communications and points related to administrative 
or procedural matters.   But without commenting on the validity or importance of the 
formal partnering process which when administered by a highly skilled facilitator can 
prove to be effective, common goal statements represent a monolithic treatment of the 
multiple perspectives of the stakeholders.  We might have the same common goals on 
a project, but would it not be reasonable to acknowledge that some of those common 
goals are held for different reasons?  Project team safety goals for example usually 
express something to the effect of a “safety first” approach to operations (the 
conversations might express the desire that no mishaps, injuries or deaths occur, etc.).  
But if one is to step beyond the commonly held notions that the human life is valuable 
and accidents, injuries and death are unwanted to examine the follow-on 
consequences of such events, the picture becomes more complicated.   
In the case of an accidental worker death on the project site in the United 
States in the current day, both contractor and owner will likely grieve for the human 
being and their family in some form or another and this is appropriate.  Also, both 
entities will aggressively investigate how the accident occurred and take appropriate 
corrective measures to minimize the risk of reoccurrence.  The owner, meanwhile, 
might not be immediately concerned about the effect of the accident to the 
contractor’s OSHA rating, the contractor’s ability to obtain other construction work 
which will rely in part on their safety record, or the contractor’s cost of doing 
business.  A contractor, however, will care that a lower OSHA rating could adversely 
affect their ability to attract future clients, result in a higher cost of doing business due 




family member, and on.  “Safety First” is but one example of how a seemingly basic 
and commonly held goal of the project team might be held for different reasons and is 
indeed a conversation having multiple dimensions.    
The “On Time” goal is also commonly held but, in its most organic form, for 
different reasons.  Typically, owners want a project on time for the same reason that 
they want the project.  Because it fulfills a basic need of their organization.  And 
while the need is fulfilled by the completion of the project, project timing can have a 
tremendous influence on the owner’s business operations.   
(1) The manufacturer of a computer chip might need their chip facility in time 
to manufacture a child’s video computer game in time for the December 
holiday shopping period.  
  
(2) The Washington Nationals professional baseball team may require their 
new ballpark in time for opening day in April 2008, or face the prospects 
of playing its home games on the road and losing considerable fan based 
revenue.  
 
(3) A new resort in Key West, Florida may need to be open not only to 
generate enough revenue from guests to meet its financial obligations but 
also to meet certain travel windows such as spring break or the post 
holiday travel season.   
 
(4) A levee repair may need to be completed at Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana 
in advance of the start of the Atlantic hurricane season in August 2006. 
   
(5) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration might need a rocket 
launch complex to be fully functional before a small time window of 
opportunity that would allow a single space probe to achieve rendezvous 
with multiple planets as it travels beyond the solar system.   
 
(6) The Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy might need a 
comprehensive dormitory renovation project to complete in early August 
1998 in order accommodate 4,000 Midshipman who are returning from 
summer cruises to start their academic classes. 
 
(7) It might be important to the National Institutes of Health that a promising 
cure for cancer be developed as quickly as possible under contract with a 





(8) The U. S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research might need to see the rapid 
completion of a research project into combating the use of “improvised 
explosive devices” in Iraq. 
 
(9) Ad finitum. 
 
But do the contractors, subcontractors and suppliers, despite what is represented 
publicly, truly place the same import on these events?  The impacts to the owner of 
late project delivery might dwarf the rise to the increased extended general conditions 
of the contractor brought about by late delivery.  And while contractors are indeed 
interested in meeting the delivery goals of their clients, these client objectives are not 
truly “organic” to their own business models. To the extent that the contractor is 
being compensated for additional time on the project, this goal seems artificial.  
Perhaps recognizing this concept, the construction owners place contract clauses into 
the contract which assess “liquidated damages” for late delivery.  These are 
established by the owner within the contract and must reflect the monetary value of 
the owner’s loss of use due to a late delivery, rather than a penal amount.  With 
liquidated damages in place, contractors might wish to be “On Time” for perhaps 
more practical reasons that are “organic” to their organizations.   
Owners rarely produce their own project schedule, relying instead upon the 
CPM produced by the prime contractor for reporting purposes.  But recognizing that a 
general contractor might have made a tactical decision not to fully share its schedule 
information, these schedule may lack the requisite detail to provide the owner with a 
practical means of accurately assessing schedule performance.  Rarely, and most 
often only once a project has already exhibited troubled symptoms, will the owner 




often already in place and the time and effort to necessary to produce an independent 
owner’s schedule is significant.  
“Within Budget” is a commonly held goal which, in its organic form, is held 
for different reasons.  Unlike “On Time,” a goal which can be measured objectively 
using clocks, calendars and even the critical path method, measuring performance 
against a budget can also present a multi-dimensional conversation.  But for a truly 
holistic “open book” arrangement whereby each party will see the other party’s cost 
estimates and accounting records for the project, contractor and owner budgets are 
indeed separate things.  Even on the largest “open book” contracts, such as the multi-
billion dollar “mega-projects” of the U. S. Department of Energy, the parties are 
generally not provided with the opportunity to see any or all records associated the 
government’s estimate or budget.  Under firm-fixed price contracts, the owner is not 
permitted to see the contractor’s cost records but for a limited set of circumstances.  It 
is fair to state that the instances of contractors and owners openly all sharing cost 
estimates and accounting data is rare, even for a mega project.   
The cost of a project to an owner who has executed a firm, fixed price contract 
is in fact, fixed.  It does not, with limited exceptions, decrease over time.  The 
contractor, meanwhile may enjoy the effects of such savings, or losses, where the 
project finishes either early or late.  These basic relationships are illustrated in a 
variation of a “cash curve” from 1957 presented under Figure 7-12.   Note the 
addition of an owner cost “curve” (it is indeed a straight horizontal line) as well as the 




damages.  The student has named this representation a “scorpion curve” due to its 
shape. 
 
  Figure 7-12  Project Cost Curves for Owner And Contractor 
It is reasonable, therefore, to state that the owner budget is indeed different than the 
contractor’s budget, at least for a firm, fixed price contract.  The owner-centric 
definition of “budget” prior to contract award would equate to the estimated cost of 
construction plus an allowance for modifications during the course of the project.  
After award, a second owner’s budget is produced consisting of the contract award 
amount plus an allowance for contract modifications.  Contractor budgets, 
meanwhile, account for their estimated cost of work plus an allowance for uncertainty 
and profits under what is generally described as “contractor contingency.”  Under the 
firm fixed price scenario, once award and contract amount have been established, the 
contractor is motivated to maximize profit by minimizing the cost of the work.  The 
owner, meanwhile, is motivated at least “organically,” to see that no contract 
modifications present themselves, thereby increasing the contract amount and 
Contractor’s Cost of Work Based 
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depleting owner contingency.  The complexities of the “Within Budget” goal is 
compounded when one considers that the “Within Quality” goal may at times have an 
adverse affect on the contractor’s budget (i.e. there may be a strong positive 
correlation between quality and the contractor’s cost of work).  Rarely, if ever, is 
there a distinction made during formal partnering processes that recognize the 









Bernoulli’s model offers a convenient model for modeling these concepts 
which are related to both human and organizational behavior.  Project Managers 
might place a far higher utilitarian value on monetary gains and losses than their 
program manager executive.  This is true for both the owner and the contractor 






if one has sustained a loss, there are several others to buffer the affect.  Project 
Managers have, perhaps, much more at stake in this regard.  Program Managers are 
likely also more focused on future work with the same client and are perhaps 
calloused to short term fluctuations in project performance because they know that 
these might correct themselves as time proceeds.  Also, Project Managers are likely 
younger, less settled professionally and have a shorter resume of noteworthy 
accomplishments, unlike Program Managers who are likely far more secure in their 
profession.  If valid, these points could suggest that the utility profile for a project 
manager might indeed be different than that of the program manager.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 7-13. 
Bernoulli’s model can also model the relationship between owners and 
contractors, say during the negotiation of a contract modification.  It is interesting to 
note the relative scale and different positions along the monetary axis as well as the 
scale of the two parties, despite the same monetary amount of the modification.  This 
is because the “gain” to the contractor is simply the anticipated profit (say 6-7% of 
the total modification), while the cost to the owner is much greater.  
Perhaps one issue that obstructs the project management community from 
developing an appreciation for the multiple perspectives is the owner centric models 
of the project life cycle (i.e. define requirements, project funding, design, procure, 
construct, maintain).  Even publications produced by contractor trade associations do 
little to question this model: 
“A successful project is one that meets the project owner’s needs and 
expectations and is completed on time and within budget.” 
         





The contractor’s project or program life cycle is more business related than this 
conventional treatment allows.  Contractors have long term goals of sustained growth 
of their organization and this is achieved most often through maximizing their 
workload and profit while observing certain constraints such as financial capacity, 
bonding limits and available personnel.  This perspective is not captured within the 
one dimensional “owner-centric” model of the construction industry. 
It is also important to consider the relationship between the prime contractor 
and their subcontractors, who are often great in number and working on other projects 
simultaneously.  Because of this, prime contractors are particularly reticent to provide 
the subcontractors with a significant amount of flexibility, if any, when providing 
them with planned periods of performance.  Because of this tendency, the 
subcontractors often are provided with simple static start and finish dates for their 
work without any information related to float or flexibility.  Free float, a measure of 
the amount of time an activity can be delayed without delaying its immediate 
successor activity would provide the subcontractor with this flexibility and allow the 
project team to enjoy reduced activity duration variability.  Oddly, the construction 
industry often does not use this measure as noted by Glavinich. 
“The calculation and use of free float is also presented because it is reported 
by commercially available scheduling software even though seldom used to 
manage projects in the construction industry.” 
        (Glavinich 2004) 
 
This theoretical approach to modeling stakeholder perspectives could be 
supplement the field of project management, just as the field of behavioral economics 




might come a better understanding of opposite stakeholders thereby reducing the 
occurrence of recent ethical and financial collapses of such organizations as Enron, 
Fannie Mae or Adelphia Cable.  Some goals are commonly held, but for independent 
reasons.  It is, at least to some extent, the knowledge of perspective and the delicate 
balance of multi-dimensional relationships that may offer a profound influence on 
project and program performance.  They at least provide a basis for identifying 
rational behavior.  In his 1967 book I’m OK-You’re OK, the Psychiatrist Dr. Thomas 
A. Harris, M.D. provided a presentation of human behavior described as transactional 
analysis. 
“Transactional Analysis constructs the following classification of the four 
possible life positions held with respect to oneself and others: 
 
1. I’M NOT OK – YOU’RE OK 
2. I’M NOT OK – YOU’RE NOT OKAY 
3. I’M OK – YOU’RE NOT OK 
4. I’M OK – YOU’RE OK” 
(Harris 1967) 
It is perhaps the projects where all parties are able to understand the motivations of 
their business partners to facilitate an “OK” status (contractor making a profit, owner 
receiving its project on time, on budget, within quality, no one is injured or killed) 
that projects will enjoy the greatest possibility of success.  
 
7.5 History as Rationale for a “New” Approach to Time Management 
 The historical discussions within this research serve two purposes, the first 
specific and discrete, the second more general in context.  Both flow from a deliberate 
effort within the research to demonstrate not only that sophisticated management 




misrepresentation or manipulation, but that some first principles have been lost and 
the platforms might not fully integrated other platforms.   
The student’s discussion of the 1959 presentation of PERT by Malcolm et al. 
demonstrated the first purposeful and specific use of history.  These discussions were 
provided with the hopes of determining if the original principles of PERT could 
enhance contemporaneous industry discussions that have become somewhat 
convoluted, to the extent they are even occurring.  The review of Malcolm’s article 
was also an attempt to re-introduce the first principles of network scheduling to see if 
they might offer solutions.  The student believes these discussions provided, at least 
in part, the rationale for a network based scheduling platform embodying these first 
principles.  PERT’s simple (if not organic) finish-to-start relationships, its repetitive 
juxtaposition of events and activities, its use of identifiable and measurable events, its 
attempt to seek time estimates from many separate experts, its deliberate attempts to 
remove bias (“built-in” schedule knowledge) by eliciting three time estimates, are all 
things that seem to have been lost with the passage of time, already fifty years.   
The discussions of the history of the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria 
and Earned Value Management System were important for the same reasons.  Like 
PERT, the Earned Value platform has also evolved since its development within the 
Minuteman Missile program of the 1960s.  The historical discussions here were 
important as they provided two explanations as to how EVMS became vulnerable to 
manipulation and/or obfuscation.  The first explanation was the private industry re-
write of the C/SCSC in the mid to late 1990s, after which C/SCSC became known as 




intuitive for the entry level project manager or senior executive, provided greater 
latitude to the contractor who could now take measurements at larger levels of detail 
within the WBS or cost loaded CPM.  Upon study of these changes during the course 
of this research, concerns over “substitute value,” “detachable value,” and other 
manipulations have, in the student’s opinion, weakened the overall integrity of the 
EVMS platform.   
The second explanation is that while EVMS has evolved, so has the 
Government’s methodology for making progress payments.  The student asked why is 
it that if major procurement projects of the U. S. Government utilize a cost loaded 
CPM schedule, one does not have “early” and “late” metrics for EVMS?  Perhaps it is 
because that while EVMS has been used for forty some years, the U. S. 
Government’s use of cost loaded CPM schedules is a more recent development 
which, for some federal agencies, may only date back ten or fifteen.  These points, 
which support the rationale for an alternative project performance measurement 
platform, could have only flowed from a historical review and discussion.  
The student’s more general use of history involved brief discussions of 
management processes and tools (e.g. the efficiency movement, scientific 
management and the Gantt chart), the increased involvement of scientists and 
scientific research during wartime (e.g. World War One, World War Two and the 
Cold War arms race) and some examples of the common notion that history can be 
“forgotten” or ignored (e.g. Grand Central Terminal, Bethesda Naval Hospital and the 
Washington Subway System).  The latter point, which is perhaps the most general 




systems and methodologies.  If we might neglect or forget the most obvious 
characteristics of a project, be it physical beauty, origins, or original requirements, 
what is the likelihood that the less visible management methodologies used during 
their construction will be remembered?  And where the source of these methodologies 
is no longer immediately apparent because missions have been accomplished, 
memories fade, people move on to other jobs, retire or die, can these situations also 
provide others an opportunity to champion old advances as their own new inventions?  
Furthermore, does the advent of new approaches and new technology (e.g. Fondahl’s 
PDM and advances in computing technology) also get in the way of a broader 
understanding of older methods that were successful and might still be successful 
(e.g. the heavily detailed bar chart on the Manhattan project)?  And if humankind 
might be prone or encouraged to embrace new technologies at the expense of older 
methods, does that also not suggest the possibility that there might be sound methods 
that may have simply been lost to the passage of time?   
Also of interest in the historical discussions were the brief mention of the 
involvement of the scientific community and their role in creating destructive 
technology before, during and after World War II.  How does one explain why some 
scientists of the period might have rationalized their participation in such projects as 
those related to the Manhattan Project, or the ICBM, or the German V-2 Rocket (e.g. 
Hahn, Heisenberg, Oppenheimer, Ferme, Von Braun) while others refused to pursue 
or attempted to hide new destructive technologies from others within the scientific 
communities (e.g. Rutherford, Einstein, Meitner).  And to the extent these 




choose to misrepresent or skew financial or schedule measurement records in a 
modern corporate setting?  These are the larger question related to this research. 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
 
Using the student’s definition, the soundest schedule platform provides an 
accurate recording of work to date, progress as of a given point in time and provides a 
reasonable and accurate depiction of the planned approach to remaining work.  To the 
extent the critical path method is used, relationships between individual work 
activities must be expressed as reasonable reflections of the intended approach and 
any contractual requirements.  However, debates over mathematics, artificial 
constraints to the project schedule which interfere with the proper network 
calculation, the diminished involvement of skilled construction personnel in the 
scheduling processes, excessive granularity and proper understandings of the 
obligations, rights and motivations of other stakeholders are perhaps key ingredients 
to what has been described by others as a scheduling “crisis” for CPM scheduling.  
To the extent that these points might be accommodated within an alternative 









The Superpath Methodology 
 
 
“In critical and baffling situations it is always best to recur to first principles and 
simple action.” 
Sir Winston Churchill 
         (Thomas 2007) 
 
8.1       The Concept and Appearance of Superpath 
 
 
Figure 8-1 A Superpath Network of 16 Events and Super-Arrows 
Superpath represents a methodology for constructing a network of easily 
distinguishable events and summary level “representations” of tasks for a project or 
program of any size or in any industry by any individual, group or team.  Perhaps the 
single most important requirement for conducting the Superpath review is to be 
physically present on-site in order to make visual confirmation of project status.  Also 
important are a basic understanding of the project’s purpose, its major and definable 
features of work and/or performance requirements.  A required contract completion 




discretion of the evaluator(s), but the consideration here is that if the required 
completion date is known it may introduce a bias to, or “anchor,” the expert opinions. 
The Superpath platform is a simple network that is constructed by first identifying 
the principal events of the endeavor (circles) and then applying connective arrows 
(“super-arrows”) between each event in such a manner that, at a summary level, the 
event-to-event relationship is captured.  It is acceptable to have more than one super-
arrow between two events, where the modeler wishes to track to separate things, but 
this departs slightly from the overall concept which is to maintain a very large 
granularity.   
As with PERT, the tail and head of each super-arrow is connected to an event, 
time is measured in weeks and only finish-to-start relationships are used.  The super-
arrows are deliberately not titled “tasks” or “activities” as the purpose of the network 
is not to focus on the individual work tasks necessary to achieve an event, but to only 
provide a spatial representation of relationships and proximity of the events.  The 
events, which are expressed as circles, can be of uniform size or may be sized or 
given color pursuant to some attribute such as the monetary value of the event, 
responsible party, area of project, type of work, or other variable.  The super-arrows, 
meanwhile are representative of work, but are deliberately non-specific as to task 
content.  The rationale here is that just as contractor centric CPM “ignored” events, 
Superpath, as an event-centric methodology may “ignore” activities.  Once the 
summary network is constructed, “conventional” PERT-CPM mathematical 
calculations are performed to identify the critical superpath(s) and the total float on 




off the critical path because of the summary level approach, may also be sub-divided 
into “near critical” and “non-critical” which may be defined by the evaluator(s). 
Overall, the summarized detail found within Superpath prevents many of the 
traditional “obfuscations” found in modern CPM schedules that are cultured through 
excessive granularity (complex, preferential or soft logic, multiple calendars, lags and 
software settings) and even allows the project team to ignore the paths completely 
and visualize the events as stars in the night sky.  This last visualization is congruent 
with the “event centric” owner’s perspective that has been lacking in CPM and PDM 
methodologies for some time.  Figure 8-2 introduces this graphical approach which is 





Figure 8-2 The Transition to Superpath’s “Stargaze” or “Night” View  
This methodology can be performed using either deterministic or probabilistic 
treatments of the super-arrow durations and the resulting Superpath network may be 
compared to identical events within the contractor’s CPM, or simply evaluated 
independently.  The contributions of this approach include: (1) intuitive summary 




proximity of non-critical paths by virtue of the fact that there will be fewer paths 
within the network with greater separation; (3) providing the owner with the ability to 
independently assess progress without the contractor’s CPM; (4) allow the contractor 
to not be forced into preparing schedule information purely for the purposes of the 
owner’s needs, which is not uncommon; and (5) avoid the obfuscating effects of CPM 
software within excessively detailed schedules. 
Upon performing conventional mathematical calculations found within the 
CPM methodology (i.e. the “forward pass” and the “backward pass”), an intuitive 




 Figure 8-3 The “Night View” of “Early” and “Late” Events 
 
Where the event maintains its circular appearance, those events are on the critical 
superpath, which because an imaginary path can be drawn through the circles, does 
not have to be drawn, but for the case where there are Superpaths that are close in 






 Figure 8-4 The “Day View” of “Early” and “Late” Events 
 
 
8.2 The Rationale for Superpath 
 
 Superpath has its origin in that there exists a need for a simplified and 
independent methodology for evaluating schedule performance while at the same 
time presenting the information in a much more intuitive fashion that is accessible - - 
both physically and intellectually -- without significant effort, cost, or requiring the 
engagement of a highly experienced CPM professional or the use of a personal 
computer.  Chapter 7 discussed the technical rationale for Superpath but did not 
address the human interface.  The Celestial appearance of Superpath is not 
coincidental but rather a deliberate effort to treat a summary look at a project as an act 
of, while not astronomy, at least something similar to stargazing.  In stargazing one is 
typically able to discern information about the deep reaches of space by focusing on 
distant objects – planets or stars.  One might observe where a planet or star is relative 
to the horizon, or one’s position, where these objects are in relation to another, etc.  
And while it is very difficult to discern any qualitative information about the 




stars themselves without powerful telescopes or images beamed to earth from 
spacecraft, celestial approaches have provided guidance to mankind, both on land and 
on the sea, for many centuries.  
8.3 The Superpath Methodology (Deterministic Solution) 
 The Superpath methodology follows the sequence of steps provided by the 
Polaris PERT program offered in 1959 by Malcolm et al.  But for the fact that 
Superpath interests itself in only a small number of events (the Polaris program’s 
PERT network had over 10,000 events as of late 1958) the process is generally the 
same and is detailed within subsections 8.4.1 to 8.4.9. 
8.3.1 The Flow Plan 
 A set of events must be selected for the project or program and then placed 
into a logic flow plan, just as in the Polaris methodology.  These events must be 
readily identifiable and measurable and represent discrete points in time vice things 
that occur over a longer period.  “Building Enclosed,” “Start of Foundation 
Excavation,” “Stormwater Permit Issued” are all examples of events.  Examples of 
tasks, which are not part of the Superpath model, related to these events might be 
“Install Windows and Doors,”  “Excavate Foundations,” “Review of Permit by State 
of Maryland.”  The distinction between “tasks” and “events,” the latter being 
instantaneous, is an important consideration. 
 Once the events are selected, the super-arrows must be drawn.  These super-
arrows do not represent individual tasks, rather an overall allowance for the one or 




Walker CPM typically did not provide event descriptions at the nodes within an 
Activity-on-Arrow diagram, Superpath does not provide activity descriptions on the 
Super-Arrows.  This is because the super-arrows are only representative of the basic 
spatial relationships between two events and not definitive models of the various 
task(s) that lie between.  Dummy arrows are also used in Superpath, consistent with 
other conventional activity-on-arrow methods.     
8.3.2 Elapsed-Time Estimates 
 Under a deterministic approach, the owner provides individual durations for 
the time along each Super-Arrow (i.e. between each connected Event, with the 
exception of the dummy arrows).  Although this one time estimate seems arbitrary, it 
is indeed consistent with mainstream CPM scheduling which uses single time 
estimate for each activity.  Section 8.4 will present a probabilistic methodology for 
Superpath utilizing three time estimates which will also address the elicitation of 
these time estimates.    
8.3.3 Organization of Data  
 Unlike PERT, which used a tabular approach to the PERT solution, a flow 
plan representation is far more conducive to the remaining steps in the methodology, 
as was demonstrated within chapter three.   
8.3.4 The Analysis 
 With the network constructed graphically a conventional forward and 




events.  These processes were presented in chapter three.  A handwritten network 
suffices for this stage. 
 
8.3.5 Computation of ‘Expected Time’ for Events 
 The early start and early finish dates obtained during the forward pass 
operation is calculated. 
 
8.3.6 Computation of ‘Latest Time’ for Events 
The late start and late finish dates obtained during the backward pass 
operation is calculated. 
 
8.3.7 Computation of ‘Slack’ in the System 
 Total float for each event would have been calculated during the preceding 
“forward” and “backward” passes.   
8.3.8 Identify the ‘Critical Path’ in the Network 
 The critical Superpath is the path with the smallest value of total float.  Where 
the project or program is projected to complete “on time,” this value is zero.  
Although the critical superpath may be drawn with a darker, or bolder line, it may 
also be omitted entirely, as the events that remain circular (i.e. where early and late 







 Figure 8-5 The “Night View” of “Early” and “Late” Events 
 
 
8.3.9 The Display of Information 
 
 Figure 8-6 through 8-8 provide separate “night” views of the Superpath model 


















 Figure 8-8 “Range Gaze” Showing Early and Late Extremes 
 
8.4 The Superpath Methodology (Probabilistic Solution) 
 
 The Superpath network may also be approached probabilistically.  Instead of 
eliciting a single time estimate for each Super-Arrow, separate time estimates for 
each activity (optimistic, likely and pessimistic) are assigned.  In order to maintain a 
non-computerized solution though, the question of how to construct probability 




the final events must be addressed.  James Kelley’s 1961 article “Critical-Path 
Planning and Scheduling: Mathematical Basis” that was described in Chapter 7 
provides a solution to this question.  Herein Kelley provided a model where each 
activity was assigned three time estimates with “odds” assigned to each.  In order to 
describe properly evaluate Kelley’s work, the student constructed a network 




Figure 8-9 A Simple Network Based Upon James E. Kelley’s Tabular Approach 
 
The next two sub-sections will discuss the methodology for identifying probability 
distributions for each Super-Arrow and the alternative concept for evaluating delays 
to the project or program which only focuses on Super-Arrows which are either in 
progress, or about to start.  This latter concept is a substantial departure from existing 




super-arrows within the network, no matter how far into the future they are planned to 
occur.  This methodology finds a practical approach to the complexities of events and 
activities wherein each event might see any of multiple durations.  This probabilistic 
approach, albeit a modest one, addresses what has affected and essentially terminated 
the probabilistic components of the PERT technique.  This complexity is visible 
within the four event network shown in Figure 8-10 which, if each event is limited to 











  Optimistic Point of Occurrence 
 
Likely Point of Occurrence  
 
  Pessimistic Point of Occurrence 
 
Figure 8-10 Conceptual Illustration of a simplified PERT Network 
 
 
8.4.1 The Elicitation of Time Estimates for Each Super-Arrow 
 
A phased process for the elicitation of expert opinion in judgmental 
probabilities is provided by Baecher and Christian.  
1. Motivating Phase 
2. Training Phase 
3. Structuring (deterministic) Phase 




5. Documenting Phase   
 
The first two phases of this process: 
“intend…to develop rapport with the experts and to explain why and how 
judgmental probabilities will be elicited and how the results will be 
used…(and also) has the purpose of making the experts aware of the processes 
and aids people typically use in quantifying judgmental uncertainties and how 
well calibrated judgmental probabilities are with respect to observed 
frequencies of assessed events in the world.  The goal of this training is to 
encourage the experts to think critically about how they quantify judgment 
and to avoid the common biases encountered in quantifying judgmental 
probability.” 
      (Baecher and Christian 2003) 
 
These are relevant considerations not only within the discussions of the elicitation of 
time estimates for Superpath, but to also accent the oft missing collaborative 
processes within modern CPM scheduling described in chapter seven.  These first two 
phases are appropriate for both Superpath’s deterministic and probabilistic 
approaches.   
Superpath employs Kelley’s use of assigning “odds” to individual completion 
times, rather than relying upon computer based solutions.  Odds making, a science in 
its own right involving far more intricate expressions of method and results within 
such industries as the gaming industry, is also simplified in Superpath using a 
timeline and a set of gaming chips to construct a rudimentary representation of the 
expert(s) custom probability distribution.  The chips associated with Kelley’s first 












    
 Figure 8-11 Assignment of Chip Distribution for a Single Super-Arrow 
 
Although deliberately simplified, Superpath does require a formal “interrogation 
process,” either with ones self or with a competent professional for the inter-event 
space (i.e. the Super-Arrow).  Because of the gaming chip approach, it is not 
necessary to limit the individual to assigning the chips to only three points in time, 
such as in PERT and most contemporaneous simulation applications.  It is also not 
necessary to limit the resulting distribution to a single peak, as was the case for 
PERT.  It is preferable, rather, to provide no guidance to the individual(s) providing 




have a full understanding of the events at either end of the super-arrow that they are 
studying (and/or whatever other information or discussions are appropriate under the 
phases identified by Baecher et al.).    
Allowing a multi-peaked distribution, or any shape, resulting from the 
distribution of the poker chips by the individual or expert(s) is a fundamental tenet of 
the probabilistic application of Superpath.  Beyond its manual solution, one 
overarching philosophy is that while attempting to closely model both the project and 
human opinion, the execution must neither alter nor influence either.  Although the 
number could vary, thirty chips seemed to be a number large enough to create an 
observable distribution “shape,” yet not so many as to become a nuisance or a time 
consuming endeavor.  The process, while perhaps too simplistic for some -- a thirty 
sample simulation is perhaps far too small by any reasonable mathematical standard – 
is sound, provided the field based application can impart a basic representation of the 
expert’s opinion.  The far greater development within this probabilistic approach is its 
improved accessibility.  The thirty poker chip solution, which may be performed on 
the tailgate of a project site pickup truck, within the cargo hold of a C-117 military 
transport, or on the battlefield is dubbed “dirty thirty” to represent the grittiness and 
simplicity of the field based application.  It may, of course be performed without 
chips using only pencil and paper, or a finger in the dirt.  As such it represents a 
feasible non-computerized solution.   
To the extent a computer is available and desired, the visual display of the 
results of probabilistic Superpath analysis is summarized in Figure 8-12.  In this 




this illustration (optimistic: green, likely: yellow, pessimistic: red).  Note the absence 
of the yellow circle for non-critical events.  This is purely for visual presentation, 
allowing the critical Superpath to be more readily identifiable.  Also of interest is the 
growing range between the events on the superpath as one travels through the 
network. 
 
Figure 8-12 Probabilistic Superpath 
8.4.2  Evaluating Delays to the Overall Project or Program 
 Earlier discussions of meaningful granularity and a “Rolling Wave” approach 
were intended as topics of discussion purely for the justification of Superpath’s 
summary level approach.  But they are also relevant in the conversation related to the 
probabilistic application of Superpath.  If one is to continue to acknowledge the 
notion that there is greater uncertainty with events as one peers into the future -- 
something that is fair to assume and seems readily accepted -- how meaningful is it to 
perform probabilistic evaluations on events that are deep in the future?  Say beyond 
two years, or even six months forward?  If one can accept the notion that probabilistic 




there exists some discrete point into the future, a horizon perhaps, beyond which a 
deterministic method suffices, or might even be more appropriate?   
 “People, even geotechnical engineers, do not enter a situation with a well-
structured, mathematical conception of the probabilities of events pre-formed 
in their minds.  The protocol of assessment must evoke such a structure.  
Current usage call this process, elicitation.  The protocol cannot simply ask a 
subject to use a number for the probability for an event and expect that 
numbers so generated will be consistent, coherent, and well calibrated.” 
       (Baecher and Christian 2003) 
But perhaps unlike the considerations within the classic engineering sciences (e.g. 
geotechnical, structural, mechanical, electrical, etc.), elicitations in support of a 
probabilistic scheduling process must account for the fact that much of the subject 
matter is not only unknown at the time of analyses, its outcome is heavily dependent 
upon the future behavior and decisions of many humans and their organizations. 
Superpath embraces these concerns, adopting a hybrid approach that treats 
short term events probabilistically and long term events deterministically.  This 
hybrid method measures slippages to the overall project end date by assessing the 
probabilities on all ongoing super-arrows at the time of the assessment and then 
applying the probability distribution for the most critical super-arrow to the project’s 









Figure 8-13 Near Term Probabilistic Approach (“Bow Wave” Method) 
 
 
This approach can also be described by the terms Near-Term Probabilistic/Long-
Range Deterministic, Over the Horizon Deterministic and/or various other 
combinations or permutations of these terms.  The student has titled this probabilistic-
deterministic approach “Bow Wave Probability.”   
Philosophically, one of the most important considerations of the probabilistic 
techniques in Superpath are: (1) that the probabilistic solution must maintain the non-
computerized capability as a primary purpose; and (2) that probabilistic schedule 
assessments are of limited value when conducted on events or activities that will not 
occur for an extended period of time.  Where the division between the “near future” 
and “far future” falls is the choice of the “competent engineer(s)” for any given 
project or program, but perhaps the most intuitive method involves performing 





8.5 Superpath’s Relationship to the Critical Path Method 
 
 Superpath and CPM are each network based expressions of project elements 
and their relationships for the same ultimate purpose: to identify the criticality of 
paths through the network in an effort to monitor and manage time.  Since Superpath 
is intended to supplement, but not replace CPM, the platforms might co-exist on a 
single project.  A co-existence can be illustrated by creating a Superpath network and 
overlaying it atop the simplified CPM network used in Chapter 7.  See Figure 8-14.  It 
must be noted, however, that a CPM schedule need not be in place in order to 
implement Superpath.  The Case Study within Chapter 9 will demonstrate the use of 
Superpath without a CPM schedule. 
 But before proceeding with a physical comparison between a Superpath 
network and a CPM network as this section will provide, it is important to note that 
Superpath, in its most basic format, might only be in the mind of the project manager 
who has broken the job down into a relatively small number of events, understands 
the relationships and holds rough approximations of time requirements for the work 
involved.  Once this is established, Superpath is no different than the approach taken 
in the kitchen by a master chef or that of the General Manager of the Washington 
Nationals while planning and executing the move of the Montreal Expos to 
Washington, DC in 2005.28  In committing the Superpath network to a physical 
network, it is important to note that some consider the identification and prioritization 
                                                 
28 The student contacted the offices of the Montreal Expos/Washington Nationals in 2005 to determine 
if they would be interested in having a CPM schedule prepared for them as part of this research.  The 
schedule would have been used to support the move of the franchise from Montreal to the District of 
Columbia within a relatively short period of time.  Despite the numerous tasks and events requiring 
close monitoring by the organization during this period, there was no interest in having a CPM 




of tasks an “ancient notion” and this would explain why not everyone wants or needs 
a CPM style network to understand what is on a critical path.  (Canby 2007)  
 
 
Figure 8-14  Small CPM Schedule Network 
 
To create the CPM-Superpath comparison for this simplified network, one 
would first select a set of events that will be monitored.  This is a process requiring 
the subjective judgment of the evaluator.  In this fictitious, generic comparison to a 
very small CPM network, the evaluator has decided that he is not significantly 
concerned with the transition between the completion of CPM Task 2 and the start of 
CPM Task 4.  See Figure 8-14.   In this particular instance it is because both tasks are 
in fact of a similar nature and are performed by the same subcontractor who intends 
to flow their crews from CPM Task 2 to CPM Task 4.  The start of CPM Task 2, 
however, is an important event and one that the evaluator deems worth monitoring.  
This might be because he is aware of strained conditions in the local marketplace and 
believes that there is a high probability that this trade subcontractor might be late in 




allows him to monitor this concern.  This event becomes “Event 4” in the Superpath 
network.     
With Superpath Event 4 established, the assessor feels comfortable that the 
subcontractor will continue on through the completion of tasks 2 and 4 without a high 
risk of demobilization.  Therefore he elects to place another event at the end of CPM 
Task 4.  This next event is Superpath Event 5.  This assumption, also, is arbitrary also 
relying on the subjective judgment of the evaluator.  But it does seem like a logical 
place to position an event as the project has two possible areas of work prior to 
conclusion (Task 3 and Task 5).  This reasoning illustrates the thought process in 
Superpath.  These same types of considerations are made throughout the network 
resulting in the identification of six Superpath events.  See Figure 8-15. 
 
 
 Figure 8-15 Superpath Events Overlaying a Small CPM Schedule 
 
Ordinarily, the CPM would not be so abbreviated and would have a far greater 
number of activities, so in this case the difference of scale between the detail 
intensive CPM platform and summary Superpath network is not apparent.  With the 
superpath event network and CPM so similar in numbers of events and tasks, the 











conceptual difference between a superpath path and a CPM path -- particularly the 
spacing of the network paths which provides one the opportunity to make general and 
subjective classifications with respect to the criticality of the various paths -- is not 
illustrated.  Also, since the CPM is already “in hand,” the summary example shows 
Superpath events that basically coincide with the starts and finishes of existing CPM 
activities.  This is not always the case and of course would not be possible where a 
CPM is not in place or available to the evaluator.   
With the events in place, connective relationships can be applied to the 
network of events.   This is done by considering the spatial relationships between the 
events and making connections that will allow the evaluator to assign critical, near 
critical and non critical superpaths.  The Chapter 9 case study will demonstrate how 
this is performed, but for these purposes, it is assumed that the basic logic of the CPM 
is congruent with that of the subjective opinions evaluator.  The overlay of the basic 
Superpath network before criticality is considered is provided under Figure 8-16.  
Note the slight shifting of event 5 (to the left and down) which is intended to provide 
a more intuitive graphical display of the Superpath relationships than is possible using 
the CPM bar chart representation.  This is possible because the Superpath diagram is 
















 Figure 8-16 View of Early Event Dates Before Criticality is Considered 
 
A more significant difference between Superpath and CPM is illustrated by 
comparing the space between Superpath Events 4 and 5.  Superpath only has one 
connective link between these two events, while CPM has two activities across this 
same area of the project.  When magnified beyond this rather small generic example, 
the ability to summarily treat a large number of tasks, if not ignore them altogether, 
with a super arrow is a major difference between the two platforms.  Super arrows do 
not represent discrete work, but rather are intended to be summary level expressions 
of the interstitial space between events.  This is an abstraction on the very discrete 
task definitions embodied within CPM networks, and is also a key difference.  This 
point will also be demonstrated in the Chapter 9 case study where Superpath is 
applied to a very large project that today would likely have tens of thousands of CPM 
tasks.  
With the network of events constructed and the connective logic in place, the 
Superpath analysis required identifying “critical,” “near critical” and “non-critical” 
network paths.  Here, one is simply “looking” forward from a particular point in time, 
evaluating the current project status, what events lie in the future, how they relate to 

















one another and which are driving an overall end date or milestone of interest.  In this 
regard, Superpath and CPM are identical in concept.  But in this comparison, the 
subjective judgment of the Superpath assessor will identify whether the event is 
“critical,” “near critical,” or “non-critical.”  In CPM, the calculation is far more 
rigorous and is performed across all activities.  Superpath does not require that a 
formal forward and backward pass exercise be performed.  Presumably the evaluator 
is seasoned enough to identify the critical path without performing these steps, 
particularly once the major events have been identified, spatially arranged and the 
critical path is obvious.  Where this is not the case, the forward and backward passes 
are certainly plausible steps to incorporate into the Superpath solution.  
Returning to the example, assuming it is March 6, 2008 and Event 1 has just 
occurred (“Project Start”), Event 2 becomes the first event of interest in the Superpath 
network.  Event 2 is estimated to complete in 10 workdays, or on March 19, 2008.  
With only one activity in play, the assessor is comfortable enough with the concepts 
of CPM to assign this event a “critical path” status within the Superpath network. A 
“critical” super arrow is assigned between events 1 and 2.  Moving forward in the 
network, the assessor must then evaluate the criticality of the path running through 
events 2-4-5-6 and through events 2-3-6.  Assuming the evaluator identifies super 
arrow durations that are close to those within the CPM, or simply agrees with them, 
the path through events 2-4-5-6 (which CPM quantifies as a 26 day duration) will be 
classified as “critical” and the path through events 2-3-6 (15 days in CPM) will be 
classified as “non-critical” as it is not “near” path 2-4-5-6.  This is again a subjective 




the ability to comfortably make this assignment.  An important point here is that 
while the Superpath evaluator may consider CPM durations in their assessment, a 









 Figure 8-17 View of Early Event Dates With Super Arrows Assigned 
 
Finally, with each event assigned a classification of critical, near critical or 
non-critical, it is possible to assign late positions for each event.  For critical events, 
both early and late positions are identical.  When the paths are later removed in “star 
gaze” view, these events will appear as single dots or circles with no connective line.  
Near Critical and Non Critical path events will have their late events in a different 
position than their early dates.  Where a formal forward and backward pass are not 
performed, either due to a lack of schedule information, or the decision of the 
evaluator to maintain a summary level approach, the “gap” between early and late 
event dates are the same length for each near critical event.  Non-critical path events 
also are assigned the same “gap” length, approximately twice that of the “near 
critical” events.  These event “gaps” are illustrated in the completed Superpath 
Network of Figure 8-18. 
 















Near Critical Path 














 Figure 8-18 View of Early and Late Event Dates With Super Arrows 
 
Now the network can be viewed with the range gaze in Figure 8-19.  Note the two 
event locations for Superpath Event 3 which indicates that it is non-critical.  Events 1, 
2, 4, 5 and 6, meanwhile, are in a single location indicating they are on the critical 










 Figure 8-19 View of Early and Late Event Dates With Super Arrows 
 
A further advantage of the Superpath network is that the spatial relationships between 
events are unchanged, even where no work has been performed on the project but 
there exists a mandatory finish constraint.  The loss of different early and late dates 
for the non-critical Task 3 was described as a problem in Chapter 7 and is repeated 
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within Figure 8-20.  Note that the Superpath model at the bottom of the figure 
remains consistent with its appearance in Figure 8-19 allowing the evaluator to view 







Figure 8-20 Project Status as of 24 MAR 08 with Finish Constraint 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the Superpath methodology, a summary level network of 
events where basic relationships between events are expressed using connective logic.  
Once constructed, subjective classifications of criticality are assigned to each network 
super arrow or network path allowing a Superpath evaluator to be provided with at 
least a conceptual interpretation of what is driving the project completion date.  The 
platform may be considered deterministically and/or probabilistically.  It can be 
maintained separately from a highly detailed CPM schedule, or be integrated into that 












events.  The degree to which this integration exists at the discretion of the Superpath 
evaluator.  Since Superpath may exist without a CPM, it is fair to consider it as a time 





                                                          CHAPTER 9 
Case Study 
 
 Figure 9-1 Photograph of Hoover Dam, Power House and Tunnel Outlets 
        (Adams Unknown) 
9.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter describes the application of the concepts of Superpath to the 
Hoover Dam construction project built on the Colorado River between the states of 
Arizona and Nevada during the 1930s.  This project represented the largest dam, 
public project and government contract in the history of the United States at the time 
of the award on March 20, 1931.  This case study demonstrates the overall concept of 
how even the largest and most complex projects can be reduced into a manageable 
network of events and either deterministic or short-term probabilistic approaches 




9.2 Pre-Construction History 
Hoover Dam was authorized by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by 
President Calvin Coolidge on December 21, 1928 under The Boulder Canyon Project 
Act.  Hoover Dam was to serve “four major purposes…flood control, water storage, 
silt control and generation of electrical energy.” (U. S. Department of the Interior 
1976)  The project had been influenced by the loss of farmland in the 1905 flood of 
the Imperial Valley which had been induced, at least in part, by man’s attempts to 
utilize the Colorado River as means of irrigation for “reclaimed” farmland.  The 1905 
flood, which breached the valley’s headgate, would create the Salton Sea out of the 
Salton Sync, a body of water that remains in place as of 2008.  (U. S. Department of 
the Interior 1955)  It is possible to argue that Hoover Dam served a fifth purpose 
which was political.  The Hoover Dam project was publicized by both Presidents 
Hoover and Roosevelt and during the great depression gave hope to millions of 
Americans.  (Kramer et al. 2002) 
The naming of the Dam was also influenced by political forces.  At the 
groundbreaking ceremony President Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior made the 
surprise announcement that the Dam would be named “Hoover Dam.”  (Kramer et al. 
2002)  Later, President Roosevelt’s administration would rename the dam “Boulder 
Dam,” a name that remained in place until 1946 when the U. S. Congress re-
established its name as “Hoover Dam.”  The name has remained unchanged since that 
time.  
The Imperial Valley and the growth of the west, which was constrained by a 




project.  Engineering studies were conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
(BuRec) and by 1918, Arthur Powell Davis, Reclamation Director and Chief 
Engineer, would recommend “control of the Colorado by a dam of unprecedented 
height” in Boulder Canyon.  (U. S. Department of the Interior 1955)   Further studies 
would ensue and it would take four more years for six of the seven states of the 
Colorado basin to agree to a division of the river’s resources and six more before the 
project would be authorized by the U.S. Congress.29  It was not until the aftermath of 
the Great Flood along the Mississippi River in 1927 that the Boulder Canyon bill 
received enough support in the U.S. Congress for passage, in exchange for the 
support of the Mississippi project. (Kramer et al. 2002) 
On January 10, 1931 the BuRec issued drawings and specifications for the 
Hoover Dam project.  Six Companies, a Delaware corporation established on 
February 19, 1931 which represented a joint venture of construction giants that 
included Bechtel, Keyser, Morris-Knudsen and Utah Construction, was the successful 
bidder at $48,890,955.00, well below the only other responsive bids of $53.9-Million 
(Arundel Corporation) and $58.6-Million (Woods Brothers Corporation).  Two non-
responsive bids included those of Edwin A.Smith of Louisville, Kentucky (“$80,000 
less than the lowest bid you get”) and John Bernard Simon Company (“$200 million 
or ‘cost plus 10 percent’ ”).  The Six Companies bid, prepared by Morris-Knudson’s 
Engineer Frank Crowe, was higher than the U.S. Government estimate by only 
                                                 
29 Secretary of the Interior Herbert Hoover appears to have been instrumental in persuading the states 




$24,000.30  (Stephens 1988)  Under the terms of the contract, Six Companies would 
be required to re-direct the Colorado into diversion tunnels within 2-1/2 years and 
complete the dam in seven.  Measuring from the actual Notice to Proceed (April 20, 
1931), these two contractual requirements were October 20, 1933 (Colorado Re-
Direction) and April 20, 1938 (Contract Complete).  
Separate contracts were issued by the Bureau of Reclamation for the dam’s 
plate steel piping (to Babcock & Wilcox in the amount of $11,500,000.00), electrical 
generation equipment (to the Allis-Chalmers Company), materiel, equipment and 
other construction related services.  Under separate agreements, BuRec had the Union 
Pacific Railroad build a spur line from Las Vegas to Boulder City, from which it 
constructed its own rail line to the site of the dam which would see 300 rail cars per 
day at the project’s peak.  Roads and utilities also were run for the project.  The 
electrical supply for the project was run from San Bernadino, California, a distance of 
222 miles. (U. S. Department of the Interior 1976) 
 
 
 Figure 9-2 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Plan View of Hoover Dam 
        (Wikipedia 2008) 
                                                 
30 The Six Companies bid of $48,890,955 consisted of a 25% contractor contingency for profit and an 
estimated total cost was $39,112,764.  (Stevens 1988)  This breakdown was not provided to the 






 The Boulder Canyon Project Act had several requirements, including that the 
dam project would pay for itself through the sale of power, provide a dependable 
water supply for irrigation, industry and domestic uses within the seven state 
Colorado River basin in addition to its other requirement of flood control and silt 
control.  The City of Los Angeles and Southern California were to be the largest 
consumers of the power and water and the act also authorized the construction of the 
All American Canal which would supply the Colorado’s water via aqueduct to 
Southern California.  Before this time, the supply of water to certain sections of 
Southern California from the Colorado River flowed through the nation of Mexico.  
(Stept 1999)  The work related to the All American Canal and electrical transmission 
lines to distant areas were not part of Six Companies’ contract scope.  The major 
features of the Hoover Dam project for which Six Companies was responsible 
included four diversion tunnels, two spillways, four intake towers and tunnels, the 
dam, two power stations and two waterworks buildings.  With the exception of the 
dam, the aforementioned project features are either on the “Nevada side” or 
“Arizona” side of the river in equal number.  Many of these features are visible in 





 Figure 9-3 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Section of Hoover Dam 
      (U. S. Department of the Interior 1976) 
 
9.3 Six Companies’ Mobilization to the Site of Hoover Dam 
 
 Following award and notice to proceed, Six Companies’ first phase of the 
project involved blasting four diversion tunnels in the canyon walls of Black Canyon, 
on either side of the river, so the Colorado River could be re-directed.  With the river 
out of the way, the dam site would be excavated and built upon.  The company set up 
along the river bottom and work began on the project on a 24 hour, 7 day week work 
schedule.  The Six Company workers would be permitted to take two optional days 
off per year, December 25 and July 4, but without pay. (Stept 1999)  As the tunneling 
operations progressed, Six Companies also constructed project support facilities that 
included two concrete plants, machine shops, an air compressor plant, equipment 




water plant, a settling works to reduce the silt content of the river water used for 
construction, a 2,000,000 gallon water tank and Boulder City, and a worker 
community eight miles from the project site. (U.S BuRec 1976) 
9.4 Overview of the Superpath Review on the Hoover Dam Project 
 
 This Superpath review was performed with limited access to project schedule 
information.  This is in keeping with the concept of Superpath which is a summary 
level assessment which can be based upon very limited information (it is not 
uncommon for independent schedule evaluations to be prepared without the 
knowledge of an on-site project team, particularly on very large projects or those with 
multiple stakeholders).  A significant amount of narrative information for Hoover 
Dam has been produced by the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of 
Reclamation and other sources and these were used as the basis for preparing a 
summary level Superpath network for the project.  Since the construction of the dam 
preceded the advent of the critical path method by at least twenty-five years, there 
was no CPM schedule in existence. 
 The flow plan for Hoover Dam consists of the identification and spatial 
arrangement of events for the definable features of work was established.  It consisted 
of 54 events with connective super-arrows and restraints (a.k.a. “dummies”).  It did 
not include the generator installation within the power plants, as those were 
performed under separate contract with the last generator installation occurring as late 
as 1961.  The flow plan depicted the spatial relationships between the major definable 
features of work for the project.  Since one of the most spectacular days on the project 




open (i.e. “last blast”) and the Colorado River was re-directed, the night before this 
date made for an interesting point at which to perform an evaluation. As of November 
12, 1932, the Critical Superpath – in the opinion of the student -- flowed through the 
re-direction of the Colorado, the pumping and excavation of the dam foundation area, 
cleaning of bedrock, placement of the dam and buildings, roads and support 
structures.  This is a reasonable assumption and demonstrates a key point in the 
Superpath method.  With a very basic set of events based upon definable features of 
work and contractor actions, it is hoped that a basic understanding of the time 
between events, coupled with what is hopefully relatively large amounts of float 
(when compared to CPM) support subjective assignments of criticality to each 
superpath.  Where more detailed analysis is desired, detailed forward and backward 
passes using estimated durations are possible and also less arduous than “typical” 
CPM schedules due to the relatively small size of the network.     
The assumption that the critical path runs through the dam seems most 
intuitive, but this must be validated.  In Superpath it is fair to assign criticality to one 
path and then “check it” by reviewing the other paths to see if they might be “as” or 
“more” critical.   In the case of the assumed critical path for the Hoover Dam 
(through the excavation and construction of the dam), the critical path “encounters” 
other paths at two events.  The first event is where the dam has reached minimum 
height and the intake gates are closed, and the second event is where the project is 
complete.  If the other paths that flow into these two events are deemed far enough 
away from the dam path, they are subjectively classified as either “non-critical” or 




In the case of the first event where the intake gates are closed, other paths 
flowing into this event are the completion of the cofferdams and the completion of the 
two Nevada diversion tunnels.  These must be evaluated to determine their proximity 
to the dam path.  Knowing that the river was re-directed on November 13, 1932 and 
the dam reached at minimum height on or before February 1, 1935, this would mean 
that this other work (cofferdams & diversion tunnels) would have 26-1/2 months to 
complete before becoming critical.  Without any other information, it seems 
reasonable to assert that neither the two Cofferdams nor the two Nevada diversion 
tunnels are close to the critical path, but a review of the actual dates of performance 
for this other work also supports this assessment.  Cofferdams were completed on 
April 1, 1933 and the two Nevada diversion tunnels were also completed in the 
Spring of 1933.  (U. S. Department of the Interior 1976)  These two other paths have 
approximately two years of float.  This is perhaps, the quintessential example of 
Superpath.  By maintaining a macroscopic perspective, one is able to achieve large 
“distances” between the paths and make a reasonably reliable subjective assessment. 
The same approach is taken for the second event where the dam path interacts 
with the rest of the network which is at project completion, or the event titled “Roads 
and Buildings, Complete.”  See Figure 9-6.  The work on other paths (intake tunnels, 
intake towers, spillways, power works and needle works) also does not “come close” 
to the assumed critical path that runs from river diversion, down to the bedrock and 
up through the top out of the dam.31  This is because with the exception of the power 
house and needle works, these can each progress from a very early point in time 
                                                 
31 The Six Companies contract did not include installation of the intake tunnel piping and penstocks 




(prior to November 1932) as they are somewhat isolated from the activity at the dam, 
have shorter durations and only tie in to the other work at the very end of the project.  
The powerhouse and needleworks work, meanwhile, must wait until the bedrock is 
exposed and the dam is up to a specific height.  But the Six Companies scope for 
these facilities should have a duration that is shorter than the remaining work on the 
dam, so it is fair to consider work in these two areas as non-critical.  Again, their 
classification as “non-critical” or “near critical” is subjective, but seems reasonable in 
light of the spacing of the paths and what is known as of November 12, 1932.32  
Superpath can be re-done periodically, so the analysis provided in the following 
section provides a reasonable amount of information for this point in time. 
Perhaps the most significant result is that it is possible to detail a very 
complicated project using very few events.  Also, the lack of detail inhibits the ability 
of critical path “jumps,” because there are indeed very few paths, and perhaps more 
separation from the critical one than would be possible within a highly detailed 
schedule.  The methodology used for providing this assessment if detailed within 
section 9.5. 
9.5 Deterministic Superpath Review for the Hoover Dam Construction Project 
  
 Chapter eight described the Superpath methodology, laying out four basic 
steps within the deterministic solution.  These steps are as follows: 
 
                                                 
32 If one assumes that powerhouse and needleworks could not begin until the bedrock was fully 
exposed (occurred in June 1933), a conservative assumption, and these superpaths tied in to the dam 
work at the very end of the Six Companies Project (March 1936), this would have provided thirty-three 
months to perform this work.  Considering that the Six Companies contract was for the buildings only, 
this would appear to be more than enough time to accomplish this work.  Installation of the generators 




 Step 1.  Selection of Superpath Events 
 Step 2.  Expression of Relationships Between Superpath Events 
 Step 3.  Classification of Superpath as Critical, Near Critical or Non-Critical 
 Step 4.  Identification of Early and Late Event Positions 
Together, these four steps represent the deterministic Superpath analysis.  The 
following sub-sections of section 9.5 detail these four steps for Hoover Dam. 
 
9.5.1 Selection of Superpath Events 
 Consideration of the project’s definable features of work allows the evaluator 
to begin to establish a conceptual understanding of the project requirements.  While it 
might be practical to review a project estimate or CPM schedule to identify the 
definable features of work, it is also possible to simply consider the most basic set of 
documents to understand where the project is now and where it is going.  For Hoover 
Dam, that might mean a look at the design drawings which would surely include 
detailed representations of both existing and the final dam design.  Alternatively a 
detailed narrative might also suffice.  For an ongoing project, project records to 
include project reports or a project schedule are also possible sources of information 
when identifying Superpath events.  It is up to the evaluator as to which documents 
are needed.  Those more experienced with the type of project might require less 
information than those who might be unfamiliar or less experienced with the type of 
work.   
 In identifying the Superpath events for Hoover Dam, the student relied upon 




reviews of several reference documents, primarily relying upon those of the  U. S. 
Department of Interior.  Oregon State University Professor Paul L. Kleinsorge 
provides what amounts to a listing of the definable features of work for the project.33   
 
“The major items of the specifications called for the construction of the 
dam…four diversion tunnels (two of which would be used later as spillway 
conduits and two as penstock tunnels), a powerhouse, four intake towers each 
30 feet in diameter, two outlet valve houses located on the canyon walls, two 
overflow spillways each about 650 long and connected to the outer diversion 
tunnels by inclined shafts from 50 to 70 feet in diameter…” 
(Kleinsorge 1941) 
 
The starts and finishes of all of these definable features of work were identified as 
Superpath events.  The student also identified other events which will be summarized 
later on in this sub-section.  Figures 9-4 and 9-5 on the next page provide plan and 
section views of the Hoover Dam design, allowing one to identify the major definable 
features of work for the project.  Overall, the goal of identifying Superpath events is 
not to simply “tag” the start and finish of major work, but to create a small set of 
activities which, together, will provide the evaluator the means to assess the basic 




                                                 
33 Kleinsorge’s work, which was not reviewed by the student until after his Superpath analysis, is 
provided here for purposes of clarity only.  The student relied upon the plan and section views of the 






 Figure 9-4 Section View of Hoover Dam 
  (U. S. Department of the Interior 1976) 
 
 
 Figure 9-5 Plan and Elevation of Hoover Dam  




 Definable features of work are not the only elements of interest when 
identifying Superath events.  Also important are events that are less associated with 
the finished product and more with project sequence (i.e. how the various “project 
pieces go together”).  In order to identify these other types of events, a basic 
understanding of the how the project must be assembled, or “flow,” is necessary.  
One such example on the Hoover Dam project was the requirement for the dam to 
reach a specified minimum height during construction before the intake gates to the 
four diversion tunnels were closed, allowing for the water to begin to collect behind 
the dam.  A second example was the requirement to remove water from between the 
cofferdams prior to excavating down to bedrock in the river bottom.  A third example 
was the requirement for the intake gates to be closed after the dam reached minimum 
height but before the four diversion tunnels could be plugged and converted into 
either penstocks or spillway conduits.  The student identified events titled “Dam at 
Minimum Height”, “Water Removed from Between Cofferdams” and “Intake Gates 
Closed” as events that were responsive to these three important requirements.  Each 
are events describing necessary action by the contractor vice events having definable 
features of work as their basis. 
The four intake tunnels of Hoover Dam were the first major pieces of 
construction work, following mobilization and other work that could be described as 
site set up and support facilities.  Much of this work was performed under separate 
government contracts, particularly that which related to the establishment of roads, 
rails and utilities to the dam site.  The student’s analysis focused on the work within 




Superpath analysis.  Each diversion tunnel was over one mile long and 56 feet in 
diameter.  Each was lined with a three foot thick concrete lining resulting in a 50 foot 
tunnel diameter.  Once these were in place, cofferdams could be placed and the 
Colorado River could be diverted from the site of the future dam.  Once the dam 
reached a minimum height, the intake gates could be closed, and the four diversion 
tunnels could be plugged with concrete at precise locations and converted to their 
final use as either penstocks (in the case of the two inner diversion tunnels) or 
spillway conduits (in the case of the two outer diversion tunnels).  A listing of the 
student’s seventeen Superpath events within the diversion tunnel category is provided 
































Table 9-1 Superpath Events Related to the Diversion Tunnels 
 
 
 Once the diversion tunnels were ready to take the flows of the Colorado River, 
the upper and lower cofferdams could be placed.  These two cofferdams isolated the 
dam site from the river, allowing for the trapped river water to be pumped from the 
future dam site.  Next, excavation could commence and once the bedrock was 
exposed and cleaned, concrete placement could begin.  Once the dam reached a 
specified minimum height, gates at the entrances of the four diversion tunnels could 
be closed and water could begin to collect in the reservoir.   Work would continue on 




buildings.  The student identified two separate event categories for these portions of 
the project.  The first category contained eight Superpath events related to the 
cofferdams.  The second category contained seven Superpath events related to the 
Colorado River, Dam and Reservoir.  Listings of these two event categories are 
provided within tables 9-2 and 9-3. 
 








 The water supply for Hoover Dam’s electrical generation plant and needle 
works was provided through a system of intake towers and tunnels.  Each of the four 
intake towers sit atop the granite bedrock, approximately two hundred feet above the 
floor of the Colorado River prior to construction.  The towers extend upward several 




bottom of the intake towers and the power plant, the intake water runs through steel 
penstocks, first thirty feet in diameter, then thirteen feet in diameter, before arriving at 
either one of the electrical generators in the power plant or the Needle Works.  These 
penstocks were installed within tunnels blasted within the granite bedrock.  The 
student has identified sixteen Superpath events within the category of Intake Tunnels 
and Towers.  
  
Table 9-4 Superpath Events for Intake Tunnels and Towers 
 
 
 For protection against overtopping, spillways were designed to carry reservoir 
water around the dam.  There are a total of two spillways, one on each side of the 
reservoir.  The electrical generating stations and needle works are summarized into 
four separate events.  There are a total of eight Superpath events across these areas of 










Table 9-5 Superpath Events for Spillways, Powerhouse and Needle Works 
 
 
In total, there are 56 Superpath events that have been identified for the Hoover Dam 
project.   
 
9.5.2 Expression of Relationships and Criticality of Superpath Events 
 Step 2 (“Expression of Relationships Between Superpath Events”) and Step 3 
(“Classification of super arrows as Critical, Near Critical or Non-Critical”) are 
combined within this subsection for the purposes of brevity.  This sub-section will 
describe the various considerations considered when evaluating the spatial 
relationships between events and their criticality, building upon the basic work 
descriptions provided within the previous sub-section.  Due to the existence of project 
performance information as of November 1932, some 18 months after contract award, 
November 12, 1932 is chosen as the date of the Superpath assessment.   
 Briefly, the choice of November 12, 1932 as the Superpath evaluation date is 
interesting for other reasons.  The date is one day before the “last blasts” in the two 
Arizona diversion tunnels, placement of cofferdams and re-direction of the Colorado 
River.  It is also one week after President Hoover lost the presidential election to 




Department of the Interior and Bureau of Reclamation.  Why is this important?  
Because up until this point in time Six Companies had been able to successfully break 
a worker strike that shuttered all operations on site for one week, fully thwart 
subsequent efforts by the workers to organize, enjoy “the pick of the nation’s labor 
pool” at very little expense during the great depression, operate gasoline powered 
equipment in the diversion tunnels without ventilation and in direct conflict with both 
Arizona and Nevada mining laws34 and exclude minority workers from the project 
while offering relatively low wages overall.  (Stept 1999)  Would the incoming 
Roosevelt administration react differently to worker issues on site?  And if so, would 
this have an effect on the project schedule?  As of this point the project was eleven 
months ahead of schedule.35  Would the new administration influence Six 
Companies’ performance on the project?  These are questions that presumably would 
have been on the mind of Six Companies’ General Superintendant Frank Crowe and 
could be factored into the Superpath review if desired.   
 The Hoover Dam Superpath network is provided under Figure 9-6, reflecting 
a data date (i.e. “today date”) of November 12, 1932.  As of this point in time, two of 
the four diversion tunnels are within one day being completed and are ready to 
assume the flow of the Colorado.  The two other diversion tunnels (on the Nevada 
side) are further behind, but they will not be necessary for at least six more months 
when the river begins to swell due to the mountain snow melt.36  Preparatory work 
                                                 
34 Six Companies successfully argued that the project site was under federal jurisdiction and was not 
privy to these state laws. 
35 The Six Companies contract required that it divert the Colorado River no later than October 20, 
1933.  It would re-direct the river on November 13, 1932.   
36 The Colorado River receives three fourths of its flows between the months of April and June.  (U. S. 




related to the cofferdams is also complete, consisting of placing a railroad bridge at 
the upper cofferdam and equipment at the lower cofferdam for rock placement once 
the two Arizona diversion tunnels are blasted open.  Initial work has also begun in 
advancement of the construction of the four intake towers and tunnels and spillways.   
 
 
 Figure 9-6 Superpath Network for Hoover Dam as of November 12, 1932 
 
 It is necessary to describe the spatial relationships or paths between the events 
and their criticality.  One significant path flows through the “last blast” events in the 
two Arizona Diversion Tunnels after which they are complete, the Phase 1 cofferdam 
operations (i.e. temporary cofferdams), The re-direction of the Colorado River, the 




the bedrock is fully exposed, the cleaning and preparation of the bedrock for the dam, 
the placement of concrete and then on through the construction of the dam and 
completion of roads and buildings.  There are a total of thirteen events along this 
path.  The placement of the super arrows were based upon the student’s general 
understanding of the project’s definable features and a feasible approach to the 
sequence of construction.  Although a critical path status is assigned subjectively to 
this set of activities at first, the remaining network is analyzed to determine if this 
classification might change.   
But if we note that the as built records for the project provide that the intake 
gates were not closed until February 1, 1935, we know that it was roughly 26-1/2 
months between the redirection of the river and the closure of the gates.  This requires 
the Superpath evaluator to ask himself if there is any other work on the project 
leading up to the closure of the intake gates that might be pushing this Superpath 
event.  So, in the subjective opinion of the evaluator, there is not and the assignment 
of a critical status to the path through the dam construction is reasonable.  
 Other areas of the network include the installation of the permanent 
cofferdams (i.e. Phase 2 cofferdam work) which must be completed prior to the 
closure of intake gates at the four diversion tunnels.  Since a significant amount of 
work must be performed on the adjacent dam path before these gates are closed, it is 
the subjective opinion of the student that Phase 2 cofferdam work may be classified 
as “non-critical.” It is provided with the “double-dotted” super arrow (see legend in 
upper left corner of figure 9-6) and restraints are employed to connect the finish 




the remaining work on the two Nevada diversion tunnels, while not considered 
critical by the student, are deemed near-critical as one or both may be needed to 
accommodate the flows of the river beginning in April 1933 (it is assumed that they 
will complete well before that point in time).  The events associated with the finish of 
these two activities are also connected to the “Intake Gates Closed” event using 
restraints.     
 Work on the intake tunnels and towers are punctuated with start and finish 
events for each of the four tunnels and the four towers.  It is assumed that Six 
Companies will stagger the starts of each tunnel and tower slightly but the issue of 
which tunnel or tower should go first, is not considered to be a significant issue for 
the evaluator as each tower-tunnel pair flows to the exact same areas (on to diversion 
tunnel plugs and connections and the powerhouse and needleworks).  This point is 
considered minor and should not affect the results of the Superpath analysis.  The 
work associated with plugging the diversion tunnels and plugs is also not considered 
significant relative to the work that must occur on the dam path following the 
achievement of “minimum height.”  However, due to the fact that this work must 
await the closure of the four gates and the project is in the latter stages of 
construction, it is assigned a near critical path status.   
 Work on the two spillways (Arizona Spillway and Nevada Spillway) were 
well away from the site of the dam, located towards the top of the canyon on either 
side of the river bank.  Other than having to connect to the diversion tunnels in the 
latter stages of the project, they may be thought of, summarily anyway and during the 




could start early on in the project, will not take four years to construct and not be 
required to “connect up” with the other diversion tunnels until sometime after 
February 1, 1935, they were assigned a “non-critical” status by the student.    
 Finally, the events associated with the powerhouse and needleworks were 
assigned a near critical status.  The most significant reason why these facilities were 
considered non-critical is because the installation of the electrical generators and 
establishment of a fully functioning power plant was not part of the Six Companies 
scope.37  Six Companies “simply” had to build the power plant and needle works 
facilities and turn over to others.  The project did, however, require that the river be 
re-directed before commencing with this work, so it has been assigned near critical 
path status.  Remembering that the Colorado was re-directed on November 13, 1932 
and the Bureau of Reclamation accepted the project from Six Companies on March 1, 
1936, this seems to be a reasonable assignment.  (U. S. Department of the Interior 
1976) 
 It is noted that two blackened circles appear in the lower right portion of the 
Superpath network provide under figure 9-6.  These are provided to facilitate a better 
organization of the restraints in certain areas and have no impact on the analysis.   
9.5.3 Identification of Early and Late Event Positions 
 
 There are two possible approaches when assigning the single lines, or “gaps” 
between early and late event dates.  The first approach requires assigning durations to 
each super arrow and performing detailed forward and backward pass calculations 
just as in manual CPM applications.  The second method, and the one used in the 
                                                 
37 Allis Chalmers was awarded a separate contract for the electrical generation plant.  This work 




Hoover Dam case study, is to subjectively classify each path into one of three broad 
but uniform categories (critical, near critical, non-critical).  Within these three 
categories there no further definition of criticality.  It is feasible to have more, or less, 
than three categories.  This is also at the discretion of the evaluator.  The legend in the 
upper left hand portion of figure 9-7 illustrates the second approach showing the non-
critical super arrow at approximately twice the length of the near critical super arrow.  









Note that critical Superpath events appear as a single circle, whereas the near critical 
and non-critical events are represented by both early and late event dates with a 
connecting horizontal line.  This presentation, while perhaps less impressive on letter 
size paper, provides the viewer with an immediate representation of what is critical 
and what is not.    
9.6 Probabilistic Superpath Review for the Hoover Dam Construction Project 
 
With the Superpath network for Hoover Dam already in place, it is possible to 
perform a probabilistic assessment.  As was described in Chapter 8, Superpath 
employs a probabilistic assessment for the immediate period (the short term) and then 
treats long term events deterministically.  Once performed, the assessment provides 
the Superpath evaluator with the ability to provide a statement concerning the 
likelihood of project completion by a specific calendar date. 
With the Superpath network in place from the deterministic solution described 
in the preceding section, the probabilistic analysis will also be performed as of 
November 12, 1932, looking forward to the end of the project.  The analysis is made 
along the critical path of the Superpath network which was also identified in the 
preceding section.  This critical path flows through the “last blasts” in the two 
Arizona diversion tunnels, the placement of cofferdams, the re-direction of the river, 
the removal of trapped water, excavations to bedrock, bedrock preparation and dam 







Figure 9-8  Critical Path For Probabilistic Superpath Analysis 
 
Next, the first “event of concern” must be selected along the critical path.  
Here, it is not absolutely necessary to select the first event along the critical path.  
Were this to be the case, the evaluation would be limited to the river re-direction 
operation, something that will likely take less than two days (it actually took one).  
Instead, the first “event of concern” along the critical path is the one titled 
“Excavation Complete, Bedrock Exposed.”  As with other portions of the Superpath 
analysis, this selection relies upon the subjective judgment of the evaluator. 
A review of the project narratives provided by BuRec suggests this is a sound 
selection as it appears that there was possibly some uncertainty about the extent of the 
excavation beneath the river bed at the dam site.  The actual depth of the bedrock 
below the existing river bottom turned out to be approximately 40 feet, with the 
exception of a rather deep gouge, in the middle of the river bed, that extended down 
an additional 100 feet.  (U. S. Department of the Interior 1976)   It is not unreasonable 




of November 12, 1932 and were cause for concern.  Say for example, that the gouge 
in the middle of the river had gone so deep that an entirely different manner of 
excavation would have been required?  Or once the bedrock was fully exposed that 
the bedrock required more preparatory work before concrete placement?  To the 
extent these concerns were legitimate, selecting the Superpath event “Excavation 
Complete, Bedrock Exposed” seemed an appropriate point to separate the short term 
probabilistic assessment.  This event, which separates the short term period from the 




 Figure 9-9 Near Term Probabilistic Evaluation as of November 12, 1932 
Next, one must treat the time between the data date, November 12, 1932 and 
the horizon event probabilistically.  It is not necessary to develop separate time 
estimates for each super arrow if there are indeed more than event one between the 
data date and the horizon event.  Rather, the entire short term period is treated as if it 
had only one super arrow.  The student, who is pretending he is Six Companies 




current conditions on site in this simulation.  A summary look shows him that the two 
Arizona diversion tunnels are essentially complete and the work crews are prepared to 
re-direct the Colorado River on the following day.  
To estimate the time between today and the horizon event (“Excavation 
Complete, Bedrock Exposed”) “Crowe” has several pieces of information to support 
what will be a subjective schedule assessment.  From having worked several similar 
dam projects for the Bureau of Reclamation, he has developed a very keen sense for 
the durations involved.  Although Hoover Dam is much larger than any of his other 
projects, the operations that lie between river re-direction and the exposure of 
bedrock are identical and any differences are purely a matter of scale (i.e. the 
operations will just take longer).  “Crowe” knows productivity rates that can be 
achieved and also has productivity records from his other projects to back up his 
subjective opinions if questioned by Six Companies executives.  In his mind the 
overall duration between river re-direction and the exposure of bedrock should be six 
months.  Interestingly, “Crowe’s” number has not changed from the first rough, 
parametric schedule estimate that he prepared during the pre-award phase and has 
compared favorably to several independent validations by Six Companies personnel.  
In “Crowe’s” mind this number is his “most likely” time estimate.  
Six months from river re-direction on November 13, 1932 would mean that 
the horizon event would be achieved on May 13, 1933, or 26 weeks from now.  The 
weekly bin size is used for the purposes of this analysis.  Again, a subjective 
selection, but one that seems appropriate given the length of period and uncertainties 




and has a desire to express some range on his time estimate.  Even if no significant 
unforeseen conditions are encountered during diversion of the river, excavation and 
preparation of the bedrock, he feels that there is some possibility of finishing earlier 
and also of finishing later than 26 weeks.  Recognizing that Six Companies operations 
are basically at their limits, working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with no days off, 
and have as many people and as much equipment as possible in the dam site at all 
times, he believes it is somewhat unlikely that the work can finish significantly earlier 
than his “most likely” time estimate.  Therefore chooses 25 weeks as the optimistic 
duration for the super arrow.  Conversely, he believes that 28 weeks represents the 
“pessimistic” duration of this upcoming work.  “Crowe” now has a range stretching 
from 25 weeks (optimistic), 26 weeks (most likely) to 28 weeks (pessimistic).  These 
time estimates do not yet take into account unforeseen events related to recent 
geotechnical concerns.  This first scenario is dubbed the “No Complications” 
scenario.  Finally, “Crowe” must distribute his chips across the weekly bins 25, 26, 27 
and 28 weeks, the results of which are displayed in Table 9-6.  He chooses ten chips 
to express his assessment, just enough to reflect his overall intuition. 
 
Table 9-6 Assignment of Chips Under the “No Complications” Scenario 
 
 
 Next, “Crowe” wants to account for the aforementioned uncertainties related 




this is possible.  Instead of treating these issues individually, as he knows there are 
more than two discrete issue areas that could affect the project, he steps to a higher 
level of granularity and identifies two other outcomes: Scenario 2. “Complications” 
and Scenario 3. “More Complications.” 38  In doing so, “Crowe” is trying to express 
his general sense of all the issues that might factor in to the time estimate without 
bogging down.  In this approach, Superpath is allowing “Crowe” to go with his 
subjective assessment if not his “gut” feel.  “Crowe” believes there is a 1-in-3 chance 
of the “No Complications” scenario from occurring and that there is a 2-in-3 chance 
that the project will experience either “Complications” or “More Complications.”  
The relatively low assignment of odds to “No Complications” scenario is based upon 
“Crowe’s” very recent review of credible geotechnical data revealing a deeper silt 
pocket of approximately 140’ depth in the middle of the existing river bed.  But 
although he has just discovered that his excavation might need to be deeper, he has 
not validated this new information enough to “come off” his original estimate.  He 
also believes the pocket might be very narrow or the recent information might not be 
credible.39  For these reasons he has not yet abandoned the “No Complications” 
Scenario.  “Crowe” also treats scenarios two and three deterministically, assigning a 4 
week duration to scenario two (with no range), and a three week duration to scenario 
three (with no range).  Finally he places a 1-in-10 chance of scenario three occurring 
once “complications” of any sort have been realized.  Accounting for these three 
                                                 
38 “Crowe” could just as readily limit his probability assessment to two issues, and the approach would 
remain consistent from this point forward. 
39 It is not known by the student when Frank Crowe and Six Companies became aware of the deep 
pocket of silt in the middle of the existing river that extended 140 feet below river bottom.  For 
purposes of this simulation, it is assumed that this information was not yet known as of November 12, 




scenarios,  Figure 9-10 models “Crowe’s” subjective probability assessments of these 
scenarios.. 
 
Figure 9-10 “Crowe’s” Assignment of Odds to Three Scenarios 
Table 9-7 provides the probability of occurrence for scenarios 2 and 3 along with 
their “most likely” point of occurrence if realized. 
 




Next, “Crowe” will duplicate his basic “No Complications” chip model around three 
points in time (Weeks 26, 30 and 33) in proportions dictated by the probability of 
occurrence for each scenario.  Some iteration is required to identify the total number 
+ 4 Weeks 




of chips necessary to construct these distributions while maintaining proper 
proportions.  For this simulation, the total number of chips required is 150.  Table 9-8 
and Figure 9-11 on the next pages provide the resulting chip distribution in both 































Figure 9-11  “Crowe’s” Expression of Odds Using the Roulette Felt Format 
While it might seem redundant to express the chip distribution found in Table 
9-8 on a gaming felt, the student believes that humans, project managers in the 
Hoover Dam scenario, are indeed able to start their work at the roulette felt and avoid 
the various machinations found within the preceding paragraphs of this section.  
Following this idea, Superpath would allow for the project manager to take a set of 
chips, and with all the issues “on their mind,” both conscious and subconscious, 
assemble a distribution by hand reflecting a subjective quantification of the 
uncertainty.  Such an approach would reflect the very essence of the probabilistic 
solution to Superpath, but either approach might suffice.  It is the opinion of the 
student that a project manager who is familiar with the project and risks, is capable of 




able to identify the critical path without intensive CPM analysis, or any network 
diagram at all. 
Recognizing that the overall goal is to provide some sort of statement of the 
probability of achieving a specific project milestone by a calendar date, the results of 
the probabilistic assessment must be examined.  Using the values for “Cumulative 
Probability” found on the bottom row of Table 9-8, a cumulative probability curve is 
constructed for the period under review.  See Figure 9-12. 
 
 
Figure 9-12 Cumulative Probability Curve for the Short Term Period 
 
Since the time between the “horizon event” and project completion is treated 
deterministically, it is important to consider what time value will be assigned to this 
later work.  Perhaps the most convenient and conservative approach would be to 
simply retain the original planned duration between the horizon event and finish 
milestone from the original as planned schedule.  If one were to simply retain the 
















be 48 months.40  For the Hoover Dam simulation, however, it might also be worth 
considering the better than expected schedule performance through November 12, 
1932 which might suggest that the initial schedule estimates that were used as the 
basis of the contract period were inflated.  If these efficiencies were applied across 
the remaining 48 month contract period, the remaining work would take only 30.4 
months.  Given the relatively large split between these two values, “Crowe” 
extrapolates between these two estimates to identify a 39.2 month duration between 
the horizon event and contract completion.  Table 9-9 provides the cumulative 
probability of the various completion dates under these three scenarios. 
 
Table 9-9 Cumulative Probabilities for Three Long Term Scenarios 
 
 
                                                 
40 The Six Companies contract was for seven years and required the re-direction of the Colorado River 
in 2-1/2 years and follow-on work to be completed in 4-1/2.  Subtracting “Crowe’s” six month 
estimate for work performed during the short term probabilistic assessment period results in a forty-




With this information, it is now possible to make statements concerning the 
probability of on time completion.  One example, using the 30.4 month time estimate 
column, would be reported as follows:  “Based upon a short term probabilistic 
analysis, the probability of Hoover Dam’s completion on or before the week of 
December 30, 1935 is 87.3%.”  These same statements could be made for the other 
entries table. 41  
9.7 Chapter Summary 
 
 Hoover Dam’s summary network analysis presented in this chapter suggests 
that it is possible to represent even the largest and most complex projects in 
meaningful summary form.  An effective summary model can be constructed and 
analyzed either by probabilistic or deterministic approaches for the largest projects.    
 
 
                                                 
41 Hoover Dam was dedicated on September 30, 1935 and accepted by the Bureau of Reclamation on 





Figure 9-13 Arial Photograph of Hoover Dam 













10.1 Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter describes the contributions of this paper to the project and 
program management communities. 
10.2 Contributions 
 The contributions of this research are based upon a limited consideration of 
history and human/corporate behavior observed by the student during his research, 
primarily in the field of engineering and construction.  The contributions result from a 
research about that was as much about treating cost and schedule platforms as 
extensions of the human being, project team and corporate entity (owner or 
contractor) as it was about the subject matter itself.  Consistent with this notion, it 
became appropriate to consider these technical management platforms as forms of 
expression rather than inert electronics.  They became no different than a 
conversation, a letter, an E-Mail or a telegraph.  Project cost and schedule platforms 
may be, therefore, as important as human speech, and perhaps more significant.  
Because where at the most inconvenient level of detail, down deep in these platforms 
where observations are difficult and interpretations subjective and uncertain, someone 
might be saying something they prefer not to divulge in a more conventional manner.  
Sending notice of, or misrepresenting, a project condition for later use during 
litigation or change order negotiation would be the most practical and immediate 




order to pilot the project beyond a point of convenient termination is another, 
particularly on the largest technical programs of the U.S. Government.   
The student’s contributions, therefore, were the result of an approach that 
chose to take “conflict for granted” in order to focus “on the more rational, conscious, 
artful kind of behavior” that he believes will remain part of the repartee of project and 
program management at least for the immediate future, if not forever.  These 
behaviors are not “pathological” expressions that lend themselves to treatment.   
10.2.1 Contribution #1: On The Role of Conflict and Games in Project Management 
 The conceptual application of pre-existing theories of conflict and games set 
forth by Professors Thomas Schelling, John von Neuman and Oskar Morganstern to 
the project and program setting.  The formal acceptance that project management is a 
“game” and conflict is inevitable, to the extent this could be publicly recognized by 
the U.S. Government, private industry, would represent a paradigm shift for some and 
might facilitate greater understanding and performance. 
10.2.2 Contribution #2: The Importance of Project Management Histories 
 The discussion of the original works of Henry Lawrence Gantt, the U.S. Army 
Ordnance Bureau, the U.S. Special Projects Office and the U.S. Bureau of Yards and 
Docks, which are all but absent from the history of operations research and project 
management as of 2008 in the United States.  These original works were relied upon 
in the development of Superpath.  The “discovery” of the BRAC 2005 legislation that 
would result in the renaming of Bethesda and the suggestions to elected officials 




10.2.3 Contribution #3: The Problematic Theory of CPM’s Parallel Development 
 The discussion of how the U.S. Navy’s deterministic solution to the 
probabilistic PERT problem “covered” what would later be claimed by three 
individual members of private industry to be their own intellectual content.  That 
these men, two of whom were senior members of a principle contractor within the 
U.S. Navy’s Polaris program, might have developed a “critical path method” 
independently from the Navy is difficult to reconcile given other historical accounts 
of the period.  This claim has gone unchecked as of 2008.   Instead, the idea that CPM 
and PERT represent two separate concepts has been facilitated by a management 
consulting industry with a vested financial interest in fostering this version of events, 
as much as the personal preferences of these three men.  That Kelly-Walker-Mauchly 
“paced” their announcement of the CPM invention (December 1959) until after 
PERT’s limited declassification (sometime before late 1958) and publication (April 
1959) suggest, regardless of who fathered the network schedule concept, these three 
men were aware of the source of the concepts embodied within CPM.  To have 
published the classified technique prior to the Navy would likely have been an act of 
treason.  This represents a new theory within the history of project management and 
merits further research and, if supportable, presentation to the U.S. Navy. 
10.2.4 Contribution #4:  Describing the Loss of the Activity-Event Juxtaposition 
 The discussion of the significance of the loss of a network model wherein 
long strings of activities, with very few events, make it difficult to obtain object 




personnel who are in a need-to-know the larger picture but are often not privy to 
complete renditions of their prime contractor’s CPM schedule. 
10.2.5 Contribution #5:  The Rationale for an Event-Centric Network 
 The “activity-centric” CPM platforms of 2008 are often prepared in 
excruciating levels of detail with thousands of activities, non-intuitive expressions of 
logic, software settings, and on.  This situation has facilitated dysfunctional and/or 
inaccurate schedule networks that are either unusable or platforms of manipulation.  
While the discussion of the symptoms are not new intellectual material, the proposed  
cure, which is a summary level event-centric network, offers the potential to eliminate 
the concerns over dysfunctional or nefarious CPM platforms.  The event-centric 
network is not intended to replace the CPM, but rather supplement it.  Where 
contractors might have the ability to use the CPM as its own management, rather than 
a multi-party platform or prescriptive owner scheduling requirements, this is a 
substantive contribution.  The event-centric network, meanwhile, provides the owner 
with objective and understandable schedule information without reliance upon the 
contractor, although continued integration remains possible. 
10.2.6 Contribution #6:  Expressions on the Limitations of Earned Value 
 The discussion of earned value focused on the limitations or inherent flaws of 
the methodology.  The introduction of the concepts of “representative value,” 
“deferred value,” “premature value,” “substituted value,” “detachable value” and the 
“costing lag” are believed to represent new concepts that are based upon opportunities 




term that is intended to express the significance of the “Earned Schedule” indicator, 
which in the student’s research, appears to be of a “limited” value.  While it was not 
the intent to introduce even more EVMS terminology, these terms may be reserved to 
discussions of the conceptual limitations of this standard.    
10.2.7 Contribution #7:  The Summarized Event Centric Network 
 The establishment of a meaningful summarized network that has the potential 
for an intuitive interface with the user on a project of any size or complexity is 
perhaps the most visible contribution of this research.  But beyond the appearance of 
the network, is the student’s belief that the model is a more useful model than a 
highly detailed schedule because it is a better representation of an individual’s 
understanding of the project.  This would allow far more individuals, perhaps many 
more, to understand, manage or simply observe time in a very intuitive manner.  
10.2.8 Contribution #8:  The Non-Computerized Solution to Probabilistic Scheduling 
 The adaptation of a roulette felt, gaming chips and the “short term” 
probabilistic approach is significant for at least three reasons. 
(1) Its simplicity makes it more accessible to the experts for each super-event, 
regardless of past experience with or understanding of probability theory. 
(2) The effort is non-computerized. 
(3) The approach, which combines probabilistic treatment of short term events 
with deterministic treatment of long term events, expresses a practical 
treatment of the greater uncertainty associated with far off events while 




The second point suggests that the non-computerized probabilistic approach provides 
a modest supplement to the 1961 non-computerized, deterministic solution of 
Stanford University Professor John W. Fondahl for the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Yards 
and Docks.  It is possible that the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command might 




Where the situational awareness of project and program management bodies 
are positively influenced by any of these presentations, it is hoped that this might be 

























































“THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
 
October 19, 1939 
 
My Dear Professor, 
 
I want to thank you for your recent letter and the most interesting and important 
enclosure.  I found this data of such import that I have convened a board…Please 
accept my sincere thanks. 
 










The 41 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines of the U. S. Fleet, 1967 
 
Number Name Builder
1 SSBN 598 GEORGE WASHINGTON General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
2 SSBN 599 PATRICK HENRY General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
3 SSBN 600 THEODORE ROOSEVELT Mare Island Naval Shipyard
4 SSBN 601 ROBERT E. LEE Newport News
5 SSBN 602 ABRAHAM LINCOLN Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
6 SSBN 608 ETHAN ALLEN General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
7 SSBN 609 SAM HOUSTON Newport News
8 SSBN 610 THOMAS A. EDISON General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
9 SSBN 611 JOHN MARSHALL Newport News
10 SSBN 616 LAFAYETTE General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
11 SSBN 618 THOMAS JEFFERSON Newport News
12 SSBN 619 ANDREW JACKSON Mare Island Naval Shipyard
13 SSBN 620 JOHN ADAMS Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
14 SSBN 617 ALEXANDER HAMILTON General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
15 SSBN 622 JAMES MONROE Newport News
16 SSBN 624 WOODROW WILSON Mare Island Naval Shipyard
17 SSBN 623 NATHAN HALE General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
18 SSBN 625 HENRY CLAY Newport News
19 SSBN 626 DANIEL WEBSTER General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
20 SSBN 629 DANIEL BOONE Mare Island Naval Shipyard
21 SSBN 627 JAMES MADISON Newport News
22 SSBN 636 NATHANAEL GREENE Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
23 SSBN 628 TECUMSEH General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
24 SSBN 630 JOHN C. CALHOUN Newport News
25 SSBN 634 STONEWALL JACKSON Mare Island Naval Shipyard
26 SSBN 631 ULYSSES S. GRANT General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
27 SSBN 632 VON STEUBEN Newport News
28 SSBN 635 SAM RAYBURN Newport News
29 SSBN 633 CASIMIR PULASKI General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
30 SSBN 641 SIMON BOLIVAR Newport News
31 SSBN 642 KAMEHAMEHA Mare Island Naval Shipyard
32 SSBN 640 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
33 SSBN 644 LEWIS AND CLARK Newport News
34 SSBN 643 GEORGE BANCROFT General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
35 SSBN 645 JAMES K. POLK General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
36 SSBN 654 GEORGE C. MARSHALL Newport News
37 SSBN 655 HENRY L. STIMSON General Dynamics (Electric Boat)
38 SSBN 658 MARIANO G. VALLEJO Mare Island Naval Shipyard
39 SSBN 656 GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER Newport News
40 SSBN 657 FRANCIS SCOTT KEY General Dynamics (Electric Boat)










Actual Production Milestones for George Washington Class Submarine 
 
Number Name Laid Down Launched Commissioned
1 SSBN 598 GEORGE WASHINGTON 11/1/1957 6/9/1959 12/30/1959
2 SSBN 599 PATRICK HENRY 5/27/1958 9/22/1959 4/9/1960
3 SSBN 600 THEODORE ROOSEVELT 5/30/1958 10/3/1959 2/13/1961
4 SSBN 601 ROBERT E. LEE 8/25/1958 12/18/1959 9/16/1960
5 SSBN 602 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11/1/1958 5/14/1960 3/11/1961
6 SSBN 608 ETHAN ALLEN 9/14/1959 11/22/1960 8/8/1961
7 SSBN 609 SAM HOUSTON 12/28/1959 2/2/1961 3/6/1962
8 SSBN 610 THOMAS A. EDISON 3/15/1960 6/15/1961 3/10/1962
9 SSBN 611 JOHN MARSHALL 4/4/1960 7/15/1961 5/21/1962
10 SSBN 616 LAFAYETTE 1/17/1961 5/8/1962 4/23/1963
11 SSBN 618 THOMAS JEFFERSON 2/3/1961 2/24/1962 1/4/1963
12 SSBN 619 ANDREW JACKSON 4/26/1961 9/15/1962 7/3/1963
13 SSBN 620 JOHN ADAMS 5/19/1961 1/12/1963 5/12/1964
14 SSBN 617 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 6/29/1961 8/18/1962 6/27/1963
15 SSBN 622 JAMES MONROE 7/31/1961 8/4/1962 12/7/1963
16 SSBN 624 WOODROW WILSON 9/13/1961 2/22/1963 12/27/1963
17 SSBN 623 NATHAN HALE 10/2/1961 1/12/1963 11/23/1963
18 SSBN 625 HENRY CLAY 10/22/1961 11/30/1962 2/20/1964
19 SSBN 626 DANIEL WEBSTER 12/28/1961 4/27/1963 4/9/1964
20 SSBN 629 DANIEL BOONE 2/6/1962 6/22/1963 4/23/1964
21 SSBN 627 JAMES MADISON 3/5/1962 3/15/1963 7/28/1964
22 SSBN 636 NATHANAEL GREENE 5/21/1962 5/12/1964 12/19/1964
23 SSBN 628 TECUMSEH 6/1/1962 6/22/1963 5/29/1964
24 SSBN 630 JOHN C. CALHOUN 6/4/1962 6/22/1963 9/15/1964
25 SSBN 634 STONEWALL JACKSON 7/4/1962 11/30/1963 8/26/1964
26 SSBN 631 ULYSSES S. GRANT 8/18/1962 11/2/1963 7/17/1964
27 SSBN 632 VON STEUBEN 9/4/1962 10/18/1963 9/30/1964
28 SSBN 635 SAM RAYBURN 12/3/1962 12/20/1963 12/2/1964
29 SSBN 633 CASIMIR PULASKI 1/12/1963 2/1/1964 8/14/1964
30 SSBN 641 SIMON BOLIVAR 4/17/1963 8/22/1964 10/29/1965
31 SSBN 642 KAMEHAMEHA 5/2/1963 1/16/1965 12/10/1965
32 SSBN 640 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 5/25/1963 12/5/1964 10/22/1965
33 SSBN 644 LEWIS AND CLARK 7/29/1963 11/21/1964 12/22/1965
34 SSBN 643 GEORGE BANCROFT 8/24/1963 3/20/1965 1/22/1966
35 SSBN 645 JAMES K. POLK 11/23/1963 5/22/1965 4/16/1966
36 SSBN 654 GEORGE C. MARSHALL 3/2/1964 5/21/1965 4/29/1966
37 SSBN 655 HENRY L. STIMSON 4/4/1964 11/13/1965 8/20/1966
38 SSBN 658 MARIANO G. VALLEJO 7/7/1964 10/23/1965 12/16/1966
39 SSBN 656 GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER 8/24/1964 8/14/1965 6/15/1966
40 SSBN 657 FRANCIS SCOTT KEY 12/5/1964 4/23/1966 12/3/1966


































    
 























































ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
 
CPM  Critical Path Method 
 
CS2  Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria 
 
CS2  Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria 
 
C/SCSC Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria  
 
CV  Cost Variance 
 
DOD  Department of Defense (U. S. Government) 
 
EAC  Estimate at Completion 
 
EV  Earned Value 
 
EVMS  Earned Value Management System 
 
MAD  Mutually Assured Destruction 
 
NASA  National Aeronautical and Space Administration (U. S. Government) 
 
PERT  Program Evaluation Research Task (Prior to mid-1958) 
 
PERT  Program Evaluation Review Technique (mid-1958 onwards) 
 
PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge 
 
PMI  Project Management Institute 
 
PV  Planned Value 
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